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Quantum cryptography could well be the first application
of quantum mechanics at the individual quanta level. The
very fast progress in both theory and experiments over the
recent years are reviewed, with emphasis on open questions
and technological issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Electrodynamics was discovered and formalized in the
19th century. The 20th century was then profoundly af-
fected by its applications. A similar adventure is pos-
sibly happening for quantum mechanics, discovered and
formalized during the last century. Indeed, although the
laser and semiconductors are already common, applica-
tions of the most radical predictions of quantum mechan-
ics have been thought of only recently and their full power
remains a fresh gold mine for the physicists and engineers
of the 21st century.
The most peculiar characteristics of quantum mechan-
ics are the existence of indivisible quanta and of entan-
gled systems. Both of these are at the root of Quantum
Cryptography (QC) which could very well be the first
commercial application of quantum physics at the indi-
vidual quantum level. In addition to quantum mechan-
ics, the 20th century has been marked by two other major
scientific revolutions: the theory of information and rel-
ativity. The status of the latter is well recognized. It
is less known that the concept of information, nowadays
measured in bits, and the formalization of probabilities is
quite recent1, although they have a tremendous impact
on our daily life. It is fascinating to realize that QC lies at
the intersection of quantum mechanics and information
theory and that, moreover, the tension between quan-
tum mechanics and relativity – the famous EPR paradox
(Einsteinet al.1935) – is closely connected to the security
of QC. Let us add a further point for the young physicists.
Contrary to laser and semiconductor physics, which are
manifestations of quantum physics at the ensemble level
and can thus be described by semi-classical models, QC,
and even much more quantum computers, require a full
quantum mechanical description (this may offer interest-
ing jobs for physicists well trained in the subtleties of
their science).
This review article has several objectives. First we
present the basic intuition behind QC. Indeed the basic
idea is so beautiful and simple that every physicist and
every student should be given the pleasure to enjoy it.
The general principle is then set in the broader context of
modern cryptology (section II B) and made more precise
(section II C). Chapter III discusses the main technologi-
cal challenges. Then, chapters IV and V present the most
common implementation of QC using weak laser pulses
and photon pairs, respectively. Finally, the important
and difficult problems of eavesdropping and of security
proofs are discussed in chapter VI, where the emphasis is
more on the variety of questions than on technical issues.
We tried to write the different parts of this review in such
1The Russian mathematician A.N. Kolmogorow (1956) is
credited with being the first to have consistently formulated
a mathematical theory of probabilities in the 1940’s.
a way that they can be read independently.
II. A BEAUTIFUL IDEA
The idea of QC was first proposed only in the 1970’s
by Wiesner2 (1983) and by Charles H. Bennett from
IBM and Gilles Brassard fromMontre´al University (1984,
1985)3. However, this idea is so simple that actually ev-
ery first year student since the infancy of quantum me-
chanics could have discovered it! Nevertheless, it is only
nowadays that the matter is mature and information se-
curity important enough, and – interestingly – only nowa-
days that physicists are ready to consider quantum me-
chanics, not only as a strange theory good for paradoxes,
but also as a tool for new engineering. Apparently, infor-
mation theory, classical cryptography, quantum physics
and quantum optics had first to develop into mature sci-
ences. It is certainly not a coincidence that QC and, more
generally, quantum information has been developed by a
community including many computer scientists and more
mathematics oriented young physicists. A broader inter-
est than traditional physics was needed.
A. The intuition
Quantum Physics is well-known for being counter-
intuitive, or even bizarre. We teach students that Quan-
tum Physics establishes a set of negative rules stating
things that cannot be done. For example:
1. Every measurement perturbs the system.
2. One cannot determine simultaneously the position
and the momentum of a particle with arbitrary high
accuracy.
3. One cannot measure the polarization of a photon in
the vertical-horizontal basis and simultaneously in
the diagonal basis.
2Stephen Wiesner, then at Columbia University, was the
first one to propose ideas closely related to QC, already in
the 1970’s. However, his revolutionary paper appeared only a
decade later. Since it is difficult to find, let us mention his ab-
stract: The uncertainty principle imposes restrictions on the
capacity of certain types of communication channels. This pa-
per will show that in compensation for this “quantum noise”,
quantum mechanics allows us novel forms of coding without
analogue in communication channels adequately described by
classical physics.
3Artur Ekert (1991) from Oxford University discovered QC
independently, though from a different perspective (see para-
graph IID3).
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4. One cannot draw pictures of individual quantum
processes.
5. One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state.
This negative viewpoint on Quantum Physics, due to
its contrast to classical physics, has only recently been
turned positive and QC is one of the best illustrations
of this psychological revolution. Actually, one could car-
icature Quantum Information Processing as the science
of turning Quantum conundrums into potentially useful
applications.
Let us illustrate this for QC. One of the basic negative
statement of Quantum Physics reads:
Every measurement perturbs the system (1)
(except if the quantum state is compatible with the mea-
surement). The positive side of this axiom can be seen
when applied to a communication between Alice and
Bob (the conventional names of the sender and receiver,
respectively), provided the communication is quantum.
The latter means that the support of information are
quantum systems, like, for example, individual photons.
Indeed, then axiom (1) applies also to the eavesdroppers,
i.e. to a malicious Eve (the conventional name given to
the adversary in cryptology). Hence, Eve cannot get any
information about the communication without introduc-
ing perturbations which would reveal her presence.
To make this intuition more precise, imagine that Alice
codes information in individual photons which she sends
to Bob. If Bob receives the photons unperturbed, then,
by the basic axiom (1), the photons were not measured.
No measurement implies that Eve did not get any in-
formation about the photons (note that acquiring infor-
mation is synonymous to carrying out measurements).
Consequently, after exchanging the photons, Alice and
Bob can check whether someone “was listening”: they
simply compare a randomly chosen subset of their data
using a public channel. If Bob received the randomly
chosen subset unperturbed then the logic goes as follows:
No perturbation⇒ No measurement
⇒ No eavesdropping (2)
It is as simple as that!
Actually, there are two more points to add. First, in
order to ensure that axiom (1) applies, Alice encodes her
information in non-orthogonal states (we shall illustrate
this in the sections II C and IID). Second, as we have
presented it so far, Alice and Bob could discover any
eavesdropper, but only after they exchanged their mes-
sage. It would of course be much better to ensure the
privacy in advance, and not afterwards! To achieve this,
Alice and Bob complement the above simple idea with a
second idea, again a very simple one, and one which is
entirely classical. Alice and Bob do not use the quantum
channel to transmit information, but only to transmit a
random sequence of bits, i.e. a key. Now, if the key is
unperturbed, then Quantum Physics guarantees that no
one got any information about this key by eavesdropping
(i.e. measuring) the quantum communication channel.
In this case, Alice and Bob can safely use this key to
encode messages. If, on the contrary, the key turns out
to be perturbed, then Alice and Bob simply disregard it;
since the key does not contain any information, they did
not lose any.
Let us make this general idea somewhat more pre-
cise, anticipating section II C. In practice, the individual
quanta used by Alice and Bob, often called qubits (for
quantum bits), are encoded in individual photons. For
example, vertical and horizontal polarization code for bit
value zero and one, respectively. The second basis, can
then be the diagonal one (±45o linear polarization), with
+45o for bit 1 and −45o for bit 0, respectively (see Fig.
1). Alternatively, the circular polarization basis could
be used as second basis. For photons the quantum com-
munication channel can either be free space (see section
IVE) or optical fibers – special fibers or the ones used in
standard telecommunication – (section III B). The com-
munication channel is thus not really quantum. What is
quantum are the information carriers.
But before continuing, we need to see how QC could
fit in the existing cryptosystems. For this purpose the
next section briefly surveys some of the main aspects of
modern cryptology.
B. Classical cryptography
Cryptography is the art of rendering a message un-
intelligible to any unauthorized party. It is part of the
broader field of cryptology, which also includes crypto-
analysis, the art of code breaking (for a historical per-
spective, see Singh 1999). To achieve this goal, an algo-
rithm (also called a cryptosystem or cipher) is used to
combine a message with some additional information –
known as the “key” – and produce a cryptogram. This
technique is known as “encryption”. For a cryptosystem
to be secure, it should be impossible to unlock the cryp-
togram without the key. In practice, this demand is often
softened so that the system is just extremely difficult to
crack. The idea is that the message should remain pro-
tected at least as long as the information it contains is
valuable. Although confidentiality is the traditional ap-
plication of cryptography, it is used nowadays to achieve
broader objectives, such as authentication, digital signa-
tures and non-repudiation (Brassard 1988).
1. Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystems
Cryptosytems come in two main classes – depending on
whether Alice and Bob use the same key. Asymmetrical
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systems involve the use of different keys for encryption
and decryption. They are commonly known as public-key
cryptosystems. Their principle was first proposed in 1976
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, who were then
at Stanford University in the US. The first actual im-
plementation was then developed by Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir,and Leonard Adleman of the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology in 19784. It is known as RSA and is
still widely used. If Bob wants to be able to receive mes-
sages encrypted with a public key cryptosystem, he must
first choose a “private” key, which he keeps secret. Then,
he computes from this private key a “public” key, which
he discloses to any interested party. Alice uses this public
key to encrypt her message. She transmits the encrypted
message to Bob, who decrypts it with the private key.
Public-key cryptosystems are convenient and they have
thus become very popular over the last 20 years. The
security of the internet, for example, is partially based
on such systems. They can be thought of as a mailbox,
where anybody can insert a letter. Only the legitimate
owner can then recover it, by opening it with his private
key.
The security of public key cryptosystems is based on
computational complexity. The idea is to use mathemat-
ical objects called one-way functions. By definition, it
is easy to compute the function f(x) given the variable
x, but difficult to reverse the calculation and compute x
from f(x). In the context of computational complexity,
the word “difficult” means that the time to do a task
grows exponentially with the number of bits in the in-
put, while “easy” means that it grows polynomially. In-
tuitively, it is easy to understand that it only takes a few
seconds to work out 67 × 71, but it takes much longer
to find the prime factors of 4757. However, factoring has
a “trapdoor”, which means that it is easy to do the cal-
culation in the difficult direction provided that you have
some additional information. For example, if you were
told that 67 was one of the prime factors of 4757, the
calculation would be relatively simple. The security of
RSA is actually based on the factorization of large inte-
gers.
In spite of its elegance suffers from a major flaw.
Whether factoring is “difficult” or not could never be
proven. This implies that the existence of a fast algo-
rithm for factorization cannot be ruled out. In addi-
tion, the discovery in 1994 by Peter Shor of a polynomial
algorithm allowing fast factorization of integers with a
quantum computer puts additional doubts on the non-
existence of a polynomial algorithm for classical comput-
4According to the British Government, public key cryptog-
raphy was originally invented at the Government Communica-
tions Headquarters in Cheltenham as early as in 1973. For an
historical account, see for example the book by Simon Singh
(1999).
ers.
Similarly, all public-key cryptosystems rely on un-
proven assumptions for their security, which could them-
selves be weakened or suppressed by theoretical or prac-
tical advances. So far, no one has proved the existence of
any one-way function with a trapdoor. In other words,
the existence of secure asymmetric cryptosystems is not
proven. This casts an intolerable threat on these cryp-
tosystems.
In a society where information and secure communi-
cation is of utmost importance, as in ours, one cannot
tolerate such a threat. Think, for instance, that an
overnight breakthrough in mathematics could make elec-
tronic money instantaneously worthless. To limit such
economical and social risks, there is no possibility but
to turn to symmetrical cryptosystems. QC has a role to
play in such alternative systems.
2. Symmetrical (secret-key) cryptosystems
Symmetrical ciphers require the use of a single key for
both encryption and decryption. These systems can be
thought of as a safe, where the message is locked by Al-
ice with a key. Bob in turns uses a copy of this key to
unlock the safe. The “one-time pad”, first proposed by
Gilbert Vernam of AT&T in 1926, belongs to this cate-
gory. In this scheme, Alice encrypts her message, a string
of bits denoted by the binary number m1, using a ran-
domly generated key k. She simply adds each bit of the
message with the corresponding bit of the key to obtain
the scrambled text (s = m1 ⊕ k, where ⊕ denotes the
binary addition modulo 2 without carry). It is then sent
to Bob, who decrypts the message by subtracting the key
(s⊖k = m1⊕k⊖k = m1). Because the bits of the scram-
bled text are as random as those of the key, they do not
contain any information. This cryptosystem is thus prov-
ably secure in the sense of information theory (Shannon
1949). Actually, this is today the only provably secure
cryptosystem!
Although perfectly secure, the problem with this sys-
tem is that it is essential for Alice and Bob to possess a
common secret key, which must be at least as long as the
message itself. They can only use the key for a single en-
cryption – hence the name “one-time pad”. If they used
the key more than once, Eve could record all of the scram-
bled messages and start to build up a picture of the plain
texts and thus also of the key. (If Eve recorded two differ-
ent messages encrypted with the same key, she could add
the scrambled text to obtain the sum of the plain texts:
s1⊕s2 = m1⊕k⊕m2⊕k = m1⊕m2⊕k⊕k = m1⊕m2,
where we used the fact that ⊕ is commutative.) Fur-
thermore, the key has to be transmitted by some trusted
means, such as a courier, or through a personal meeting
between Alice and Bob. This procedure can be complex
and expensive, and may even amount to a loophole in
the system.
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Because of the problem of distributing long sequences
of key bits, the one-time pad is currently used only for the
most critical applications. The symmetrical cryptosys-
tems in use for routine applications such as e-commerce
employ rather short keys. In the case of the Data En-
cryption Standard (also known as DES, promoted by the
United States’ National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology), a 56 bits key is combined with the plain text
divided in blocks in a rather complicated way, involving
permutations and non-linear functions to produce the ci-
pher text blocks (see Stallings 1999 for a didactic pre-
sentation). Other cryptosystems (e.g. IDEA or AES)
follow similar principles. Like asymmetrical cryptosys-
tems, they offer only computational security. However
for a given key length, symmetrical systems are more se-
cure than their asymmetrical counterparts.
In practical implementations, asymmetrical algorithms
are not so much used for encryption, because of their
slowness, but to distribute session keys for symmetrical
cryptosystems such as DES. Because the security of those
algorithms is not proven (see paragraph II B 1), the secu-
rity of the whole implementation can be compromised. If
they were broken by mathematical advances, QC would
constitute the only way to solve the key distribution
problem.
3. The one-time-pad as “classical teleportation”
The one-time-pad has an interesting characteristic.
Assume that Alice aims at transferring to Bob a faithful
copy of a classical system, without giving any informa-
tion to Eve about this system. For this purpose Alice
and Bob have only access to an insecure classical chan-
nel. This is possible provided they share an arbitrary
long secret key. Indeed, in principle Alice can measure
the state of her classical system with arbitrary high pre-
cision and then use the one-time-pad to securely commu-
nicate this information to Bob who can then, in principle,
reconstruct (a copy of) the classical system. This some-
what artificial use of the one-time-pad has an interesting
quantum relative, (see section II E).
C. The example of the BB84 protocol
1. Principle
The first protocol for QC has been proposed in 1984
by Charles H. Bennett, from IBM New-York, and Gilles
Brassard, from the University of Montreal, hence the
name BB84 under which this protocol is recognized nowa-
days. They published their work in a conference in In-
dia, totally unknown to physicists. This underlines at
once that QC needs the collaboration between different
communities, with different jargons and different habits
and conventions5. The interdisciplinary character of QC
is the probable reason for its relatively slow start, but
it certainly contributes crucially to the vast and fast ex-
pansion over the recent years.
We shall explain the BB84 protocol using the language
of spin 12 , but clearly any 2-level quantum system would
do. The protocol uses 4 quantum states that constitute
2 bases, think of the states up | ↑〉, down | ↓〉, left | ←〉
and right | →〉. The bases are maximally conjugate in
the sense that any pair of vectors, one from each basis,
has the same overlap, e.g. |〈↑ | ←〉|2 = 12 . Convention-
ally, one attributes the binary value 0 to states | ↑〉 and
| →〉 and the value 1 to the other two states, and calls
the states qubits (for quantum bits). In the first step,
Alice sends individual spins to Bob in states chosen at
random among the 4 basic states (in Fig. 1 the spin
states | ↑〉,| ↓〉, | →〉 and | ←〉 are identified with the
polarization states “horizontal”, “verical”, “+45o” and
“-45o”, respectively). How she “chooses at random” is
a delicate problem in practice (see section III D), but in
principle she could use her free will. The individual spins
could be sent all at once, or one after the other (much
more practical); the only restriction being that Alice and
Bob can establish a one-to-one correspondence between
the transmitted and the received spins. Next, Bob mea-
sures the incoming spins in one of the two bases, chosen
at random (using a random number generator indepen-
dent from that of Alice). At this point, whenever they
used the same basis, they get perfectly correlated results.
However, whenever they used different basis, they get
uncorrelated results. Hence, on average, Bob obtains a
string of bits with 25% errors, called the raw key. This er-
ror rate is so large that standard error correction schemes
would fail. But in this protocol, as we shall see, Alice and
Bob know which bits are perfectly correlated (the ones for
which Alice and Bob used the same basis) and which ones
are completely uncorrelated (all the other ones). Hence,
a straightforward error correction scheme is possible: For
each bit Bob announces publicly in which basis he mea-
sured the corresponding qubit (but he does not tell the
result he obtained). Alice then only tells whether or not
the state in which she encoded that qubit is compatible
with the basis announced by Bob. If the state is com-
patible, they keep the bit, if not they disregard it. In
this way about 50% of the bit string is discarded. This
shorter key obtained after bases reconciliation is called
the sifted key6. The fact that Alice and Bob use a public
channel at some stage of their protocol is very common
5For instance, it is amusing to note that physicists must
publish in reputed journals while conference proceedings are
of secondary importance. For computer science, on the con-
trary, the proceedings of the best conferences are considered
as the top, while journals are secondary!
6This terminology has been introduced by Ekert and Hut-
tner in 1994.
5
in crypto-protocols. This channel does not have to be
confidential, but has to be authentic. Hence, any ad-
versary Eve can listen to all the communication on the
public channel, but she can’t modify it. In practice Al-
ice and Bob may use the same transmission channel to
implement both the quantum and the classical channels.
Note that neither Alice nor Bob can decide which key
results from the protocol7. Indeed, it is the conjunction
of both of their random choices which produces the key.
Let us now consider the security of the above ideal
protocol (ideal because so far we did not take into ac-
count unavoidable noise due to technical imperfections).
Assume that some adversary Eve intercepts a qubit prop-
agating from Alice to Bob. This is very easy, but if Bob
does not receive an expected qubit, he will simply inform
Alice to disregard it. Hence, in this way Eve only lowers
the bit rate (possibly down to zero), but she does not
gain any useful information. For real eavesdropping Eve
must send a qubit to Bob. Ideally she would like to send
this qubit in its original state, keeping a copy for herself.
2. No cloning theorem
FollowingWootters and Zurek (1982) it is easy to prove
that perfect copying is impossible in the quantum world
(see also Milonni and Hardies 1982, Dieks 1982, and the
anticipating intuition by Wigner in 1961). Let ψ denote
the original state of the qubit, |b〉 the blank copy8 and
denote |0〉 ∈ HQCM the initial state of Eve’s “quantum
copy machine”, where the Hilbert space HQCM of the
quantum cloning machine is arbitrary. The ideal machine
would produce:
ψ ⊗ |b〉 ⊗ |0〉 → ψ ⊗ ψ ⊗ |fψ〉 (3)
where |fψ〉 denotes the final state of Eve’s machine which
might depend on ψ. Accordingly, using obvious nota-
tions,
| ↑, b, 0〉 → | ↑, ↑, f↑〉 (4)
and | ↓, b, 0〉 → | ↓, ↓, f↓〉. (5)
By linearity of quantum dynamics it follows that
| →, b, 0〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉)⊗ |b, 0〉 (6)
→ 1√
2
(| ↑, ↑, f↑〉+ | ↓, ↓, f↓〉). (7)
7Alice and Bob can however determine the statistics of the
key.
8|b〉 corresponds to the stock of white paper in everyday’s
photocopy machine. We shall assume that exceptionally this
stock is not empty, a purely theoretical assumption, as is well
known.
But the latter state differs from the ideal copy | →,→
, f→〉, whatever the states |fψ〉 are.
Consequently, Eve can’t keep a perfect quantum copy,
because perfect quantum copy machines can’t exist. The
possibility to copy classical information is probably one
of the most characteristic features of information in the
every day sense. The fact that quantum states, nowadays
often called quantum information, can’t be copied is cer-
tainly one of the most specific attributes which make this
new kind of information so different, hence so attractive.
Actually, this “negative rule” has clearly its positive side,
since it prevents Eve from perfect eavesdropping, and
hence makes QC potentially secure.
3. Intercept-resend strategy
We have seen that the eavesdropper needs to send a
qubit to Bob, while keeping a necessarily imperfect copy
for herself. How imperfect the copy has to be, accord-
ing to quantum theory, is a delicate problem that we
shall address in chapter VI. Here, let us develop a sim-
ple eavesdropping strategy, called intercept-resend. This
simple and even practical attack consists in Eve measur-
ing each qubit in one of the two basis, precisely as Bob
does. Then, she resends to Bob another qubit in the
state corresponding to her measurement result. In about
half of the cases Eve will be lucky and choose the basis
compatible with the state prepared by Alice. In these
cases she resends to Bob a qubit in the correct state and
Alice and Bob won’t notice her intervention. However, in
the other 50% cases, Eve unluckily uses the basis incom-
patible with the state prepared by Alice. This necessarily
happens, since Eve has no information on Alice’s random
generator (hence the importance that this generator is
truly random). In these cases the qubits sent out by Eve
are in states with overlap 12 with the correct states. Al-
ice and Bob discover thus her intervention in about half
of these cases, since they get uncorrelated results. Alto-
gether, if Eve uses this intercept-resend strategy, she gets
50% information, while Alice and Bob have about 25%
of errors in their sifted key, i.e. after they eliminated the
cases in which they used incompatible states, there are
still about 25% errors. They can thus easily detect the
presence of Eve. If, however, Eve applies this strategy to
only a fraction of the communication, 10% let’s say, then
the error rate will be only ≈2.5% while Eve’s information
would be ≈5%. The next section explains how Alice and
Bob can counter such attacks.
4. Error correction, privacy amplification and quantum
secret growing
At this point in the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob
share a so-called sifted key. But this key contains errors.
The errors are caused as well by technical imperfections,
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as possibly by Eve’s intervention. Realistic error rates
on the sifted key using today’s technology are of a few
percent. This contrasts strongly with the 10−9 typical in
optical communication. Of course, the few percent errors
will be corrected down to the standard 10−9 during the
(classical) error correction step of the protocol. In order
to avoid confusion, especially among the optical commu-
nication specialists, Beat Perny from Swisscom and Paul
Townsend, then with BT, proposed to name the error
rate on the sifted key QBER, for Quantum Bit Error
Rate, to make it clearly distinct from the BER used in
standard communications.
Such a situation where the legitimate partners share
classical information, with high but not 100% correla-
tion and with possibly some correlation to a third party
is common to all quantum cryptosystems. Actually, it
is also a standard starting point for classical information
based cryptosystems where one assumes that somehow
Alice, Bob and Eve have random variables α, β and ǫ, re-
spectively, with joint probability distribution P (α, β, ǫ).
Consequently, the last step in a QC protocol uses classi-
cal algorithms, first to correct the errors, next to lower
Eve’s information on the final key, a process called pri-
vacy amplification.
The first mention of privacy amplification appears in
Bennett, Brassard and Robert (1988). It was then ex-
tended in collaboration with C. Cre´peau and U. Maurer
from the University of Montreal and the ETH Zu¨rich, re-
spectively (Bennett et al. 1995, see also Bennett et al.
1992a). Interestingly, this work motivated by QC found
applications in standard information-based cryptography
(Maurer 1993, Maurer and Wolf 1999).
Assume that such a joint probability distribution
P (α, β, ǫ) exists. Near the end of this section, we com-
ment on this assumption. Alice and Bob have access only
to the marginal distribution P (α, β). From this and from
the laws of quantum mechanics, they have to deduce con-
straints on the complete scenario P (α, β, ǫ), in particular
they have to bound Eve’s information (see sections VIE
and VIG). Given P (α, β, ǫ), necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a positive secret key rate between Alice and
Bob, S(α, β||ǫ), are not yet known. However, a useful
lower bound is given by the difference between Alice and
Bob’s mutual Shannon information I(α, β) and Eve’s mu-
tual information (Csisza´r and Ko¨rner 1978, and theorem
1 in section VIG):
S(α, β||ǫ) ≥ max{I(α, β) − I(α, ǫ), I(α, β) − I(β, ǫ)}
(8)
Intuitively, this result states that secure key distillation
(Bennett et al. 1992a) is possible whenever Bob has more
information than Eve.
The bound (8) is tight if Alice and Bob are restricted
to one-way communication, but for two-way communica-
tion, secret key agreement might be possible even when
(8) is not satisfied (see next paragraph II C5).
Without discussing any algorithm in detail, let us give
some intuition how Alice and Bob can establish a se-
cret key when condition (8) is satisfied. First, once the
sifted key is obtained (i.e. after the bases have been an-
nounced), Alice and Bob publicly compare a randomly
chosen subset of it. In this way they estimate the error
rate (more generally, they estimate their marginal prob-
ability distribution P (α, β)). These publicly disclosed
bits are then discarded. Next, either condition (8) is not
satisfied and they stop the protocol. Or condition (8)
is satisfied and they use some standard error correction
protocol to get a shorter key without errors.
With the simplest error correction protocol, Alice ran-
domly chooses pairs of bits and announces their XOR
value (i.e. their sum modulo 2). Bob replies either “ac-
cept” if he has the same XOR value for his corresponding
bits, or “reject” if not. In the first case, Alice and Bob
keep the first bit of the pair and eliminate the second one,
while in the second case they eliminate both bits. In re-
ality, more complex and efficient algorithms are used.
After error correction, Alice and Bob have identical
copies of a key, but Eve may still have some information
about it (compatible with condition (8)). Alice and Bob
thus need to lower Eve’s information down to an arbitrar-
ily low value using some privacy amplification protocols.
These classical protocols typically work as follows. Alice
again randomly choses pairs of bits and computes their
XOR value. But, contrary to error correction she does
not announce this XOR value. She only announces which
bits she chose (e.g. bit number 103 and 537). Alice and
Bob then replace the two bits by their XOR value. In
this way they shorten their key while keeping it error
free, but if Eve has only partial information on the two
bits, her information on the XOR value is even lower.
Consider for example that Eve knows only the value of
the first bit, and nothing about the second one. Then
she has no information at all on the XOR value. Also, if
Eve knows the value of both bits with 60% probability,
then the probability that she guesses correctly the value
of the XOR is only of 0.62 + 0.42 = 52%. This process
would have to be repeated several times; more efficient
algorithms use larger blocks (Brassard and Salvail 1993).
The error correction and privacy amplification algo-
rithms sketched above are purely classical algorithms.
This illustrates that QC is a truly interdisciplinary field.
Actually, the above presentation is incomplete. Indeed,
in this presentation, we have assumed that Eve has mea-
sured her probe before Alice and Bob run the error cor-
rection and privacy amplification algorithms, hence that
P (α, β, ǫ) exists. In practice this is a very reasonable
assumption, but, in principle, Eve could wait until the
end of all the protocol, and then optimize her measure-
ments accordingly. Such “delayed choice eavesdropping
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strategies9” are discussed in chapter VI.
It should now be clear that QC does not provide a
complete solution for all cryptographic purposes10. Ac-
tually, quite on the contrary, QC can only be used as
a complement to standard symmetrical cryptosystems.
Accordingly, a more precise name for QC is Quantum
Key Distribution, since this is all QC does. Nevertheless,
we prefer to keep the well known terminology which gives
its title to this review.
Finally, let us emphasize that every key distribution
system must incorporate some authentification scheme:
the two parties must identify themselves. If not, Alice
could actually be communicating directly with Eve! A
straightforward possibility is that Alice and Bob initially
share a short secret. Then QC provides them with a
longer one and, for example, they each keep a small por-
tion for authentification at the next session (Bennett et
al. 1992a). From this perspective, QC is a Quantum
Secret Growing protocol.
5. Advantage distillation
QC has triggered and still triggers research in classical
information theory. The best known example is proba-
bly the development of privacy amplification algorithms
(Bennett et al. 1988 and 1995). This in turn triggered
the development of new cryptosystems based on weak but
classical signals, emitted for instance by satellites (Mau-
rer 1993)11. These new developments required secret key
agreement protocols that can be used even when the con-
dition (8) doesn’t apply. Such protocols, called advantage
distillation, necessarily use two way communication and
are much less efficient than privacy amplification. Usu-
ally, they are not considered in the literature on QC.
But, conceptually, they are remarkable from at least two
points of view. First it is somewhat surprising that se-
cret key agreement is possible even if Alice and Bob start
with less mutual (Shannon) information than Eve. How-
ever, they can take advantage of the authenticated public
channel: Alice and Bob can decide which series of realiza-
9Note however that Eve has to choose the interaction be-
tween her probe and the qubits before the public discussion
phase of the protocol.
10For a while it was thought that bit commitment (see, e.g.,
Brassard 1988), a powerful primitive in cryptology, could be
realized using quantum principles. However, Dominic Mayers
(1996a and 1997) and Lo and Chau (1998) proved it to be
impossible (see also Brassard et al. 1998).
11Note that here the confidentiality is not guaranteed by
the laws of physics, but relies on the assumption that Eve’s
technology is limited, e.g. her antenna is finite, her detectors
have limited efficiencies.
tion to keep, whereas Eve can’t influence this process12
(Maurer 1993, Maurer and Wolf 1999).
Recently a second remarkable connection between
quantum and classical secret key agreement has been dis-
covered (assuming they use the Ekert protocol described
in paragraph IID 3): If Eve follows the strategy which op-
timizes her Shannon information, under the assumption
that she attacks the qubit one at a time (the so-called
individual attacks, see section VIE), then Alice and Bob
can use advantage distillation if and only if Alice and
Bob’s qubits are still entangled (they can thus use quan-
tum privacy amplification (Deutsch et al. 1996)) (Gisin
and Wolf 1999). This connection between the concept
of entanglement, central to quantum information theory,
and the concept of intrinsic classical information, cen-
tral to classical information based cryptography (Maurer
and Wolf 1999), has been shown to be general (Gisin
and Wolf 2000). The connection seems even to extend to
bound entanglement (Gisin et al. 2000).
D. Other protocols
1. 2-state protocol
In 1992 Charles H. Bennett noticed that actually 4
states is more than necessary for QC: all what is really
needed is 2 nonorthogonal states. Indeed the security re-
lies on the impossibility for any adversary to distinguish
unambiguously and without perturbation between the
different states that Alice may send to Bob, hence 2 states
are necessary and if they are incompatible (i.e. not mutu-
ally orthogonal), then 2 states are also sufficient. This is
a conceptually important clarification. It also made sev-
eral of the first experimental demonstrations easier (this
is further discussed in section IVD). But in practice it
is not a good solution. Indeed, although 2 nonorthogo-
nal states can’t be distinguished unambiguously without
perturbation, one can unambiguously distinguish them
at the cost of some losses (Ivanovic 1987, Peres 1988).
This possibility has even been demonstrated in practice
(Huttner et al. 1996, Clarke et al. 2000). Hence, Alice
and Bob would have to monitor the attenuation of the
12The idea is that Alice picks out several instances where she
got the same bit and communicates the instances - but not
the bit - to Bob. Bob replies yes only if it happens that for all
these instances he also has the same bit value. For large error
rates this is unlikely, but when it happens there is a large
chance that both have the same bit. Eve can’t influence the
choice of the instances. All she can do is to use a majority
vote for the cases accepted by Bob. The probability that Eve
makes an error can be much larger than the probability that
Bob makes an error (i.e. that all his instances are wrong),
even if Eve’s initial information is larger than Bob’s.
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quantum channel (and even this is not entirely safe if Eve
could replace the channel by a more transparent one, see
section VIH). The two-state protocol can also be im-
plemented using an interference between a macroscopic
bright pulse and a dim pulse with less than one photon on
average (Bennett, 1992). The presence of the bright pulse
makes this protocol specially resistant to eavesdropping,
even in settings with high attenuation. Indeed Bob can
monitor the bright pulses, to make sure that Eve does not
remove any. In this case, Eve cannot eliminate the dim
pulse without revealing her presence, because the inter-
ference of the bright pulse with vacuum would introduce
errors. A practical implementation of this protocol is
discussed in section IVD. Huttner et al. extended this
reference beam monitoring to the four-states protocol in
1995.
2. 6-state protocol
While two states are enough and four states are stan-
dard, a 6-state protocol respects much more the sym-
metry of the qubit state space, see Fig. 2 (Bruss 1998,
Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin 1999). The 6 states
constitute 3 bases, hence the probability that Alice and
Bob chose the same basis is only of 13 . But the symme-
try of this protocol greatly simplifies the security anal-
ysis and reduces Eve’s optimal information gain for a
given error rate QBER. If Eve measures every photon,
the QBER is 33%, compared to 25% in the case of the
BB84 protocol.
3. EPR protocol
This variation of the BB84 protocol is of special con-
ceptual, historical and practical interest. The idea is due
to Artur Ekert (1991) from Oxford University, who, while
elaborating on a suggestion of David Deutsch (1985), dis-
covered QC independently of the BB84 paper. Intellec-
tually, it is very satisfactory to see this direct connec-
tion to the famous EPR paradox (Einstein, Podolski and
Rosen 1935): the initially philosophical debate turned to
theoretical physics with Bell’s inequality (1964), then to
experimental physics (Freedmann and Clauser 1972, Fry
and Thompson 1976, and Aspect, Dalibard and Roger
1982), and is now – thanks to Ekert’s ingenious idea –
part of applied physics.
The idea consists in replacing the quantum channel
carrying qubits from Alice to Bob by a channel carrying
2 qubits from a common source, one qubit to Alice and
one to Bob. A first possibility would be that the source
emits the two qubits always in the same state chosen ran-
domly among the 4 states of the BB84 protocol. Alice
and Bob would then both measure their qubit in one of
the two bases, again chosen independently and randomly.
The source then announces the bases and Alice and Bob
keep the data only when they happen to have done their
measurements in the compatible basis. If the source is
reliable, this protocol is equivalent to the BB84 one: Ev-
ery thing is as if the qubit propagates backwards in time
from Alice to the source, and then forwards to Bob! But
better than trusting the source, which could be in Eve’s
hand, the Ekert protocol assumes that the 2 qubits are
emitted in a maximally entangled state like:
φ+ =
1√
2
(| ↑, ↑〉+ | ↓, ↓〉). (9)
Then, when Alice and Bob happen to use the same basis,
both the x-basis or both the y-basis, i.e. in about half
of the cases, their results are identical, providing them
with a common key. Note the similarity between the 1-
qubit BB84 protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and the 2-qubit
Ekert protocol of Fig. 3. The analogy can be even made
stronger by noting that for all unitary evolutions U1 and
U2, the following equality hold:
U1 ⊗ U2Φ(+) = 1 ⊗ U2U t1Φ(+) (10)
where U t1 denotes the transpose.
In his 1991 paper Artur Ekert suggested to base the
security of this 2-qubit protocol on Bell’s inequality, an
inequality which demonstrates that some correlation pre-
dicted by quantum mechanics can’t be reproduced by
any local theory (Bell 1964). For this, Alice and Bob
have a third choice of basis (see Fig. 4). In this way the
probability that they happen to choose the same basis
is reduced from 12 to
2
9 , but at the same time as they
establish a key they collect enough data to test Bell in-
equality13. They can thus check that the source really
emits the entangled state (9) and not merely product
states. The following year Bennett, Brassard and Mer-
min (1992b) criticized Ekert’s letter, arguing that the
violation of Bell inequality is not necessary for the secu-
rity of QC and emphasizing the close connection between
the Ekert and the BB84 schemes. This criticism might
be missing an important point. Indeed, although the ex-
act relation between security and Bell inequality is not
yet fully known, there are clear results establishing fasci-
nating connections, (see section VIF). In October 1992,
an article by Bennett, Brassard and Ekert demonstrated
that the founding fathers joined forces to develop the field
in a pleasant atmosphere (Bennett et al. 1992c)!
13A maximal violation of Bell inequality is necessary to rule
out tampering by Eve. In this case, the QBER must nec-
essarily be equal to zero. With a non-maximal violation, as
typically obtained in experimental systems, Alice and Bob
can distil a secure key using error correction and privacy
amplification.
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4. Other variations
There is a large collection of variations around the
BB84 protocol. Let us mention a few, chosen somewhat
arbitrarily. First, one can assume that the two bases
are not chosen with equal probability (Ardehali et al.
1998). This has the nice consequence that the proba-
bility that Alice and Bob choose the same basis is larger
than 12 , increasing thus the transmission rate of the sifted
key. However, this protocol makes Eve’s job easier as she
is more likely to guess correctly the used basis. Conse-
quently, it is not clear whether the final key rate, after
error correction and privacy amplification, is higher or
not.
Another variation consists in using quantum systems of
dimension larger than 2 (Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Tit-
tel 2000, Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Peres 2000, Bouren-
nane et al. 2001a). Again, the practical value of this idea
has not yet been fully determined.
A third variation worth mentioning is due to Gold-
enberg and Vaidman, from Tel-Aviv University (1995).
They suggested to prepare the qubits in a superposition
of two spatially separated states, then to send one compo-
nent of this superposition and to wait until Bob received
it before sending the second component. This doesn’t
sound of great practical value, but has the nice concep-
tual feature that the minimal two states do not need to
be mutually orthogonal.
E. Quantum teleportation as “Quantum
one-time-pad”
Since its discovery in 1993 by a surprisingly large
group of physicists, Quantum teleportation (Bennett et
al. 1993) received a lot of attention in the scientific com-
munity as well as in the general public. The dream of
beaming travellers through the Universe is exciting, but
completely out of the realm of any foreseeable technol-
ogy. However, quantum teleportation can be seen as the
fully quantum version of the one-time-pad, see paragraph
II B 3, hence as the ultimate form of QC. Similarly to
“classical teleportation”, let’s assume that Alice aims at
transferring to Bob a faithful copy of a quantum system.
If Alice has full knowledge of the quantum state, the
problem is not really a quantum one (Alice information
is classical). If, on the opposite, Alice does not know the
quantum state, she cannot send a copy, since quantum
copying is impossible according to quantum physics (see
paragraph IIC 2). Nor can she send classical instructions,
since this would allow the production of many copies.
However, if Alice and Bob share arbitrarily many entan-
gled qubits, sometimes called a quantum key, and share a
classical communication channel then the quantum tele-
portation protocol provides them with a mean to transfer
the quantum state of the system from Alice to Bob. In
the course of running this protocol, Alice’s quantum sys-
tem is destroyed without Alice learning anything about
the quantum state, while Bob’s qubit ends in a state
isomorphic to the state of the original system (but Bob
doesn’t learn anything about the quantum state). If the
initial quantum system is a quantum message coded in
the form of a sequence of qubits, then this quantum mes-
sage is faithfully and securely transferred to Bob, without
any information leaking to the outside world (i.e. to any-
one not sharing the prior entanglement with Alice and
Bob). Finally, the quantum message could be formed of
a 4 letter quantum alphabet constituted by the 4 states
of the BB84 protocol. With futuristic, but not impossi-
ble technology, Alice and Bob could have their entangled
qubits in appropriate wallets and could establish a totally
secure communication at any time, without even having
to know where the partner is located (provided they can
communicate classically).
F. Optical amplification, quantum nondemolition
measurements and optimal quantum cloning
After almost every general talk on QC, two questions
arise: what about optical amplifiers? and what about
quantum nondemolition measurements? In this section
we briefly address these questions.
Let us start with the second one, being the easiest. The
terminology “quantum nondemolition measurement” is
simply a confusing one! There is nothing like a quan-
tum measurement that does not perturb (i.e. modify)
the quantum state, except if the state happens to be an
eigenstate of the observable. Hence, if for some reason
one conjectures that a quantum system is in some state
(or in a state among a set of mutually orthogonal ones),
this can be in principle tested repeatedly (Braginsky and
Khalili 1992). But if the state is only restricted to be in
a finite set containing non-orthogonal states, as in QC,
then there is no way to perform a measurement without
“demolishing” (perturbing) the state. Now, in QC the
terminology “nondemolition measurement” is also used
with a different meaning: one measures the number of
photons in a pulse without affecting the degree of free-
dom coding the qubit (e.g. the polarization), (see section
VIH), or one detects the presence of a photon without
destroying it (Nogues et al. 1999). Such measurements
are usually called “ideal measurements”, or “projective
measurements”, because they produce the least possible
perturbation (Piron 1990) and because they can be repre-
sented by projectors. It is important to stress that these
“ideal measurements” do not invalidate the security of
QC.
Let us consider now optical amplifiers (a laser medium,
but without mirrors, so that amplification takes place in
a single pass, see Desurvire 1994). They are widely used
in today’s optical communication networks. However,
they are of no use for quantum communication. Indeed,
as seen in section II C, the copying of quantum informa-
tion is impossible. Here we illustrate this characteristic
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of quantum information with the example of optical am-
plifiers: the necessary presence of spontaneous emission
whenever there is stimulated emission, prevents perfect
copying. Let us clarify this important and often confus-
ing point, following the work of Simon et al. (1999 and
2000; see also Kempe et al. 2000, and De Martini et al.
2000). Let the two basic qubit states |0〉 and |1〉 be physi-
cally implemented by two optical modes: |0〉 ≡ |1, 0〉 and
|1〉 ≡ |0, 1〉. |n,m〉ph ⊗ |k, l〉a denotes thus the state of
n photons in mode 1 and m in mode 2, and k, l = 0 (1)
the ground (excited) state of 2-level atoms coupled to
mode 1 and 2, respectively. Hence spontaneous emission
corresponds to
|0, 0〉ph ⊗ |1, 0〉a → |1, 0〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a, (11)
|0, 0〉ph ⊗ |0, 1〉a → |0, 1〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a (12)
and stimulated emission to
|1, 0〉ph ⊗ |1, 0〉a →
√
2|2, 0〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a, (13)
|0, 1〉ph ⊗ |0, 1〉a →
√
2|0, 2〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a (14)
where the
√
2 factor takes into account the ratio stimu-
lated/spontaneous emission. Let the initial state of the
atom be a mixture of the following two states (each with
equal weight 50%):
|0, 1〉a |1, 0〉a (15)
By symmetry, it suffices to consider one possible initial
state of the qubit, e.g. 1 photon in the first mode |1, 0〉ph.
The initial state of the photon+atom system is thus a
mixture:
|1, 0〉ph ⊗ |1, 0〉a or |1, 0〉ph ⊗ |0, 1〉a (16)
This corresponds to the first order term in an evolution
with a Hamiltonian (in the interaction picture): H =
χ(a†1σ
−
1 + a1σ
†
1 + a
†
2σ
−
2 + a2σ
†
2). After some time the
2-photon component of the evolved states reads:
√
2|2, 0〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a or |1, 1〉ph ⊗ |0, 0〉a (17)
The correspondence with a pair of spin 12 goes as follows:
|2, 0〉 = | ↑↑〉 |0, 2〉 = | ↓↓〉 (18)
|1, 1〉ph = ψ(+) = 1√
2
(| ↑↓〉+ | ↓↑〉) (19)
Tracing over the amplifier (i.e. the 2-level atom), an
(ideal) amplifier achieves the following transformation:
P↑ → 2P↑↑ + Pψ(+) (20)
where the P ’s indicate projectors (i.e. pure state density
matrices) and the lack of normalization results from the
first order expansion used in (11) to (14). Accordingly,
after normalization, each photon is in state :
Tr1−ph mode
(
2P↑↑ + Pψ(+)
3
)
=
2P↑ + 121
3
(21)
The corresponding fidelity is:
F =
2 + 12
3
=
5
6
(22)
which is precisely the optimal fidelity compatible with
quantum mechanics (Buzˇek and Hillery 1996, Bruss et
al 1998, Gisin and Massar 1997). In other words, if we
start with a single photon in an arbitrary state, and pass
it through an amplifier, then due to the effect of sponta-
neous emission the fidelity of the state exiting the ampli-
fier, in the cases where it consists of exactly two photons,
with the initial state will be equal to at most 5/6. Note
that if it were possible to make better copies, then, using
EPR correlations between spatially separated systems,
signaling at arbitrarily fast speed would also be possible
(Gisin 1998).
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III. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The very first demonstration of QC was a table top ex-
periment performed at the IBM laboratory in the early
1990’s over a distance of 30 cm (Bennett et al. 1992a),
marking the start of impressive experimental improve-
ments during the last years. The 30 cm distance is of
little practical interest. Either the distance should be
even shorter, think of a credit card and the ATM ma-
chine (Huttner et al. 1996b), but in this case all of Al-
ice’s components should fit on the credit card. A nice
idea, but still impractical with present technology. Or
the distance should be much longer, at least in the km
range. Most of the research so far uses optical fibers to
guide the photons from Alice to Bob and we shall mainly
concentrate here on such systems. There is, however, also
some very significant research on free space systems, (see
section IVE).
Once the medium is chosen, there remain the questions
of the source and detectors. Since they have to be com-
patible, the crucial choice is the wavelength. There are
two main possibilities. Either one chooses a wavelength
around 800 nm where efficient photon counters are com-
mercially available, or one chooses a wavelength compat-
ible with today’s telecommunication optical fibers, i.e.
near 1300 nm or 1550 nm. The first choice requires free
space transmission or the use of special fibers, hence the
installed telecommunication networks can’t be used. The
second choice requires the improvement or development
of new detectors, not based on silicon semiconductors,
which are transparent above 1000 nm wavelength.
In case of transmission using optical fibers, it is still
unclear which of the two alternatives will turn out to be
the best choice. If QC finds niche markets, it is conceiv-
able that special fibers will be installed for that purpose.
But it is equally conceivable that new commercial detec-
tors will soon make it much easier to detect single pho-
tons at telecommunication wavelengths. Actually, the
latter possibility is very likely, as several research groups
and industries are already working on it. There is an-
other good reason to bet on this solution: the quality
of telecommunication fibers is much higher than that of
any special fiber, in particular the attenuation is much
lower (this is why the telecommunication industry chose
these wavelengths): at 800 nm, the attenuation is about
2 dB/km (i.e. half the photons are lost after 1.5 km),
while it is only of the order of 0.35 and 0.20 dB/km at
1300 nm and 1550 nm, respectively (50% loss after about
9 and 15 km) 14.
In case of free space transmission, the choice of wave-
length is straightforward since the region where good
photon detectors exist – around 800 nm – coincides with
14 The losses in dB (ldb) can be calculated from the losses in
percent (l%): ldB = −10 log10(1−
l%
100
).
the one where absorption is low. However, free space
transmission is restricted to line-of sight links and is very
weather dependent.
In the next sections we successively consider the ques-
tions “how to produce single photons?” (section III A),
“how to transmit them?” (section III B), “how to detect
single photons?” (section III C), and finally “how to ex-
ploit the intrinsic randomness of quantum processes to
build random generators?” (section III D).
A. Photon sources
Optical quantum cryptography is based on the use of
single photon Fock states. Unfortunately, these states
are difficult to realize experimentally. Nowadays, practi-
cal implementations rely on faint laser pulses or entan-
gled photon pairs, where both the photon as well as the
photon-pair number distribution obeys Poisson statistics.
Hence, both possibilities suffer from a small probability
of generating more than one photon or photon pair at
the same time. For large losses in the quantum chan-
nel even small fractions of these multi-photons can have
important consequences on the security of the key (see
section VIH), leading to interest in “photon guns”, see
paragraph III A 3). In this section we briefly comment
on sources based on faint pulses as well as on entan-
gled photon-pairs, and we compare their advantages and
drawbacks.
1. Faint laser pulses
There is a very simple solution to approximate single
photon Fock states: coherent states with an ultra-low
mean photon number µ. They can easily be realized us-
ing only standard semiconductor lasers and calibrated
attenuators. The probability to find n photons in such a
coherent state follows the Poisson statistics:
P (n, µ) =
µn
n!
e−
µ
. (23)
Accordingly, the probability that a non-empty weak co-
herent pulse contains more than 1 photon,
P (n > 1|n > 0, µ) = 1− P (0, µ)− P (1, µ)
1− P (0, µ)
=
1− e−µ(1 + µ)
1− e−µ
∼= µ
2
(24)
can be made arbitrarily small. Weak pulses are thus ex-
tremely practical and have indeed been used in the vast
majority of experiments. However, they have one ma-
jor drawback. When µ is small, most pulses are empty:
P (n = 0) ≈ 1− µ. In principle, the resulting decrease in
bit rate could be compensated for thanks to the achiev-
able GHz modulation rates of telecommunication lasers.
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But in practice the problem comes from the detectors’
dark counts (i.e. a click without a photon arriving).
Indeed, the detectors must be active for all pulses, in-
cluding the empty ones. Hence the total dark counts
increase with the laser’s modulation rate and the ratio
of the detected photons over the dark counts (i.e. the
signal to noise ratio) decreases with µ (see section IVA).
The problem is especially severe for longer wavelengths
where photon detectors based on Indium Gallium Ar-
senide semiconductors (InGaAs) are needed (see section
III C) since the noise of these detectors explodes if they
are opened too frequently (in practice with a rate larger
than a few MHz). This prevents the use of really low
photon numbers, smaller than approximately 1%. Most
experiments to date relied on µ = 0.1, meaning that 5%
of the nonempty pulses contain more than one photon.
However, it is important to stress that, as pointed out
by Lu¨tkenhaus (2000), there is an optimal µ depending
on the transmission losses 15. After key distillation, the
security is just as good with faint laser pulses as with
Fock states. The price to pay for using such states lies in
a reduction of the bit rate.
2. Photon pairs generated by parametric downconversion
Another way to create pseudo single-photon states is
the generation of photon pairs and the use of one photon
as a trigger for the other one (Hong and Mandel 1986).
In contrast to the sources discussed before, the second
detector must be activated only whenever the first one
detected a photon, hence when µ = 1, and not whenever
a pump pulse has been emitted, therefore circumventing
the problem of empty pulses.
The photon pairs are generated by spontaneous para-
metric down conversion in a χ(2) non-linear crystal16. In
this process, the inverse of the well-known frequency dou-
bling, one photon spontaneously splits into two daughter
photons – traditionally called signal and idler photon –
conserving total energy and momentum. In this con-
text, momentum conservation is called phase matching,
and can be achieved despite chromatic dispersion by ex-
ploiting the birefringence of the nonlinear crystal. The
phase matching allows to choose the wavelength, and de-
termines the bandwidth of the downconverted photons.
15Contrary to a frequent misconception, there is nothing spe-
cial about a µ value of 0.1, eventhough it has been selected
by most experimentalists. The optimal value – i.e. the value
that yields the highest key exchange rate after distillation –
depends on the optical losses in the channel and on assump-
tions about Eve’s technology (see VIH and VI I).
16 For a review see Rarity and Tapster 1988, and for latest
developments Tittel et al. 1999, Kwiat et al. 1999, Jennewein
et al. 2000b, Tanzilli et al. 2001.
The latter is in general rather large and varies from a few
nanometers up to some tens of nanometers. For the non
degenerate case one typically gets 5-10 nm, whereas in
the degenerate case (central frequency of both photons
equal) the bandwidth can be as large as 70 nm.
This photon pair creation process is very inefficient,
typically it needs some 1010 pump photons to create one
pair in a given mode17. The number of photon pairs per
mode is thermally distributed within the coherence time
of the photons, and follows a poissonian distribution for
larger time windows (Walls and Milburn 1995). With a
pump power of 1 mW, about 106 pairs per second can
be collected in single mode fibers. Accordingly, in a time
window of roughly 1ns the conditional probability to find
a second pair having detected one is 106 · 10−9 ≈ 0.1%.
In case of continuous pumping, this time window is given
by the detector resolution. Tolerating, e.g. 1% of these
multi-pair events, one can generate 107 pairs per second,
using a realistic 10 mW pump. Detecting for example
10 % of the trigger photons, the second detector has to
be activated 106 times per second. In comparison, the
example of 1% of multi-photon events corresponds in the
case of faint laser pulses to a mean photon number of µ =
0.02. In order to get the same number 106 of non-empty
pulses per second, a pulse rate of 50 MHz is needed. For a
given photon statistics, photon pairs allow thus to work
with lower pulse rates (e.g. 50 times lower) and hence
reduced detector-induced errors. However, due to limited
coupling efficiency into optical fibers, the probability to
find the sister photon after detection of the trigger photon
in the respective fiber is in practice lower than 1. This
means that the effective photon number is not one, but
rather µ ≈ 2/3 (Ribordy et al. 2001), still well above
µ = 0.02.
Photon pairs generated by parametric down conversion
offer a further major advantage if they are not merely
used as pseudo single-photon source, but if their entan-
glement is exploited. Entanglement leads to quantum
correlations which can be used for key generation, (see
paragraph II D 3 and chapter V). In this case, if two pho-
ton pairs are emitted within the same time window but
their measurement basis is choosen independently, they
produce completely uncorrelated results. Hence, depend-
ing on the realization, the problem of multiple photon can
be avoided, see section VI J.
Figure 5 shows one of our sources creating entangled
photon pairs at 1310 nm wavelength as used in tests of
Bell inequalities over 10 kilometers (Tittel et al. 1998).
Although not as simple as faint laser sources, diode
pumped photon pair sources emitting in the near infrared
can be made compact, robust and rather handy.
17Recently we achieved a conversion rate of 10−6 using an
optical waveguide in a periodically poled LiNbO3 crystal
(Tanzilli et al. 2001).
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3. Photon guns
The ideal single photon source is a device that when
one pulls the trigger, and only then, emits one and only
one photon. Hence the name photon gun. Although pho-
ton anti-bunching has been demonstrated already years
ago (Kimble et al. 1977), a practical and handy device is
still awaited. At present, there are essentially three dif-
ferent experimental approaches that come more or less
close to this ideal.
A first idea is to work with a single two-level quan-
tum system that can obviously not emit two photons at
a time. The manipulation of single trapped atoms or
ions requires a much too involved technical effort. Sin-
gle organics dye molecules in solvents (S.C. Kitson et al.
1998) or solids (Brunel et al. 1999, Fleury et al. 2000)
are easier to handle but only offer limited stability at
room temperature. Promising candidates, however, are
nitrogen-vacancy centers in diamond, a substitutional ni-
trogen atom with a vacancy trapped at an adjacent lat-
tice position (Kurtsiefer et al. 2000, Brouri et al. 2000).
It is possible to excite individual nitrogen atoms with a
532 nm laser beam, which will subsequently emit a fluo-
rescence photon around 700 nm (12ns decay time). The
fluorescence exhibits strong photon anti-bunching and
the samples are stable at room temperature. However,
the big remaining experimental challenge is to increase
the collection efficiency (currently about 0.1%) in order
to obtain mean photon numbers close to 1. To obtain
this, an optical cavity or a photonic bandgap structure
must suppress the emission in all spatial modes but one.
In addition, the spectral bandwith of this type of source
is broad (of the order of 100 nm), enhancing the effect of
pertubations in a quantum channel.
A second approach is to generate photons by single
electrons in a mesoscopic p-n junction. The idea is to
take profit of the fact that thermal electrons show anti-
bunching (Pauli exclusion principle) in contrast to pho-
tons (Imamoglu and Yamamoto, 1994). First experimen-
tal results have been presented (Kim et al. 1999), how-
ever with extremely low efficiencies, and only at a tem-
perature of 50mK!
Finally, another approach is to use the photon emis-
sion of electron-hole pairs in a semiconductor quantum
dot. The frequency of the emitted photon depends on the
number of electron-hole pairs present in the dot. After
one creates several such pairs by optical pumping, they
will sequentially recombine and hence emit photons at
different frequencies. Therefore, by spectral filtering a
single-photon pulse can be obtained (Ge´rard et al. 1999,
Santori et al. 2000, and Michler et al. 2000). These dots
can be integrated in solid-states microcavities with strong
enhancements of the spontaneous emission (Ge´rard et al.
1998).
In summary, today’s photon guns are still too compli-
cated to be used in a QC-prototype. Moreover, due to
their low quantum efficiencies they do not offer an ad-
vantage with respect to faint laser pulses with extremely
low mean photon numbers µ.
B. Quantum channels
The single photon source and the detectors must be
connected by a “quantum channel”. Such a channel is
actually nothing specially quantum, except that it is in-
tended to carry information encoded in individual quan-
tum systems. Here “individual” doesn’t mean “non-
decomposible”, it is meant in opposition to “ensemble”.
The idea is that the information is coded in a physical
system only once, contrary to classical communication
where many photons carry the same information. Note
that the present day limit for fiber-based classical optical
communication is already down to a few tens of photons,
although in practice one usually uses many more. With
the increasing bit rate and the limited mean power – im-
posed to avoid nonlinear effects in silica fibers – these
figures are likely to get closer and closer to the quantum
domain.
The individual quantum systems are usually 2-level
systems, called qubits. During their propagation they
must be protected from environmental noise. Here “en-
vironment” refers to everything outside the degree of
freedom used for the encoding, which is not necessar-
ily outside the physical system. If, for example, the in-
formation is encoded in the polarization state, then the
optical frequencies of the photon is part of the environ-
ment. Hence, coupling between the polarization and the
optical frequency has to be mastered18 (e.g. avoid wave-
length sensitive polarizers and birefringence). Moreover,
the sender of the qubits should avoid any correlation be-
tween the polarization and the spectrum of the photons.
Another difficulty is that the bases used by Alice to
code the qubits and the bases used by Bob for his mea-
surements must be related by a known and stable uni-
tary transformation. Once this unitary transformation
is known, Alice and Bob can compensate for it and get
the expected correlation between their preparations and
measurements. If it changes with time, they need an ac-
tive feedback to track it, and if the changes are too fast
the communication must be interrupted.
1. Singlemode fibers
Light is guided in optical fibers thanks to the refrac-
tive index profile n(x, y) across the section of the fibers
(traditionally, the z-axis is along the propagation direc-
tion). Over the last 25 years, a lot of effort has been
18Note that, as we will see in chapter V, using entangled
photons prevents such information leakage.
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made to reduce transmission losses – initially several dB
per km –, and nowadays, the attenuation is as low as
2dB/km at 800nm wavelength, 0.35 dB/km at 1310 nm,
and 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm (see Fig. 6). It is amusing
to note that the dynamical equation describing optical
pulse propagation (in the usual slowly varying envelope
aproximation) is identical to the Schro¨dinger equation,
with V (x, y) = −n(x, y) (Snyder 1983). Hence a positive
bump in the refractive index corresponds to a potential
well. The region of the well is called the fiber core. If
the core is large, many bound modes exist, correspond-
ing to many guided modes in the fiber. Such fibers are
called multimode fibers, their core being usually 50 mi-
crometer in diameter. The modes couple easily, acting
on the qubit like a non-isolated environment. Hence mul-
timode fibers are not appropriate as quantum channels
(see however Townsend 1998a and 1998b). If, however,
the core is small enough (diameter of the order of a few
wavelengths) then a single spatial mode is guided. Such
fibers are called singlemode fibers. For telecommunica-
tions wavelength (i.e. 1.3 and 1.5 µm), their core is typ-
ically 8 µm in diameter. Singlemode fibers are very well
suited to carry single quanta. For example, the optical
phase at the output of a fiber is in a stable relation with
the phase at the input, provided the fiber doesn’t get
elongated. Hence, fiber interferometers are very stable, a
fact exploited in many instruments and sensors (see, e.g.,
Cancellieri 1993).
Accordingly, a singlemode fiber with perfect cylindric
symmetry would provide an ideal quantum channel. But
all real fibers have some asymmetries and then the two
polarization modes are no longer degenerate but each has
its own propagation constant. A similar effect is caused
by chromatic dispersion, where the group delay depends
on the wavelength. Both dispersion effects are the sub-
ject of the next paragraphs.
2. Polarization effects in singlemode fibers
Polarization effects in singlemode fibers are a common
source of problems in all optical communication schemes,
as well classical as quantum ones. In recent years this has
been a major topic for R&D in classical optical commu-
nication (Gisin et al. 1995). As a result, today’s fibers
are much better than the fibers a decade ago. Nowa-
days, the remaining birefringence is small enough for the
telecom industry, but for quantum communication, any
birefringence, even extremely small, will always remain
a concern. All fiber based implementations of QC have
to face this problem. This is clearly true for polarization
based systems; but it is equally a concern for phase based
systems, since the interference visibility depends on the
polarization states. Hence, although polarization effects
are not the only source of difficulties, we shall describe
them in some detail, distinguishing between 4 effects: the
geometrical one, birefringence, polarization mode disper-
sion and polarization dependent losses.
The Geometric phase as encountered when guiding
light in an optical fiber is a special case of the Berry
phase19 which results when any parameter describing a
property of the system under concern, here the k-vector
characterizing the propagation of the light field, under-
goes an adiabatic change. Think first of a linear polar-
ization state, let’s say vertical at the input. Will it still
be vertical at the output? Vertical with respect to what?
Certainly not the gravitational field! One can follow that
linear polarization by hand along the fiber and see how
it may change even along a closed loop. If the loop stays
in a plane, the state after a loop coincides with the input
state. But if the loop explores the 3 dimensions of our
space, then the final state will differ from the initial one
by an angle. Similar reasoning holds for the axes of el-
liptical polarization states. The two circular polarization
states are the eigenstates: during parallel transport they
acquire opposite phases, called the Berry phase. The
presence of a geometrical phase is not fatal for quantum
communication, it simply means that initially Alice and
Bob have to align their systems by defining for instance
the vertical and diagonal directions (i.e. performing the
unitary transformation mentioned before). If these vary
slowly, they can be tracked, though this requires an ac-
tive feedback. However, if the variations are too fast,
the communication might be interrupted. Hence, aerial
cables that swing in the wind are not appropriate (ex-
cept with selfcompensating configurations, see paragraph
IVC2).
Birefringence is the presence of two different phase
velocities for two orthogonal polarization states. It is
caused by asymmetries in the fiber geometry and in the
residual stress distribution inside and around the core.
Some fibers are made birefringent on purpose. Such
fibers are called polarization maintaining (PM) fibers be-
cause the birefringence is large enough to effectively un-
couple the two polarization eigenmodes. But note that
only these two orthogonal polarization modes are main-
tained; all the other modes, on the contrary, evolve very
quickly, making this kind of fiber completely unsuitable
for polarization-based QC systems20. The global effect
of the birefringence is equivalent to an arbitrary com-
bination of two waveplates, that is, it corresponds to a
unitary transformation. If this transformation is stable,
19Introduced by Michael Berry in 1984, then observed in
optical fiber by Tomita and Chiao (1986), and on the single
photon level by Hariharan et al. (1993), studied in connection
to photon pairs by Brendel et al. (1995).
20PM fibers might be of use for phase based QC systems.
However, this requires the whole setup – transmission lines
as well as interferometers at Alice’s and Bob’s – to be made
of PM fibers. While this is principally possible, the need of
installing a completely new fiber network makes this solution
not very practical.
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Alice and Bob can compensate for it. The effect of bire-
fringence is thus similar to the geometrical effect, though,
in addition to a rotation, it may also affect the elliptic-
ity. Stability of birefringence requires slow thermal and
mechanical variations.
Polarization Mode Dispersion (PMD) is the pres-
ence of two different group velocities for two orthogonal
polarization modes. It is due to a delicate combination
of two causes. First, birefringence produces locally two
group velocities. For optical fibers, this local modal dis-
persion is in good approximation equal to the phase dis-
persion, of the order of a few ps/km. Hence, locally an
optical pulse tends to split into a fast mode and a slow
mode. But because the birefringence is small, the two
modes couple easily. Hence any small imperfection along
the fiber produces polarization mode coupling: some en-
ergy of the fast mode couples into the slow mode and
vice-versa. PMD is thus similar to a random walk21 and
grows only with the square root of the fiber length. It
is expressed in ps√
km
, with values as low as 0.1 ps√
km
for
modern fibers and possibly as high as 0.5 or even 1 ps√
km
for older ones.
Typical lengths for the polarization mode coupling
vary from a few meters up to hundreds of meters. The
stronger the coupling, the weaker the PMD (the two
modes do not have time to move away between the cou-
plings). In modern fibers, the couplings are even artifi-
cially increased during the drawing process of the fibers
(Hart et al. 1994, Li and Nolan 1998). Since the cou-
plings are exceedingly sensitive, the only reasonable de-
scription is a statistical one, hence PMD is described as
a statistical distribution of delays δτ . For long enough
fibers, the statistics is Maxwellian and PMD is related to
the fiber length ℓ, the mean coupling length h, the mean
modal birefringence B and to the RMS delay as follows
(Gisin et al. 1995): PMD≡
√
<< δτ2>> = Bh
√
ℓ/h.
PMD could cause depolarization which would be devas-
tating for quantum communication, similar to any deco-
herence in quantum information processing. But fortu-
nately, for quantum communication the remedy is easy, it
suffices to use a source with a coherence time larger than
the largest delay δτ . Hence, when laser pulses are used
(with typical spectral widths ∆λ ≤ 1 nm, corresponding
to a coherence time ≥ 3 ps, see paragraph IIIA 1), PMD
is no real problem. For photons created by parametric
down conversion, however, PMD can impose severe lim-
itations since ∆λ ≥ 10 nm (coherence time ≤ 300 fs) is
not unusual.
Polarization Dependent Losses (PDL) is a differ-
ential attenuation between two orthogonal polarization
modes. This effect is negligible in fibers, but can be sig-
21In contrast to Brownian motion describing particles diffu-
sion in space as time passes, here photons diffuse in time as
they propagate along the fiber.
nificant in components like phase modulators. In par-
ticular, some integrated optics waveguides actually guide
only one mode and thus behave almost like polarizers
(e.g. proton exchange waveguides in LiNbO3). PDL
is usually stable, but if connected to a fiber with some
birefringence, the relation between the polarization state
and the PDL may fluctuate, producing random outcomes
(Elamari et al. 1998). PDL cannot be described by a uni-
tary operator acting in the polarization state space (but
it is of course unitary in a larger space (Huttner et al.
1996a). It does thus not preserve the scalar product. In
particular, it can turn non-orthogonal states into orthog-
onal ones which can then be distinguished unambiguously
(at the cost of some loss) (Huttner et al. 1996a, Clarke et
al. 2000). Note that this could be used by Eve, specially
to eavesdrop on the 2-state protocol (paragraph IID 1).
Let us conclude this paragraph on polarization effects
in fibers by mentioning that they can be passively com-
pensated, provided one uses a go-&-return configuration,
using Faraday mirrors, as described in section IVC2.
3. Chromatic dispersion effects in singlemode fibers
In addition to polarization effects, chromatic disper-
sion (CD) can cause problems for quantum cryptography
as well. For instance, as explained in sections IVC and
VB, schemes implementing phase- or phase-and-time-
coding rely on photons arriving at well defined times,
that is on photons well localized in space. However, in
dispersive media like optical fibers, different group ve-
locities act as a noisy environment on the localization of
the photon as well as on the phase acquired in an inter-
ferometer. Hence, the broadening of photons featuring
non-zero bandwidth, or, in other words, the coupling be-
tween frequency and position must be circumvented or
controlled. This implies working with photons of small
bandwidth, or, as long as the bandwidth is not too large,
operating close to the wavelength λ0 where chromatic
dispersion is zero, i.e. for standard fibers around 1310
nm. Fortunately, fiber losses are relatively small at this
wavelength and amount to ≈0.35 dB/km. This region
is called the second telecommunication window22. There
are also special fibers, called dispersion-shifted, with a
refractive index profile such that the chromatic disper-
sion goes to zero around 1550 nm, where the attenuation
is minimal (Neumann 1988)23.
22The first one, around 800 nm, is almost no longer used. It
was motivated by the early existence of sources and detectors
at this wavelength. The third window is around 1550 nm
where the attenuation reaches an absolute minimum (Thomas
et al. 2000) and where erbium doped fibers provide convenient
amplifiers (Desurvire 1994).
23Chromatic dispersion in fibers is mainly due to the mate-
rial, essentially silicon, but also to the refractive index profile.
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CD does not constitute a problem in case of faint laser
pulses where the bandwidth is small. However, it be-
comes a serious issue when utilizing photon pairs cre-
ated by parametric downconversion. For instance, send-
ing photons of 70 nm bandwidth (as used in our long-
distance Bell inequality tests, Tittel et al. 1998) down
10 km of optical fibers leads to a temporal spread of
around 500 ps (assuming photons centered at λ0 and a
typical dispersion slope of 0.086 psnm2km ). However, this
can be compensated for when using energy-time entan-
gled photons (Franson 1992, Steinberg et al. 1992a and
1992b, Larchuk et al. 1995). In contrast to polariza-
tion coding where frequency and the physical property
used to implement the qubit are not conjugate variables,
frequency and time (thus position) constitute a Fourier
pair. The strict energy anti-correlation of signal and idler
photon enables one to achieve a dispersion for one pho-
ton which is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to
that of the sister photon, corresponding thus to the same
delay24 (see Fig. 7). The effect of broadening of the two
wave packets then cancels out and two simultaneously
emitted photons stay coincident. However, note that the
arrival time of the pair varies with respect to its emission
time. The frequency anticorrelation provides also the
basis for avoiding decrease of visibility due to different
wavepacket broadening in the two arms of an interferom-
eter. And since the CD properties of optical fibers do
not change with time – in contrast to birefringence – no
on-line tracking and compensation is required. It thus
turns out that phase and phase-time coding is particu-
larly suited to transmission over long distances in optical
fibers: nonlinear effects decohering the qubit “energy”
are completely negligible, and CD effects acting on the
localization can be avoided or compensated for in many
cases.
4. Free-space links
Although telecommunication based on optical fibers is
very advanced nowadays, such channels may not always
be available. Hence, there is also some effort in devel-
oping free space line-of-sight communication systems -
not only for classical data transmission but for quantum
cryptography as well (see Hughes et al. 2000a and Gor-
man et al. 2000).
Indeed, longer wavelengths feel regions further away from the
core where the refractive index is lower. Dispersion-shifted
fibers have, however, been abandoned by today’s industry, be-
cause it turned out to be simpler to compensate for the global
chromatic dispersion by adding an extra fiber with high neg-
ative dispersion. The additional loss is then compensated by
an erbium doped fiber amplifier.
24Assuming a predominantly linear dependence of CD in
function of the optical frequency, a realistic assumption.
Transmission over free space features some advan-
tages compared to the use of optical fibers. The atmo-
sphere has a high transmission window at a wavelength
of around 770 nm (see Fig. 8) where photons can eas-
ily be detected using commercial, high efficiency photon
counting modules (see chapter III C 1). Furthermore, the
atmosphere is only weakly dispersive and essentially non-
birefringent25 at these wavelengths. It will thus not alter
the polarization state of a photon.
However, there are some drawbacks concerning free-
space links as well. In contrast to transmitting a signal
in a guiding medium where the energy is “protected” and
remains localized in a small region in space, the energy
transmitted via a free-space link spreads out, leading to
higher and varying transmission losses. In addition to
loss of energy, ambient daylight, or even light from the
moon at night, might couple into the receiver, leading
to a higher error rate. However, the latter errors can be
maintained at a reasonable level by using a combination
of spectral filtering (≤ 1 nm interference filters), spatial
filtering at the receiver and timing discrimination using
a coincidence window of typically a few ns. Finally, it
is clear that the performance of free-space systems de-
pends dramatically on atmospheric conditions and is
possible only with clear weather.
Finally, let us briefly comment on the different sources
leading to coupling losses. A first concern is the trans-
mission of the signals through a turbulent medium, lead-
ing to arrival-time jitter and beam wander (hence prob-
lems with beam pointing). However, as the time-scales for
atmospheric turbulences involved are rather small –
around 0.1 to 0.01 s –, the time jitter due to a varia-
tion of the effective refractive index can be compensated
for by sending a reference pulse at a different wavelength
at short time (around 100 ns) before each signal pulse.
Since this reference pulse experiences the same atmo-
spheric conditions as the subsequent one, the signal will
arrive essentially without jitter in the time-window de-
fined by the arrival of the reference pulse. In addition,
the reference pulse can be reflected back to the transmit-
ter and used to correct the direction of the laser beam by
means of adaptive optics, hence to compensate for beam
wander and to ensure good beam pointing
Another issue is the beam divergence, hence increase of
spot size at the receiver end caused by diffraction at the
transmitter aperture. Using for example 20 cm diameter
optics, the diffraction limited spot size after 300 km is
of ≈ 1 m. This effect can in principle be kept small
taking advantage of larger optics. However, it can also
be of advantage to have a spot size large compared to the
receiver’s aperture in order to ensure constant coupling
in case of remaining beam wander. In their 2000 paper,
25In contrast to an optical fiber, air is not subject to stress,
hence isotropic.
17
Gilbert and Hamrick provide a comprehensive discussion
of free-space channels in the context of QC.
C. Single-photon detection
With the availability of pseudo single-photon and
photon-pair sources, the success of quantum cryptogra-
phy is essentially dependent on the possibility to detect
single photons. In principle, this can be achieved using
a variety of techniques, for instance photo-multipliers,
avalanche-photodiodes, multichannel plates, supercon-
ducting Josephson junctions. The ideal detector should
fulfill the following requirements:
• it should feature a high quantum detection effi-
ciency over a large spectral range,
• the probability of generating noise, that is a signal
without a photon arriving, should be small,
• to ensure a good timing resolution, the time be-
tween detection of a photon and generation of an
electrical signal should be as constant as possible,
i.e. the time jitter should be small,
• the recovery time (i.e. the deadtime) should be
small to allow high data rates.
In addition, it is important to keep the detectors
handy. For instance, a detector which needs liquid he-
lium or even nitrogen cooling would certainly render a
commercial development difficult.
Unfortunately, it turns out that it is impossible to meet
all mentioned points at the same time. Today, the best
choice is avalanche photodiodes (APD). Three different
semiconductor materials are used: either Silicon, Ger-
manium or Indium Gallium Arsenide, depending on the
wavelengths.
APDs are usually operated in so-called Geiger mode.
In this mode, the applied voltage exceeds the breakdown
voltage, leading an absorbed photon to trigger an elec-
tron avalanche consisting of thousands of carriers. To re-
set the diode, this macroscopic current must be quenched
– the emission of charges stopped and the diode recharged
(Cova et al. 1996). Three main possibilities exist:
• In passive-quenching circuits, a large (50-500 kΩ)
resistor is connected in series with the APD (see
e.g. Brown et al. 1986). This causes a decrease of
the voltage across the APD as soon as an avalanche
starts. When it drops below breakdown voltage,
the avalanche stops and the diode recharges. The
recovery time of the diode is given by its capaci-
tance and by the value of the quench resistor. The
maximum count rate varies from some hundred kHz
to a few MHz.
• In active quenching circuits, the bias voltage is
actively lowered below the breakdown voltage as
soon as the leading edge of the avalanche current
is detected (see e.g. Brown et al. 1987). This
mode enables higher count rates compared to pas-
sive quenching (up to tens of MHz), since the dead-
time can be as short as some tens of ns. How-
ever, the fast electronic feedback system renders
active quenching circuits much more complicated
than passive ones.
• Finally, in gated mode operation, the bias volt-
age is kept below the breakdown voltage and is
raised above only for a short time when a photon
is expected to arrive, typically a few ns. Maxi-
mum count-rates similar to active quenching cir-
cuits can be obtained using less complicated elec-
tronics. Gated mode operation is commonly used in
quantum cryptography based on faint laser pulses
where the arrival-times of the photons are well
known. However, it only applies if prior timing
information is available. For 2-photon schemes, it
is most often combined with one passive quenched
detector, generating the trigger signal for the gated
detector.
Apart from Geiger mode, Brown et al. also investi-
gated the performance of Silicon APDs operated in sub-
Geiger mode (Brown et al. 1989). In this mode, the bias
voltage is kept slightly smaller than the breakdown volt-
age such that the multiplication factor – around 100 –
already enables to detect an avalanche, however, is still
small enough to prevent real breakdowns. Unfortunately,
the single-photon counting performance in this mode is
rather bad and initial efforts have not been continued,
the major problem being the need for extremely low-noise
amplifiers.
An avalanche engendered by carriers created in the
conduction band of the diode can not only be caused
by an impinging photon, but also by unwanted causes.
These might be thermal or band-to-band tunneling pro-
cesses, or emissions from trapping levels populated while
a current transits through the diode. The first two causes
produce avalanches not due to photons and are referred
to as darkcounts. The third process depends on previous
avalanches and its effect is called afterpulses. Since the
number of trapped charges decreases exponentially with
time, these afterpulses can be limited by applying large
deadtimes. Thus, there is a trade-off between high count
rates and low afterpulses. The time-constant of the ex-
ponential decrease of afterpulses shortens for higher tem-
peratures of the diode. Unfortunately, operating APDs
at higher temperature leads to a higher fraction of ther-
mal noise, that is higher dark counts. There is thus again
a tradeoff to be optimized. Finally, increasing the bias
voltage leads to a larger quantum efficiency and a smaller
time jitter, at the cost of an increase in the noise.
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We thus see that the optimal operating parameters,
voltage, temperature and dead time (i.e. maximum count
rate) depend on the very application. Besides, since the
relative magnitude of efficiency, thermal noise and af-
ter pulses varies with the type of semiconductor material
used, no general solution exists. In the two next para-
graphs we briefly present the different types of APDs.
The first paragraph focuses on Silicon APDs which en-
able the detection of photons at wavelengths below 1µm,
the second one comments on Germanium and on Indium
Gallium Arsenide APDs for photon counting at telecom-
munication wavelength. The different behaviour of the
three types is shown in Fig. 9. Although the best fig-
ure of merit for quantum cryptography is the ratio of
dark count rate R per time unit to detection efficiency η,
we depict here the better-known noise equivalent power
NEP which shows similar behaviour. The NEP is de-
fined as the optical power required to measure a unity
signal-to-noise ratio, and is given by
NEP =
hν
η
√
2R. (25)
Here, h is Planck’s constant and ν is the frequency of the
impinging photons.
1. Photon counting at wavelengths below 1.1 µm
Since the beginning of the 80’s, a lot of work has
been done to characterize Silicon APDs for single pho-
ton counting (Ingerson 1983, Brown 1986, Brown 1987,
Brown 1989, Spinelli 1996), and the performance of Si-
APDs has continuously been improved. Since the first
test of Bell inequality using Si-APDs by Shih and Al-
ley in 1988, they have completely replaced the photo-
multipliers used until then in the domain of fundamental
quantum optics, known now as quantum communication.
Today, quantum efficiencies of up to 76% (Kwiat et al.
1993) and time jitter down to 28 ps (Cova et al. 1989)
have been reported. Commercial single photon counting
modules are available (EG&G SPCM-AQ-151), featuring
quantum efficiencies of 70 % at a wavelength of 700 nm, a
time jitter of around 300 psec and maximum count rates
larger than 5 MHz. Temperatures of -20oC – sufficient to
keep thermally generated dark counts as low as 50 Hz –
can easily be achieved using Peltier cooling. Single pho-
ton counters based on Silicon APDs thus offer an almost
perfect solution for all applications where photons of a
wavelength below 1 µm can be used. Apart from funda-
mental quantum optics, this includes quantum cryptog-
raphy in free space and in optical fibers, however, due to
high losses, the latter one only over short distances.
2. Photon counting at telecommunication wavelengths
When working in the second telecommunication win-
dow (1.3µm), one has to take advantage of APDs made
from Germanium or InGaAs/InP semiconductor materi-
als. In the third window (1.55 µm), the only option is
InGaAs/InP APDs.
Photon counting with Germanium APDs, although
known for 30 years (Haecker, Groezinger and Pilkuhn
1971), started to be used in the domain of quantum com-
munication with the need of transmitting single photons
over long distances using optical fibers, hence with the
necessity to work at telecommunications wavelength. In
1993, Townsend, Rarity and Tapster (Townsend et al.
1993a) implemented a single photon interference scheme
for quantum cryptography over a distance of 10 km, and
in 1994, Tapster, Rarity and Owens (1994) demonstrated
a violation of Bell inequalities over 4 km. These experi-
ments where the first ones to take advantage of Ge APDs
operated in passively quenched Geiger mode. At a tem-
perature of 77K which can be achieved using either liquid
nitrogen or Stirling engine cooling, typical quantum ef-
ficiencies of about 15 % at dark count rates of 25 kHz
can be found (Owens et al. 1994), and time jitter down
to 100 ps have been observed (Lacaita et al. 1994) – a
normal value being 200-300 ps.
Traditionally, Germanium APDs have been imple-
mented in the domain of long-distance quantum com-
munication. However, this type of diode is currently get-
ting replaced by InGaAs APDs and it is more and more
difficult to find Germanium APDs on the market. Mo-
tivated by pioneering research reported already in 1985
(Levine, Bethea and Campbell 1985), latest research fo-
cusses on InGaAs APDs, allowing single photon detection
in both telecommunication windows. Starting with work
by Zappa et al. (1994), InGaAs APDs as single photon
counters have meanwhile been characterized thoroughly
(Lacaita et al. 1996, Ribordy et al. 1998, Hiskett et al.
2000, Karlsson et al. 1999, and Rarity et al. 2000, Stucki
et al. 2001), and first implementations for quantum cryp-
tography have been reported (Ribordy 1998, Bourennane
et al. 1999, Bethune and Risk 2000, Hughes et al. 2000b,
Ribordy et al. 2000). However, if operating Ge APDs
is already inconvenient compared to Silicon APDs, the
handiness of InGaAs APDs is even worse, the problem
being a extremely high afterpulse fraction. Therefore,
operation in passive quenching mode is impossible for
applications where noise is crucial. In gated mode, In-
GaAs APDs feature a better performance for single pho-
ton counting at 1.3 µm compared to Ge APDs. For in-
stance, at a temperature of 77 K and a dark count prob-
ability of 10−5 per 2.6 ns gate, quantum efficiencies of
around 30% and of 17% have been reported for InGaAs
and Ge APDs, respectively (Ribordy et al. 1998), while
the time jitter of both devices is comparable. If working
at a wavelength of 1.55 µm, the temperature has to be
increased for single photon detection. At 173 K and a
dark count rate of now 10−4, a quantum efficiency of 6%
can still be observed using InGaAs/InP devices while the
same figure for Germanium APDs is close to zero.
To date, no industrial effort has been done to opti-
mize APDs operating at telecommunication wavelength
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for photon counting, and their performance is still far
behind the one of Silicon APDs26. However, there is
no fundamental reasons why photon counting at wave-
lengths above 1 µm should be more delicate than below,
except that the photons are less energetic. The real rea-
sons for the lack of commercial products are, first, that
Silicon, the most common semiconductor, is not sensitive
(the band gap is too large), and secondly that the mar-
ket for photon counting is not yet mature. But, without
great risk, one can forecast that good commercial pho-
ton counters will become available in the near future, and
that this will have a major impact on quantum cryptog-
raphy.
D. Quantum random number generators
The key used in the one-time-pad must be secret and
used only once. Consequently, it must be as long as the
message and must be perfectly random. The later point
proves to be a delicate and interesting one. Computers
are deterministic systems that cannot create truly ran-
dom numbers. But all secure cryptosystems, both classi-
cal and quantum ones, require truly random numbers27!
Hence, the random numbers must be created by a ran-
dom physical process. Moreover, to make sure that the
random process is not merely looking random with some
hidden deterministic pattern, it is necessary that it is
completely understood. It is thus of interest to imple-
ment a simple process in order to gain confidence in its
proper operation.
A natural solution is to rely on the random choice of
a single photon at a beamsplitter28 (Rarity et al. 1994).
In this case the randomness is in principle guaranteed by
the laws of quantum mechanics, though, one still has to
be very careful not to introduce any experimental arte-
fact that could correlate adjacent bits. Different experi-
mental realizations have been demonstrated (Hildebrand
2001, Stefanov et al. 2000, Jennewein et al. 2000a)
and prototypes are commercially available (www.gap-
optique.unige.ch). One particular problem is the dead-
time of the detectors, that may introduce a strong an-
ticorrelation between neighboring bits. Similarly, after-
pulses may provoke a correlation. These detector-related
effects increase with higher pulse rates, limiting the bit
rate of quantum number generator to some MHz.
26The first commercial photon counter at telecommunication
wavelengths came out only this year (Hamamatsu photomul-
tiplier R5509-72). However, the efficiency does not yet allow
an implementation for quantum cryptography.
27The pin number that the bank attributes to your credit
card must be random. If not, someone knows it!
28Strictly speaking, the choice is made only once the photons
are detected at one of the outports.
In the BB84 protocol Alice has to choose randomly
between four different states and Bob between two bases.
The limited random number generation rate may force
Alice to produce her numbers in advance and store them,
opening a security weakness. On Bob’s side the random
bit creation rate can be lower since, in principle, the basis
must be changed only after a photon has been detected,
which normally happens at rates below 1 MHz. However,
one has to make sure that this doesn’t give the spy an
opportunity for a Trojan horse attack (see section VIK)!
An elegant configuration integrating the random num-
ber generator into the QC system consists in using a pas-
sive choice of bases, as discussed in chapter V (Muller et
al. 1993). However, the problem of detector induced
correlation remains.
E. Quantum repeaters
Todays fiber based QC systems are limited to tens of
kilometers. This is due to the combination of fiber losses
and detectors’ noise. The losses by themselves do only
reduce the bit rate (exponentially with the distance), but
with perfect detectors the distance would not be limited.
However, because of the dark counts, each time a pho-
ton is lost there is a chance that a dark count produces
an error. Hence, when the probability of a dark count
becomes comparable to the probability that a photon
is correctly detected, the signal to noise ratio tends to
0 (more precisely the mutual information I(α, β) tends
to a lower bound29). In this section we briefly explain
how the use of entangled photons and of entanglement
swapping (Z˙ukowski et al. 1993) could open ways to
extend the achievable distances in a foreseeable future
(some prior knowledge of entanglement swapping is as-
sumed). Let us denote tlink the transmission coefficient
(i.e. tlink=probability that a photon sent by Alice gets
to one of Bob’s detectors), η the detectors’ efficiency and
pdark the dark count probability per time bin. With a
perfect single photon source, the probability Praw of a
correct qubit detection reads: Praw = tlinkη, while the
probability Pdet of an error is: Pdet = (1 − tlinkη)pdark.
Accordingly, the QBER= PdetPraw+Pdet and the normalized
net rate reads: ρnet = (Praw + Pdet) · fct(QBER) where
the function fct denotes the fraction of bits remaining
after error correction and privacy amplification. For the
sake of illustration we simply assume a linear dependence
dropping to zero for QBER≥ 15% (This simplification
does not affect the qualitative results of this section.
For a more precise calculation, see Lu¨tkenhaus 2000.):
29The absolute lower bound is 0, but dependening on the
assumed eavesdropping strategy, Eve could take advantage of
the losses. In the latter case, the lower bound is given by her
mutual information I(α, ǫ).
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fct(QBER) = 1 − QBER15% . The corresponding net rate
ρnet is displayed on Fig. 10. Note that it drops to zero
near 90 km.
Let us now assume that instead of a perfect single-
photon source, Alice and Bob use a (perfect) 2-photon
source set in the middle of their quantum channel. Each
photon has then a probability
√
tlink to get to a detec-
tor. The probability of a correct joined detection is thus
Praw = tlinkη
2, while an error occurs with probability
Pdet = (1−√tlinkη)2p2dark+2
√
tlinkη(1−
√
tlinkη)pdark
(both photon lost and 2 dark counts, or one photon
lost and one dark count). This can be conveniently
rewritten as: Praw = tlinkη
n and Pdet = (t
1/n
linkη + (1 −
t
1/n
linkη)pdark)
n − tlinkηn valid for any division of the link
into n equal-length sections and n detectors. Note that
the measurements performed at the nodes between Alice
and Bob do transmit (swap) the entanglement to the twin
photons, without revealing any information about the
qubit (these measurements are called Bell-measurements
and are the core of entanglement swapping and of quan-
tum teleportation). The corresponding net rates are dis-
played in Fig. 10. Clearly, the rates for short distances
are smaller when several detectors are used, because of
their limited efficiencies (here we assume η = 10%). But
the distance before the net rate drops to zero is extended
to longer distances! Intuitively, this can be understood
as follows. Let’s consider that a logical qubit propagates
from Alice to Bob (although some photons propagate in
the opposite direction). Then, each 2-photon source and
each Bell-measurement acts on this logical qubit as a kind
of QNDmeasurement: they test whether the logical qubit
is still there! In this way, Bob activates his detectors only
when there is a large chance t
1/n
link that the photon gets
to his detectors.
Note that if in addition to the detectors’ noise there
is noise due to decoherence, then the above idea can be
extended, using entanglement purification. This is essen-
tially the idea of quantum repeaters (Briegel et al. 1998,
Dur et al. 1999).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH FAINT LASER
PULSES
Experimental quantum key distribution was demon-
strated for the first time in 1989 (it was published only
in 1992 by Bennett et al. 1992a). Since then, tremen-
dous progress has been made. Today, several groups have
shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even
outside the laboratory. In principle, any two-level quan-
tum system could be used to implement QC. In practice,
all implementations have relied on photons. The reason
is that their interaction with the environment, also called
decoherence, can be controlled and moderated. In addi-
tion, researchers can benefit from all the tools developed
in the past two decades for optical telecommunications.
It is unlikely that other carriers will be employed in the
foreseeable future.
Comparing different QC-setups is a difficult task, since
several criteria must be taken into account. What mat-
ters in the end is of course the rate of corrected secret bits
(distilled bit rate, Rdist) that can be transmitted and the
transmission distance. One can already note that with
present and near future technology, it will probably not
be possible to achieve rates of the order of gigahertz,
nowadays common with conventional optical communi-
cation systems (in their comprehensive paper published
in 2000, Gilbert and Hamrick discuss practical methods
to achieve high bit rate QC). This implies that encryp-
tion with a key exchanged through QC is to be limited
to highly confidential information. While the determina-
tion of the transmission distance and rate of detection
(the raw bit rate, Rraw) is straightforward, estimating
the net rate is rather difficult. Although in principle er-
rors in the bit sequence follow only from tampering by
a malevolent eavesdropper, the situation is rather dif-
ferent in reality. Discrepancies in the keys of Alice and
Bob also always happen because of experimental imper-
fections. The error rate (here called quantum bit error
rate, or QBER) can be easily determined. Similarly, the
error correction procedure is rather simple. Error cor-
rection leads to a first reduction of the key rate that de-
pends strongly on the QBER. The real problem consist
in estimating the information obtained by Eve, a quan-
tity necessary for privacy amplification. It does not only
depend on the QBER, but also on other factors, like the
photon number statistics of the source, or the way the
choice of the measurement basis is made. Moreover in
a pragmatic approach, one might also accept restrictions
on Eve’s technology, limiting her strategies and there-
fore also the information she can obtain per error she
introduces. Since the efficiency of privacy amplification
rapidly decreases when the QBER increases, the distilled
bit rate depends dramatically on Eve’s information and
hence on the assumptions made. One can define as the
maximum transmission distance, the distance where the
distilled rate reaches zero. This can give an idea of the
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difficulty to evaluate a QC system from a physical point
of view.
Technological aspects must also be taken into account.
In this article we do not focus on all the published per-
formances (in particular not on the key rates), which
strongly depend on present technology and the financial
possibilities of the research teams having carried out the
experiments. On the contrary, we try to weight the in-
trinsic technological difficulties associated with each set-
up and to anticipate certain technological advances. And
last but not least the cost of the realization of a prototype
should also be considered.
In this chapter, we first deduce a general formula for
the QBER and consider its impact on the distilled rate.
We then review faint pulses implementations. We class
them according to the property used to encode the qubits
value and follow a rough chronological order. Finally, we
assess the possibility to adopt the various set-ups for the
realization of an industrial prototype. Systems based on
entangled photon pairs are presented in the next chapter.
A. Quantum Bit Error Rate
The QBER is defined as the number of wrong bits to
the total number of received bits30 and is normally in
the order of a few percent. In the following we will use
it expressed as a function of rates:
QBER =
Nwrong
Nright +Nwrong
=
Rerror
Rsift +Rerror
≈ Rerror
Rsift
(26)
where the sifted key corresponds to the cases in which
Alice and Bob made compatible choices of bases, hence
its rate is half that of the raw key.
The raw rate is essentially the product of the pulse
rate frep, the mean number of photon per pulse µ, the
probability tlink of a photon to arrive at the analyzer and
the probability η of the photon being detected:
Rsift =
1
2
Rraw =
1
2
q frep µ tlink η (27)
The factor q (q≤1, typically 1 or 12 ) must be introduced
for some phase-coding setups in order to correct for non-
interfering path combinations (see, e.g., sections IVC
and VB).
One can distinguish three different contributions to
Rerror. The first one arises because of photons ending
up in the wrong detector, due to unperfect interference
or polarization contrast. The rate Ropt is given by the
30In the followin we are considering systems implementing
the BB84 protocol. For other protocols some of the formulas
have to be slightly adapted.
product of the sifted key rate and the probability popt of
a photon going in the wrong detector:
Ropt = Rsift popt =
1
2
q frep µ tlink popt η (28)
This contribution can be considered, for a given set-up,
as an intrinsic error rate indicating the suitability to use
it for QC. We will discuss it below in the case of each
particular system.
The second contribution, Rdet, arises from the detector
dark counts (or from remaining environmental stray light
in free space setups). This rate is independent of the bit
rate31. Of course, only dark counts falling in a short time
window when a photon is expected give rise to errors.
Rdet =
1
2
1
2
freppdarkn (29)
where pdark is the probability of registering a dark count
per time-window and per detector, and n is the number of
detectors. The two 12 -factors are related to the fact that
a dark count has a 50% chance to happen with Alice and
Bob having chosen incompatible bases (thus eliminated
during sifting) and a 50% chance to arise in the correct
detector.
Finally error counts can arise from uncorrelated pho-
tons, because of imperfect photon sources:
Racc =
1
2
1
2
paccfreptlinknη (30)
This factor appears only in systems based on entangled
photons, where the photons belonging to different pairs
but arriving in the same time window are not necessarily
in the same state. The quantity pacc is the probability to
find a second pair within the time window, knowing that
a first one was created32.
The QBER can now be expressed as follows:
QBER =
Ropt +Rdet +Racc
Rsift
(31)
= popt +
pdark · n
tlink · η · 2 · q · µ +
pacc
2 · q · µ (32)
= QBERopt +QBERdet +QBERacc (33)
We analyze now these three contributions. The first
one, QBERopt, is independent on the transmission dis-
tance (it is independent of tlink). It can be considered as
a measure of the optical quality of the setup, depending
only on the polarisation or interference fringe contrast.
31This is true provided that afterpulses (see section IIIC)
do not contribute to the dark counts.
32Note that a passive choice of measurement basis implies
that four detectors (or two detectors during two time win-
dows) are activated for every pulse, leading thus to a doubling
of Rdet and Racc.
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The technical effort needed to obtain, and more impor-
tant, to maintain a givenQBERopt is an important crite-
rion for evaluating different QC-setups. In polarization
based systems, it’s rather simple to achieve a polarisa-
tion contrast of 100:1, corresponding to a QBERopt of
1%. In fiber based QC, the problem is to maintain this
value in spite of polarisation fluctuations and depolarisa-
tion in the fiber link. For phase coding setups, QBERopt
and the interference visibility are related by
QBERopt =
1− V
2
(34)
A visibility of 98% translates thus into an optical error
rate of 1%. Such a value implies the use of well aligned
and stable interferometers. In bulk optics perfect mode
overlap is difficult to achieve, but the polarization is sta-
ble. In single-mode fiber interferometers, on the contrary,
perfect mode overlap is automatically achieved, but the
polarisation must be controlled and chromatic dispersion
can constitute a problem.
The second contribution, QBERdet, increases with dis-
tance, since the darkcount rate remains constant while
the bit rate goes down like tlink. It depends entirely on
the ratio of the dark count rate to the quantum efficiency.
At present, good single-photon detectors are not commer-
cially available for telecommunication wavelengths. The
span of QC is not limited by decoherence. As QBERopt
is essentially independent of the fiber length, it is the
detector noise that limits the transmission distance.
Finally, the QBERacc contribution is present only in
some 2-photon schemes in which multi-photon pulses are
processed in such a way that they do not necessarily
encode the same bit value (see e.g. paragraphs VB1
and VB2). Indeed, although in all systems there is a
probability for multi-photon pulses, in most these con-
tribute only to the information available to Eve (see sec-
tion VIH) and not to the QBER. But for implementa-
tions featuring passive choice by each photon, the multi-
photon pulses do not contribute to Eve’s information but
to the error rate (see section VI J).
Now, let us calculate the useful bit rate as a func-
tion of the distance. Rsift and QBER are given as a
function of tlink in eq. (27) and (32) respectively. The
fiber link transmission decreases exponentially with the
length. The fraction of bits lost due to error correc-
tion and privacy amplification is a function of QBER
and depends on Eve’s strategy. The number of remain-
ing bits Rnet is given by the sifted key rate multiplied
by the difference of the Alice-Bob mutual Shannon infor-
mation I(α, β) and Eve’s maximal Shannon information
Imax(α, ǫ):
Rnet = Rsift
(
I(α, β)− Imax(α, ǫ)
)
(35)
The latter are calculated here according to eq. (64) and
(66) (section VIE), considering only individual attacks
and no multiphoton pulses. We obtain Rnet (useful bit
rate after error correction and privacy amplification) for
different wavelengths as shown in Fig. 11. There is first
an exponential decrease, then, due to error correction
and privacy amplification, the bit rates fall rapidly down
to zero. This is most evident comparing the curves 1550
nm and 1550 nm “single” since the latter features 10
times less QBER. One can see that the maximum range
is about 100 km. In practice it is closer to 50 km, due
to non-ideal error correction and privacy amplification,
multiphoton pulses and other optical losses not consid-
ered here. Finally, let us mention that typical key cre-
ation rates of the order of a thousand bits per second over
distances of a few tens of kilometers have been demon-
strated experimentally (see, for example, Ribordy et al.
2000 or Townsend 1998b).
B. Polarization coding
Encoding the qubits in the polarization of photons is
a natural solution. The first demonstration of QC by
Charles Bennett and his coworkers (Bennett et al. 1992a)
made use of this choice. They realized a system where
Alice and Bob exchanged faint light pulses produced by
a LED and containing less than one photon on average
over a distance of 30 cm in air. In spite of the small scale
of this experiment, it had an important impact on the
community in the sense that it showed that it was not
unreasonable to use single photons instead of classical
pulses for encoding bits.
A typical system for QC with the BB84 four states
protocol using the polarization of photons is shown in
Fig. 12. Alice’s system consists of four laser diodes. They
emit short classical photon pulses (≈ 1ns) polarized at
−45◦, 0◦, +45◦, and 90◦. For a given qubit, a single
diode is triggered. The pulses are then attenuated by a
set of filters to reduce the average number of photons well
below 1, and sent along the quantum channel to Alice.
It is essential that the pulses remain polarized for Bob
to be able to extract the information encoded by Alice.
As discussed in paragraph III B 2, polarization mode dis-
persion may depolarize the photons, provided the delay
it introduces between both polarization modes is larger
than the coherence time. This sets a constraint on the
type of lasers used by Alice.
When reaching Bob, the pulses are extracted from the
fiber. They travel through a set of waveplates used to re-
cover the initial polarization states by compensating the
transformation induced by the optical fiber (paragraph
III B 2). The pulses reach then a symmetric beamsplit-
ter, implementing the basis choice. Transmitted photons
are analyzed in the vertical-horizontal basis with a po-
larizing beamsplitter and two photon counting detectors.
The polarization state of the reflected photons is first ro-
tated with a waveplate by 45◦ (−45◦ to 0◦). The photons
are then analyzed with a second set of polarizing beam-
splitter and photon counting detectors. This implements
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the diagonal basis. For illustration, let us follow a photon
polarized at +45◦, we see that its state of polarization is
arbitrarily transformed in the optical fiber. At Bob’s end,
the polarization controller must be set to bring it back
to +45◦. If it chooses the output of the beamsplitter
corresponding to the vertical-horizontal basis, it will ex-
perience equal reflection and transmission probability at
the polarizing beamsplittter, yielding a random outcome.
On the other hand, if it chooses the diagonal basis, its
state will be rotated to 90◦. The polarizing beamsplit-
ter will then reflect it with unit probability, yielding a
deterministic outcome.
Instead of Alice using four lasers and Bob two polar-
izing beamsplitters, it is also possible to implement this
system with active polarization modulators such as Pock-
els cells. For emission, the modulator is randomly acti-
vated for each pulse to rotate the state of polarization
to one of the four states, while, at the receiver, it ran-
domly rotates half of the incoming pulses by 45◦. It is
also possible to realize the whole system with fiber optics
components.
Antoine Muller and his coworkers at the University of
Geneva used such a system to perform QC experiments
over optical fibers (1993, see also Bre´guet et al. 1994).
They created a key over a distance of 1100 meters with
photons at 800 nm. In order to increase the transmission
distance, they repeated the experiment with photons at
1300nm (Muller et al.1995 and 1996) and created a key
over a distance of 23 kilometers. An interesting feature
of this experiment is that the quantum channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob consisted in an optical fiber part of an
installed cable, used by the telecommunication company
Swisscom for carrying phone conversations. It runs be-
tween the Swiss cities of Geneva and Nyon, under Lake
Geneva (Fig. 13). This was the first time QC was per-
formed outside of a physics laboratory. It had a strong
impact on the interest of the wider public for the new
field of quantum communication.
These two experiments highlighted the fact that the
polarization transformation induced by a long optical
fiber was unstable over time. Indeed, when monitoring
the QBER of their system, Muller noticed that, although
it remained stable and low for some time (of the order of
several minutes), it would suddenly increase after a while,
indicating a modification of the polarization transforma-
tion in the fiber. This implies that a real fiber based QC
system requires active alignment to compensate for this
evolution. Although not impossible, such a procedure is
certainly difficult. James Franson did indeed implement
an active feedback aligment system ( 1995), but did not
pursue along this direction. It is interesting to note that
replacing standard fibers with polarization maintaining
fibers does not solve the problem. The reason is that, in
spite of their name, these fibers do not maintain polar-
ization, as explained in paragraph III B 2.
Recently, Paul Townsend of BT Laboratories also in-
vestigated such polarization encoding systems for QC on
short-span links up to 10 kilometers (1998a and 1998b)
with photons at 800nm. It is interesting to note that,
although he used standard telecommunications fibers
which can support more than one spatial mode at this
wavelength, he was able to ensure single-mode propa-
gation by carefully controlling the launching conditions.
Because of the problem discussed above, polarization
coding does not seem to be the best choice for QC in
optical fibers. Nevertheless, this problem is drastically
improved when considering free space key exchange, as
the air has essentially no birefringence at all (see section
IVE).
C. Phase coding
The idea of encoding the value of qubits in the phase
of photons was first mentioned by Bennett in the paper
where he introduced the two-states protocol (1992). It is
indeed a very natural choice for optics specialists. State
preparation and analysis are then performed with inter-
ferometers, that can be realized with single-mode optical
fibers components.
Fig. 14 presents an optical fiber version of a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer. It is made out of two symmetric
couplers – the equivalent of beamsplitters – connected
to each other, with one phase modulator in each arm.
One can inject light in the set-up using a continuous and
classical source, and monitor the intensity at the output
ports. Provided that the coherence length of the light
used is larger than the path mismatch in the interferom-
eters, interference fringes can be recorded. Taking into
account the π/2-phase shift experienced upon reflection
at a beamsplitter, the effect of the phase modulators (φA
and φB) and the path length difference (∆L), the inten-
sity in the output port labeled “0” is given by:
I0 = I · cos2
(
φA − φB + k∆L
2
)
(36)
where k is the wave number and I the intensity of the
source. If the phase term is equal to π/2 + nπ where n
is an integer, destructive interference is obtained. There-
fore the intensity registered in port “0” reaches a mini-
mum and all the light exits in port “1”. When the phase
term is equal to nπ, the situation is reversed: construc-
tive interference is obtained in port “0”, while the inten-
sity in port “1” goes to a minimum. With intermediate
phase settings, light can be recorded in both ports. This
device acts like an optical switch. It is essential to keep
the path difference stable in order to record stationary
interferences.
Although we discussed the behavior of this interferom-
eter for classical light, it works exactly the same when a
single photon is injected. The probability to detect the
photon in one output port can be varied by changing the
phase. It is the fiber optic version of Young’s slits exper-
iment, where the arms of the interferometer replace the
apertures.
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This interferometer combined with a single photon
source and photon counting detectors can be used for
QC. Alice’s set-up consists of the source, the first coupler
and the first phase modulator, while Bob takes the sec-
ond modulator and coupler, as well as the detectors. Let
us consider the implementation of the four-states BB84
protocol. On the one hand, Alice can apply one of four
phase shifts (0, π/2, π, 3π/2) to encode a bit value. She
associates 0 and π/2 to bit 0, and π and 3π/2 to bit
1. On the other hand, Bob performs a basis choice by
applying randomly a phase shift of either 0 or π/2, and
he associates the detector connected to the output port
“0” to a bit value of 0, and the detector connected to
the port “1” to 1. When the difference of their phase is
equal to 0 or π, Alice and Bob are using compatible bases
and they obtain deterministic results. In such cases, Al-
ice can infer from the phase shift she applied, the output
port chosen by the photon at Bob’s end and hence the
bit value he registered. Bob, on his side, deduces from
the output port chosen by the photon, the phase that
Alice selected. When the phase difference equals π/2 or
3π/2, the bases are incompatible and the photon chooses
randomly which port it takes at Bob’s coupler. This is
summarized in Table 1. We must stress that it is essen-
tial with this scheme to keep the path difference stable
during a key exchange session. It should not change by
more than a fraction of a wavelength of the photons. A
drift of the length of one arm would indeed change the
phase relation between Alice and Bob, and induce errors
in their bit sequence.
Alice Bob
Bit value φA φB φA − φB Bit value
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 π/2 3π/2 ?
1 π 0 π 1
1 π π/2 π/2 ?
0 π/2 0 π/2 ?
0 π/2 π/2 0 0
1 3π/2 0 3π/2 ?
1 3π/2 π/2 π 1
Table 1: Implementation of the BB84 four-states pro-
tocol with phase encoding.
It is interesting to note that encoding qubits with 2-
paths interferometers is formally isomorphic to polar-
ization encoding. The two arms correspond to a nat-
ural basis, and the weights cj of each qubit state ψ =(
c1e
−iφ/2, c2eiφ/2
)
are determined by the coupling ratio
of the first beam splitter while the relative phase φ is in-
troduced in the interferometer. The Poincare´ sphere rep-
resentation, which applies to all two-levels quantum sys-
tems, can also be used to represent phase-coding states.
In this case, the azimuth angle represents the relative
phase between the light having propagated along the two
arms. The elevation corresponds to the coupling ratio of
the first beamsplitter. States produced by a switch are
on the poles, while those resulting from the use of a 50/50
beamsplitter lie on the equator. Figure 15 illustrates this
analogy. Consequently, all polarization schemes can also
be implemented using phase coding. Similarly, every cod-
ing using 2-path interferometers can be realized using po-
larization. However, in practice one choice is often more
convenient than the other, depending on circumstances
like the nature of the quantum channel33.
1. The double Mach-Zehnder implementation
Although the scheme presented in the previous para-
graph works perfectly well on an optical table, it is im-
possible to keep the path difference stable when Alice and
Bob are separated by more than a few meters. As men-
tioned above, the relative length of the arms should not
change by more than a fraction of a wavelength. Consid-
ering a separation between Alice and Bob of 1 kilometer
for example, it is clear that it is not possible to prevent
path difference changes smaller than 1µm caused by en-
vironmental variations. In his 1992 letter, Bennett also
showed how to get round this problem. He suggested to
use two unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers con-
nected in series by a single optical fiber (see Fig. 16),
both Alice and Bob being equipped with one. When
monitoring counts as a function of the time since the
emission of the photons, Bob obtains three peaks (see
the inset in Fig. 16). The first one corresponds to the
cases where the photons chose the short path both in
Alice’s and in Bob’s interferometers, while the last one
corresponds to photons taking twice the long paths. Fi-
nally, the central peak corresponds to photons choosing
the short path in Alice’s interferometer and the long one
in Bob’s, and to the opposite. If these two processes are
indistinguishable, they produce interference. A timing
window can be used to discriminate between interfering
and non-interfering events. Disregarding the latter, it is
then possible for Alice and Bob to exchange a key.
The advantage of this set-up is that both “halves” of
the photon travel in the same optical fiber. They experi-
ence thus the same optical length in the environmentally
sensitive part of the system, provided that the variations
in the fiber are slower than their temporal separations,
determined by the interferometer’s imbalance (≈ 5ns).
This condition is much less difficult to fulfill. In order to
obtain a good interference visibility, and hence a low er-
ror rate, the imbalancements of the interferometers must
33Note, in addition, that using many-path interferometers
opens up the possibility to code quantum systems of dimen-
sions larger than 2, like qutrits, ququarts, etc. (Bechmann-
Pasquinucci and Tittel 2000, Bechmann-Pasquinucci and
Peres 2000, Bourennane et al. 2001a).
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be equal within a fraction of the coherence time of the
photons. This implies that the path differences must be
matched within a few millimeters, which does not con-
stitute a problem. Besides, the imbalancement must be
chosen so that it is possible to clearly distinguish the
three temporal peaks and thus discriminate interfering
from non-interfering events. It must then typically be
larger than the pulse length and than the timing jitter
of the photon counting detectors. In practice, the second
condition is the most stringent one. Assuming a time
jitter of the order of 500ps, an imbalancement of at least
1.5ns keeps the overlap between the peaks low.
The main difficulty associated with this QC scheme is
that the imbalancements of Alice’s and Bob’s interferom-
eters must be kept stable within a fraction of the wave-
length of the photons during a key exchange to maintain
correct phase relations. This implies that the interfer-
ometers must lie in containers whose temperature is sta-
bilized. In addition, for long key exchanges an active
system is necessary to compensate the drifts34. Finally,
in order to ensure the indistinguishability of both inter-
fering processes, one must make sure that in each inter-
ferometer the polarization transformation induced by the
short path is the same as the one induced by the long one.
Alice as much as Bob must then use a polarization con-
troller to fulfill this condition. However, the polarization
transformation in short optical fibers whose temperature
is kept stable, and which do not experience strains, is
rather stable. This adjustment does thus not need to be
repeated frequently.
Paul Tapster and John Rarity from DERA working
with Paul Townsend were the first ones to test this sys-
tem over a fiber optic spool of 10 kilometers (1993a and
1993b). Townsend later improved the interferometer by
replacing Bob’s input coupler by a polarization splitter
to suppress the lateral non-interfering peaks (1994). In
this case, it is unfortunately again necessary to align the
polarization state of the photons at Bob’s, in addition to
the stabilization of the interferometers imbalancement.
He later thoroughly investigated key exchange with phase
coding and improved the transmission distance (Marand
and Townsend 1995, Townsend 1998b). He also tested
the possibility to multiplex at two different wavelengths
a quantum channel with conventional data transmission
over a single optical fiber (Townsend 1997a). Richard
Hughes and his co-workers from Los Alamos National
Laboratory also extensively tested such an interferome-
34Polarization coding requires the optimization of three pa-
rameters (three parameters are necessary for unitary polar-
ization control). In comparison, phase coding requires opti-
mization of only one parameter. This is possible because the
coupling ratios of the beamsplitters are fixed. Both solutions
would be equivalent if one could limit the polarization evolu-
tion to rotations of the elliptic states, without changes in the
ellipticity.
ter (1996 and 2000b), up to distances of 48 km of installed
optical fiber 35.
2. The “Plug-&-Play” systems
As discussed in the two previous sections, both polar-
ization and phase coding require active compensation of
optical path fluctuations. A simple approach would be
to alternate between adjustment periods, where pulses
containing large numbers of photons are exchanged be-
tween Alice and Bob to adjust the compensating system
correcting for slow drifts in phase or polarization, and
qubits transmission periods, where the number of pho-
tons is reduced to a quantum level.
An approach invented in 1989 by Martinelli, then at
CISE Tecnologie Innovative in Milano, allows to auto-
matically and passively compensate all polarization fluc-
tuations in an optical fiber (see also Martinelli, 1992).
Let us consider first what happens to the state of po-
larization of a pulse of light travelling through an op-
tical fiber, before being reflected by a Faraday mirror
– a mirror with a λ4 Faraday rotator
36 – in front, and
coming back. We must first define a convenient descrip-
tion of the change in polarization of light reflected by
a mirror under perpendicular incidence. Let the mirror
be in the x-y plane and z be the optical axis. Clearly,
all linear polarization states are unchanged by a reflec-
tion. But right-handed circular polarization is changed
into left-handed and vice-versa. Actually, after a reflec-
tion the rotation continues in the same sense, but since
the propagation direction is reversed, right-handed and
left-handed are swapped. The same holds for elliptic po-
larization states: the axes of the ellipse are unchanged,
35Note that in this experiment Hughes and his coworkers
used an unusually high mean number of photons per pulse
(They used a mean photon number of approximately 0.6 in
the central interference peak, corresponding to a µ ≈ 1.2 in
the pulses leaving Alice. The latter value is the relevant one
for an eavesdropping analysis, since Eve could use an inter-
ferometer – conceivable with present technology – where the
first coupler is replaced by an optical switch and which allows
her to exploit all the photons sent by Alice.). In the light of
this high µ and of the optical losses (22.8 dB), one may argue
that this implementation was not secure, even when taking
into account only so-called realistic eavesdropping strategies
(see VI I). Finally, it is possible to estimate the results that
other groups would have obtained if they had used a similar
value of µ. One then finds that key distribution distances
of the same order could have been achieved. This illustrates
that the distance is a somewhat arbitrary figure of merit for
a QC system.
36These components, commercially available, are extremely
compact and convenient when using telecommunications
wavelengths, which is not true for other wavelengths.
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but right and left are exchanged. Accordingly, on the
Poincare´ sphere the polarization transformation upon re-
flection is described by a symmetry through the equa-
torial plane: the north and south hemispheres are ex-
changed: ~m→ (m1,m2,−m3). Or in terms of the qubit
state vector:
T :
(
ψ1
ψ2
)
→
(
ψ∗2
ψ∗1
)
(37)
This is a simple representation, but some attention has
to be paid. Indeed this transformation is not a unitary
one! Actually, the above description switches from a
right-handed reference frame XY Z to a left handed one
XY Z˜, where Z˜ = −Z. There is nothing wrong in doing
so and this explains the non-unitary polarization trans-
formation37. Note that other descriptions are possible,
but they require to artificially break the XY symmetry.
The main reason for choosing this particular transforma-
tion is that the description of the polarization evolution
in the optical fiber before and after the reflection is then
straightforward. Indeed, let U = e−iω ~B~σℓ/2 describe this
evolution under the effect of some modal birefringence
~B in a fiber section of length ℓ (~σ is the vector whose
components are the Pauli matrices). Then, the evolution
after reflection is simply described by the inverse opera-
tor U−1 = eiω ~B~σℓ/2. Now that we have a description for
the mirror, let us add the Faraday rotator. It produces
a π2 rotation of the Poincare´ sphere around the north-
south axis: F = e−iπσz/4 (see Fig. 17). Because the
Faraday effect is non-reciprocal (remember that it is due
to a magnetic field which can be thought of as produced
by a spiraling electric current), the direction of rotation
around the north-south axis is independent of the light
propagation direction. Accordingly, after reflection on
the mirror, the second passage through the Faraday ro-
tator rotates the polarization in the same direction (see
again Fig. 17) and is described by the same operator F .
Consequently, the total effect of a Faraday mirror is to
change any incoming polarization state into its orthogo-
nal state ~m→ −~m. This is best seen on Fig. 17, but can
also be expressed mathematically:
FTF :
(
ψ1
ψ2
)
→
(
ψ∗2
−ψ∗1
)
(38)
Finally, the whole optical fiber can be modelled as con-
sisting of a discrete number of birefringent elements. If
37Note that this transformation is positive, but not com-
pletely positive. It is thus closely connected to the partial
transposition map (Peres 1996). If several photons are entan-
gled, then it is crucial to describe all of them in frames with
the same chirality. Actually that this is necessary is the con-
tent of the Peres-Horodecki entanglement witness (Horodecki
et al. 1996).
there are N such elements in front of the Faraday mirror,
the change in polarization during a round trip can be
expressed as (recall that the operator FTF only changes
the sign of the corresponding Bloch vector ~m = 〈ψ|~σ|ψ〉):
U−11 ...U
−1
N FTFUN ...U1 = FTF (39)
The output polarization state is thus orthogonal to the
input one, regardless of any birefringence in the fibers.
This approach can thus correct for time varying birefrin-
gence changes, provided that they are slow compared to
the time required for the light to make a round trip (a
few hundreds of microseconds).
By combining this approach with time-multiplexing
in a long path interferometer, it is possible to imple-
ment a quantum cryptography system based on phase
coding where all optical and mechanical fluctuations are
automatically and passively compensated (Muller et al.
1997). We performed a first experiment in early 1997
(Zbinden et al., 1997), and a key was exchanged over an
installed optical fiber cable of 23 km (the same one as in
the case of polarization coding mentioned before). This
setup features a high interference contrast (fringe visi-
bility of 99.8%) and an excellent long term stability and
clearly established the value of the approach for QC. The
fact that no optical adjustments are necessary earned it
the nickname of “plug & play” set-up. It is interesting to
note that the idea of combining time-multiplexing with
Faraday mirrors was first used to implement an “optical
microphone” (Bre´guet and Gisin, 1995)38.
However, our first realization still suffered from certain
optical inefficiencies, and has been improved since then.
Similar to the setup tested in 1997, the new system is
based on time multiplexing as well, where the interfering
pulses travel along the same optical path, however, in
different time ordering. A schematic is shown in Fig. 18.
Briefly, to understand the general idea, pulses emitted
at Bobs can travel either via the short arm at Bob’s, be
reflected at the Faraday mirror FM at Alice’s and finally,
back at Bobs, travel via the long arm. Or, they travel
first via the long arm at Bob’s, get reflected at Alice’s,
travel via the short arm at Bob’s and then superpose
with the first mentioned possibility on beamsplitter C1.
We now explain the realization of this scheme more in
detail: A short and bright laser pulse is injected in the
system through a circulator. It splits at a coupler. One
of the half pulses, labeled P1, propagates through the
short arm of Bob’s set-up directly to a polarizing beam-
splitter. The polarization transformation in this arm is
set so that it is fully transmitted. P1 is then sent onto
the fiber optic link. The second half pulse, labeled P2,
38Note that since then, we have used this interferometer for
various other applications: non-linear index of refraction mea-
surement in fibers (Vinegoni et al., 2000a), optical switch
(Vinegoni et al., 2000b).
27
takes the long arm to the polarizing beamsplitter. The
polarization evolution is such that it is reflected. A phase
modulator present in this long arm is left inactive so that
it imparts no phase shift to the outgoing pulse. P2 is
also sent onto the link, with a delay of the order of 200
ns. Both half pulses travel to Alice. P1 goes through a
coupler. The diverted light is detected with a classical
detector to provide a timing signal. This detector is also
important in preventing so called Trojan Horse attacks
discussed in section VIK. The non-diverted light prop-
agates then through an attenuator and a optical delay
line – consisting simply of an optical fiber spool – whose
role will be explained later. Finally it passes a phase
modulator, before being reflected by Faraday mirror. P2
follows the same path. Alice activates briefly her modula-
tor to apply a phase shift on P1 only, in order to encode
a bit value exactly like in the traditional phase coding
scheme. The attenuator is set so that when the pulses
leave Alice, they do not contain more than a fraction of a
photon. When they reach the PBS after their return trip
through the link, the polarization state of the pulses is
exactly orthogonal to what it was when they left, thanks
to the effect of the Faraday mirror. P1 is then reflected
instead of being transmitted. It takes the long arm to
the coupler. When it passes, Bob activates his modula-
tor to apply a phase shift used to implement his basis
choice. Similarly, P2 is transmitted and takes the short
arm. Both pulses reach the coupler at the same time and
they interfere. Single-photon detectors are then use to
record the output port chosen by the photon.
We implemented with this set-up the full four states
BB84 protocol. The system was tested once again on
the same installed optical fiber cable linking Geneva and
Nyon (23 km, see Fig. 13) at 1300 nm and observed
a very low QBERopt ≈ 1.4% (Ribordy et al. 1998 and
2000). Proprietary electronics and software were devel-
oped to allow fully automated and user-friendly operation
of the system. Because of the intrinsically bi-directional
nature of this system, great attention must be paid to
Rayleigh backscattering. The light traveling in an optical
fiber undergoes scattering by inhomogeneities. A small
fraction (≈1%) of this light is recaptured by the fiber
in the backward direction. When the repetition rate is
high enough, pulses traveling to Alice and back from her
must intersect at some point along the line. Their inten-
sity is however strongly different. The pulses are more
than a thousand times brighter before than after reflec-
tion from Alice. Backscattered photons can accompany
a quantum pulse propagating back to Bob and induce
false counts. We avoided this problem by making sure
that pulses traveling from and to Bob are not present in
the line simultaneously. They are emitted in the form
of trains by Bob. Alice stores these trains in her optical
delay line, which consists of an optical fiber spool. Bob
waits until all the pulses of a train have reached him, be-
fore sending the next one. Although it completely solves
the problem of Rayleigh backscattering induced errors,
this configuration has the disadvantage of reducing the
effective repetition frequency. A storage line half long as
the transmission line amounts to a reduction of the bit
rate by a factor of approximately three.
Researchers at IBM developed a similar system simul-
taneously and independently (Bethune and Risk, 2000),
also working at 1300 nm. However, they avoided the
problems associated with Rayleigh backscattering, by re-
ducing the intensity of the pulses emitted by Bob. As
these cannot be used for synchronization purposes any
longer, they added a classical channel wavelength mul-
tiplexed (1550 nm) in the line, to allow Bob and Alice
to synchronize their systems. They tested their set-up
on a 10 km long optical fiber spool. Both of these sys-
tems are equivalent and exhibit similar performances. In
addition, the group of Anders Karlsson at the Royal In-
stitute of Technology in Stockholm verified in 1999 that
this technique also works at a wavelength of 1550 nm
(Bourennane et al., 1999 and Bourennane et al., 2000).
These experiments demonstrate the potential of “plug &
play”-like systems for real world quantum key distribu-
tion. They certainly constitute a good candidate for the
realization of prototypes.
Their main disadvantage with respect to the other sys-
tems discussed in this section is that they are more sensi-
tive to Trojan horse strategies (see section VIK). Indeed,
Eve could send a probe beam and recover it through the
strong reflection by the mirror at the end of Alice’s sys-
tem. To prevent such an attack, Alice adds an attenu-
ator to reduce the amount of light propagating through
her system. In addition, she must monitor the incoming
intensity using a classical linear detector. Besides, sys-
tems based on this approach cannot be operated with a
true single-photon source, and will thus not benefit from
the progress in this field 39.
D. Frequency coding
Phase based systems for QC require phase synchroniza-
tion and stabilization. Because of the high frequency of
optical waves (approximately 200 THz at 1550 nm), this
condition is difficult to fulfill. One solution is to use self-
aligned systems like the “plug&play” set-ups discussed
in the previous section. Prof. Goedgebuer and his team
from the University of Besanc¸on, in France, introduced
an alternative solution (Sun et al. 1995, Mazurenko et al.
1997, Me´rolla et al. 1999; see also Molotkov 1998). Note
that the title of this section is not completely correct in
the sense that the value of the qubits is not coded in the
frequency of the light, but in the relative phase between
sidebands of a central optical frequency.
39The fact that the pulses travel along a round trip implies
that losses are doubled, yielding a reduced counting rate.
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Their system is depicted in Fig. 19. A source emits
short pulses of classical monochromatic light with angu-
lar frequency ωS . A first phase modulator PMA modu-
lates the phase of this beam with a frequency Ω ≪ ωS
and a small modulation depth. Two sidebands are thus
generated at frequencies ωS±Ω. The phase modulator is
driven by a radio-frequency oscillatorRFOA whose phase
ΦA can be varied. Finally, the beam is attenuated so that
the sidebands contain much less than one photon per
pulse, while the central peak remains classical. After the
transmission link, the beam experiences a second phase
modulation applied by PMB. This phase modulator is
driven by a second radio-frequency oscillator RFOB with
the same frequency Ω and a phase ΦB. These oscillators
must be synchronized. After passing through this device,
the beam contains the original central frequency ωS, the
sidebands created by Alice, and the sidebands created by
Bob. The sidebands at frequencies ωS ± Ω are mutually
coherent and thus yield interference. Bob can then record
the interference pattern in these sidebands, after removal
of the central frequency and the higher order sidebands
with a spectral filter.
To implement the B92 protocol (see paragraph IID 1),
Alice randomly chooses the value of the phase ΦA, for
each pulse. She associates a bit value of “0” to the phase
0 and the bit “1” to phase π. Bob also chooses randomly
whether to apply a phase ΦB of 0 or π. One can see that
if |ΦA − ΦB| = 0, the interference is constructive and
Bob’s single-photon detector has a non-zero probability
of recording a count. This probability depends on the
number of photons present initially in the sideband, as
well as the losses induced by the channel. On the other
hand, if |ΦA − ΦB| = π, interference is destructive and
no count will ever be recorded. Consequently, Bob can
infer, everytime he records a count, that he applied the
same phase as Alice. When a given pulse does not yield
a detection, the reason can be that the phases applied
were different and destructive interference took place. It
can also mean that the phases were actually equal, but
the pulse was empty or the photon got lost. Bob cannot
decide between these two possibilities. From a concep-
tual point of view, Alice sends one of two non-orthogonal
states. There is then no way for Bob to distinguish be-
tween them deterministically. However he can perform a
generalized measurement, also known as a positive opera-
tor value measurement, which will sometimes fail to give
an answer, and at all other times gives the correct one.
Eve could perform the same measurement as Bob.
When she obtains an inconclusive result, she could just
block both the sideband and the central frequency so
that she does not have to guess a value and does not risk
introducing an error. To prevent her from doing that,
Bob verifies the presence of this central frequency. Now
if Eve tries to conceal her presence by blocking only the
sideband, the reference central frequency will still have
a certain probability of introducing an error. It is thus
possible to catch Eve in both cases. The monitoring of
the reference beam is essential in all two-states protocol
to reveal eavesdropping. In addition, it was shown that
this reference beam monitoring can be extended to the
four-states protocol (Huttner et al., 1995).
The advantage of this set-up is that the interference
is controlled by the phase of the radio-frequency oscilla-
tors. Their frequency is 6 orders of magnitude smaller
than the optical frequency, and thus considerably easier
to stabilize and synchronize. It is indeed a relatively sim-
ple task that can be achieved by electronic means. The
Besanc¸on group performed key distribution with such a
system. The source they used was a DBR laser diode
at a wavelength of 1540 nm and a bandwidth of 1 MHz.
It was externally modulated to obtain 50 ns pulses, thus
increasing the bandwidth to about 20 MHz. They used
two identical LiNbO3 phase modulators operating at a
frequency Ω/2π = 300MHz. Their spectral filter was
a Fabry-Perot cavity with a finesse of 55. Its resolution
was 36 MHz. They performed key distribution over a
20 km long single-mode optical fiber spool, recording a
QBERopt contribution of approximately 4%. They es-
timated that 2% can be attributed to the transmission
of the central frequency by the Fabry-Perot cavity. Note
also that the detector noise is relatively large due to the
large pulse durations. Both these errors could be lowered
by increasing the separation between the central peak
and the sidebands, allowing reduced pulse widths, hence
shorter detection times and lower darkcounts. Neverthe-
less, a compromise must be found since, in addition to
technical drawbacks of high speed modulation, the po-
larization transformation in an optical fiber depends on
the wavelength. The remaining 2% of the QBERopt is
due to polarization effects in the set-up.
This system is another possible candidate. It’s main
advantage is the fact that it could be used with a true
single-photon source, if it existed. On the other hand,
the contribution of imperfect interference visibility to the
error rate is significantly higher than that measured with
“plug&play” systems. In addition, if this system is to be
truly independent of polarization, it is essential to ensure
that the phase modulators have very low polarization
dependency. In addition, the stability of the frequency
filter may constitute a practical difficulty.
E. Free space line-of-sight applications
Since optical fiber channels may not always be avail-
able, several groups are trying to develop free space line-
of-sight QC systems, capable for example to distribute a
key between buildings rooftops in an urban setting.
It may of course sound difficult to detect single pho-
tons amidst background light, but the first experiments
demonstrated the possibility of free space QC. Besides,
sending photons through the atmosphere also has advan-
tages, since this medium is essentially not birefringent
(see paragraph III B 4). It is then possible to use plain
polarization coding. In addition, one can ensure a very
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high channel transmission over large distances by choos-
ing carefully the wavelength of the photons (see again
paragraph III B 4). The atmosphere has for example a
high transmission “window” in the vicinity of 770 nm
(transmission as high as 80% between a ground station
and a satellite), which happens to be compatible with
commercial silicon APD photon counting modules (de-
tection efficiency as high as 65% and low noise).
The systems developed for free space applications are
actually very similar to the one shown in Fig. 12. The
main difference is that the emitter and receiver are con-
nected to telescopes pointing at each other, instead of
an optical fiber. The contribution of background light
to errors can be maintained at a reasonable level by us-
ing a combination of timing discrimination (coincidence
windows of typically a few ns), spectral filtering (≤ 1 nm
interference filters) and spatial filtering (coupling into an
optical fiber). This can be illustrated with the follow-
ing simple calculation. Let us suppose that the isotropic
spectral background radiance is 10−2 W/m2 nm sr at
800 nm. This corresponds to the spectral radiance of a
clear zenith sky with a sun elevation of 77◦ (Zissis and
Larocca, 1978). The divergence θ of a Gaussian beam
with radius w0 is given by θ = λ/w0π. The product of
beam (telescope) cross-section and solid angle, which is a
constant, is therefore πw20πθ
2 = λ2. By multiplying the
radiance by λ2, one obtains the spectral power density.
With an interference filter of 1 nm width, the power on
the detector is 6 · 10−15 W, corresponding to 2 · 104 pho-
tons per second or 2 · 10−5 photons per ns time window.
This quantity is approximately two orders of magnitude
larger than the dark count probability of Si APD’s, but
still compatible with the requirements of QC. Besides the
performance of free space QC systems depends dramati-
cally on atmospheric conditions and air quality. This is
problematic for urban applications where pollution and
aerosols degrade the transparency of air.
The first free space QC experiment over a distance of
more than a few centimeters 40 was performed by Jacobs
and Franson in 1996. They exchanged a key over a dis-
tance of 150 m in a hallway illuminated with standard
fluorescent lighting and 75 m outdoor in bright daylight
without excessive QBER. Hughes and his team were the
first to exchange a key over more than one kilometer un-
der outdoor nighttime conditions (Buttler et al. 1998,
and Hughes et al. 2000a). More recently, they even im-
proved their system to reach a distance of 1.6 km under
daylight conditions (Buttler et al. 2000). Finally Rarity
and his coworkers performed a similar experiment where
they exchanged a key over a distance of 1.9 km under
nighttime conditions (Gorman et al. 2000).
40Remember that Bennett and his coworkers performed the
first demonstration of QC over 30 cm in air (Bennett et al.
1992a).
Before quantum repeaters become available and allow
to overcome the distance limitation of fiber based QC,
free space systems seem to offer the only possibility for
QC over distances of more than a few dozens kilome-
ters. A QC link could be established between ground
based stations and a low orbit (300 to 1200 km) satel-
lite. The idea is first to exchange a key kA between Alice
and a satellite, using QC, next to establish another key
kB between Bob and the same satellite. Then the satel-
lite publicly announces the value K = kA ⊕ kB obtained
after an XOR of the two keys (⊕ represents here the
XOR operator or equivalently the binary addition mod-
ulo 2 without carry). Bob subtracts then his key from
this value to recover Alice’s key (kA = K ⊖ kB) 41. The
fact that the key is known to the satellite operator may
be at first sight seen as a disadvantage. But this point
might on the contrary be a very positive one for the de-
velopment of QC, since governments always like to keep
control of communications! Although this has not yet
been demonstrated, Hughes as well as Rarity have es-
timated - in view of their free space experiments - that
the difficulty can be mastered. The main difficulty would
come from beam pointing - don’t forget that the satel-
lites will move with respect to the ground - and wander-
ing induced by turbulences. In order to reduce this latter
problem the photons would in practice probably be sent
down from the satellite. Atmospheric turbulences are in-
deed almost entirely concentrated on the first kilometer
above the earth surface. Another possibility to compen-
sate for beam wander is to use adaptative optics. Free
space QC experiments over distances of the order of 2
km constitute major steps towards key exchange with a
satellite. According to Buttler et al. (2000), the optical
depth is indeed similar to the effective atmospheric thick-
ness that would be encountered in a surface-to-satellite
application.
F. Multi-users implementations
Paul Townsend and colleagues investigated the ap-
plication of QC over multi-user optical fiber networks
(Phoenix et al 1995, Townsend et al. 1994, Townsend
1997b). They used a passive optical fiber network ar-
chitecture where one Alice – the network manager – is
connected to multiple network users (i.e. many Bobs, see
Fig. 20). The goal is for Alice to establish a verifiably
secure and unique key with each Bob. In the classical
limit, the information transmitted by Alice is gathered by
all Bobs. However, because of their quantum behavior,
41This scheme could also be used with optical fiber imple-
mentation provided that secure nodes exist. In the case of a
satellite, one tacitly assumes that it constitutes such a secure
node.
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the photons are effectively routed at the beamsplitter to
one, and only one, of the users. Using the double Mach-
Zehnder configuration discussed above, they tested such
an arrangement with three Bobs. Nevertheless, because
of the fact that QC requires a direct and low attenuation
optical channel between Alice and Bob, the possibility to
implement it over large and complex networks appears
limited.
V. EXPERIMENTAL QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH PHOTON PAIRS
The possibility to use entangled photon pairs for quan-
tum cryptography was first proposed by Ekert in 1991.
In a subsequent paper, he investigated, with other re-
searchers, the feasibility of a practical system (Ekert et
al., 1992). Although all tests of Bell inequalities (for a
review, see for example, Zeilinger 1999) can be seen as
experiments of quantum cryptography, systems specifi-
cally designed to meet the special requirements of QC,
like quick change of bases, were first implemented only
recently 42. In 1999, three groups demonstrated quan-
tum cryptography based on the properties of entangled
photons. They were reported in the same issue of Phys.
Rev. Lett. (Jennewein et al. 2000b, Naik et al. 2000,
Tittel et al. 2000), illustrating the fast progress in the
still new field of quantum communication.
When using photon pairs for QC, one advantage lies
in the fact that one can remove empty pulses, since the
detection of one photon of a pair reveals the presence of
a companion. In principle, it is thus possible to have
a probability of emitting a non-empty pulse equal to
one43. It is beneficial only because presently available
single-photon detector feature high dark count probabil-
ity. The difficulty to always collect both photons of a pair
somewhat reduces this advantage. One frequently hears
that photon-pairs have also the advantage of avoiding
multi-photon pulses, but this is not correct. For a given
mean photon number, the probability that a non-empty
pulse contains more than one photon is essentially the
same for weak pulses and for photon pairs (see paragraph
IIIA 2). Second, using entangled photons pairs prevents
unintended information leakage in unused degrees of free-
dom (Mayers and Yao 1998). Observing a QBER smaller
than approximately 15%, or equivalently that Bell’s in-
equality is violated, indeed guarantees that the photons
are entangled and so that the different states are not
fully distinguishable through other degrees of freedom.
A third advantage was indicated recently by new and
elaborate eavesdropping analyses. The fact that passive
state preparation can be implemented prevents multipho-
ton splitting attacks (see section VI J).
42This definition of quantum cryptography applies to the fa-
mous experiment by Aspect and his co-workers testing Bell
inequalities with time varying analyzers (Aspect et al., 1982).
QC had however not yet been invented. It also applies to the
more recent experiments closing the locality loopholes, like
the one performed in Innsbruck using fast polarization mod-
ulators (Weihs et al. 1998) or the one performed in Geneva
using two analyzers on each side (Tittel et al. 1999; Gisin and
Zbinden 1999).
43Photon pair sources are often, though not always, pumped
continuously. In these cases, the time window determined by
a trigger detector and electronics defines an effective pulse.
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The coupling between the optical frequency and the
property used to encode the qubit, i.e. decoherence, is
rather easy to master when using faint laser pulses. How-
ever, this issue is more serious when using photon pairs,
because of the larger spectral width. For example, for a
spectral width of 5 nm FWHM – a typical value, equiva-
lent to a coherence time of 1 ps – and a fiber with a typical
PMD of 0.2 ps/
√
km, transmission over a few kilometers
induces significant depolarization, as discussed in para-
graph III B 2. In case of polarization-entangled photons,
this gradually destroys their correlation. Although it is in
principle possible to compensate this effect, the statistical
nature of the PMD makes this impractical44. Although
perfectly fine for free-space QC (see section IVE), polar-
ization entanglement is thus not adequate for QC over
long optical fibers. A similar effect arises when dealing
with energy-time entangled photons. Here, the chromatic
dispersion destroys the strong time-correlations between
the photons forming a pair. However, as discussed in
paragraph III B 3, it is possible to passively compensate
for this effect using either additional fibers with opposite
dispersion, or exploiting the inherent energy correlation
of photon pairs.
Generally speaking, entanglement based systems are
far more complex than faint laser pulses set-ups. They
will most certainly not be used in the short term for the
realization of industrial prototypes. In addition the cur-
rent experimental key creation rates obtained with these
systems are at least two orders of magnitude smaller than
those obtained with faint laser pulses set-ups (net rate in
the order of a few tens of bits per second rather than a few
thousands bits per second for a 10 km distance). Nev-
ertheless, they offer interesting possibilities in the con-
text of cryptographic optical networks The photon pairs
source can indeed be operated by a key provider and sit-
uated somewhere in between potential QC customers. In
this case, the operator of the source has no way to get any
information about the key obtained by Alice and Bob.
It is interesting to emphasize the close analogy between
1 and 2-photon schemes, which was first noted by Ben-
nett, Brassard and Mermin (1992). Indeed, in a 2-photon
scheme, one can always consider that when Alice detects
her photon, she effectively prepares Bob’s photon in a
given state. In the 1-photon analog, Alice’s detectors
are replaced by sources, while the photon pair source be-
tween Alice and Bob is bypassed. The difference between
these schemes lies only in practical issues, like the spec-
tral widths of the light. Alternatively, one can look at
this analogy from a different point of view: in 2-photon
44In the case of weak pulses we saw that a full round trip to-
gether with the use of Faraday mirrors circumvents the prob-
lem (see paragraph IVC2). However, since the channel loss
on the way from the source to the Faraday mirror inevitably
increases the empty pulses fraction, the main advantage of
photon pairs vanishes in such a configuration.
schemes, everything is as if Alice’s photon propagated
backwards in time from Alice to the source and then for-
wards from the source to Bob.
A. Polarization entanglement
A first class of experiments takes advantage of
polarization-entangled photon pairs. The setup, depicted
in Fig. 21, is similar to the scheme used for polarization
coding based on faint pulses. A two-photon source emits
pairs of entangled photons flying back to back towards
Alice and Bob. Each photon is analyzed with a polar-
izing beamsplitter whose orientation with respect to a
common reference system can be changed rapidly. Two
experiments, have been reported in the spring of 2000
(Jennewein et al. 2000b, Naik et al. 2000). Both used
photon pairs at a wavelength of 700 nm, which were de-
tected with commercial single photon detectors based on
Silicon APD’s. To create the photon pairs, both groups
took advantage of parametric downconversion in one or
two BBO crystals pumped by an argon-ion laser. The an-
alyzers consisted of fast modulators, used to rotate the
polarization state of the photons, in front of polarizing
beamsplitters.
The group of Anton Zeilinger, then at the University of
Innsbruck, demonstrated such a crypto-system, including
error correction, over a distance of 360 meters (Jennewein
et al. 2000b). Inspired by a test of Bell inequalities
performed with the same set-up a year earlier (Weihs et
al., 1998), the two-photon source was located near the
center between the two analyzers. Special optical fibers,
designed for guiding only a single mode at 700 nm, were
used to transmit the photons to the two analyzers. The
results of the remote measurements were recorded locally
and the processes of key sifting and of error correction
implemented at a later stage, long after the distribution
of the qubits. Two different protocols were implemented:
one based on Wigner’s inequality (a special form of Bell
inequalities), and the other one following BB84.
The group of Paul Kwiat then at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, demonstrated the Ekert protocol (Naik et al.
2000). This experiment was a table-top realization with
the source and the analyzers only separated by a few
meters. The quantum channel consisted of a short free
space distance. In addition to performing QC, the re-
searchers simulated different eavesdropping strategies as
well. As predicted by the theory, they observed a rise of
the QBER with an increase of the information obtained
by the eavesdropper. Moreover, they also recently im-
plemented the six-state protocol described in paragraph
IID 2, and observed the predicted QBER increase to 33%
(Enzer et al. 2001).
The main advantage of polarization entanglement is
the fact that analyzers are simple and efficient. It is
therefore relatively easy to obtain high contrast. Naik
and co-workers, for example, measured a polarization
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extinction of 97%, mainly limited by electronic imper-
fections of the fast modulators. This amounts to a
QBERopt contribution of only 1.5%. In addition, the
constraint on the coherence length of the pump laser is
not very stringent (note that if it is shorter than the
length of the crystal some difficulties can appear, but we
will not mention them here).
In spite of their qualities, it would be difficult to repro-
duce these experiments on distances of more than a few
kilometers of optical fiber. As mentioned in the intro-
duction to this chapter, polarization is indeed not robust
enough to decoherence in optical fibers. In addition, the
polarization state transformation induced by an installed
fiber frequently fluctuates, making an active alignment
system absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, these exper-
iments are very interesting in the context of free space
QC.
B. Energy-time entanglement
1. Phase-coding
The other class of experiments takes advantage of
energy-time entangled photon pairs. The idea originates
from an arrangement proposed by Franson in 1989 to
test Bell inequalities. As we will see below, it is com-
parable to the double Mach-Zehnder configuration dis-
cussed in section IVC1. A source emits pairs of energy-
correlated photons with both particles created at exactly
the same, however uncertain time (see Fig. 22). This
can be achieved by pumping a non-linear crystal with
a pump of large coherence time. The pairs of down-
converted photons are then split, and one photon is sent
to each party down quantum channels. Both Alice and
Bob possess a widely, but identically unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer, with photon counting detectors
connected to the outputs. Locally, if Alice or Bob change
the phase of their interferometer, no effect on the count
rates is observed, since the imbalancement prevents any
single-photon interference. Looking at the detection-time
at Bob’s with respect to the arrival time at Alice’s, three
different values are possible for each combination of de-
tectors. The different possibilities in a time spectrum
are shown in Fig. 22. First, both photons can propagate
through the short arms of the interferometers. Next, one
can take the long arm at Alice’s, while the other one
takes the short one at Bob’s. The opposite is also pos-
sible. Finally, both photons can propagate through the
long arms. When the path differences of the interferome-
ters are matched within a fraction of the coherence length
of the down-converted photons, the short-short and the
long-long processes are indistinguishable, provided that
the coherence length of the pump photon is larger than
the path-length difference. Conditioning detection only
on the central time peak, one observes two-photon inter-
ferences which depends on the sum of the relative phases
in Alice’s and Bob’s interferometer – non-local quantum
correlation (Franson 1989)45 – see Fig. 22. The phase
in the interferometers at Alice’s and Bob’s can, for ex-
ample, be adjusted so that both photons always emerge
from the same output port. It is then possible to ex-
change bits by associating values to the two ports. This
is, however, not sufficient. A second measurement basis
must be implemented, to ensure security against eaves-
dropping attempts. This can be done for example by
adding a second interferometer to the systems (see Fig.
23). In the latter case, when reaching an analyzer, a
photon chooses randomly to go to one or the other in-
terferometer. The second set of interferometers can be
adjusted to also yield perfect correlations between out-
put ports. The relative phase between their arms should
however be chosen so that when the photons go to inter-
ferometers not associated, the outcomes are completely
uncorrelated.
Such a system features a passive state preparation by
Alice, yielding security against multiphoton splitting at-
tacks (see section VI J). In addition, it also features a
passive basis choice by Bob, which constitutes an elegant
solution: neither a random number generator, nor an
active modulator are necessary. It is nevertheless clear
that QBERdet and QBERacc (defined in eq. (33)) are
doubled since the number of activated detectors is twice
as high. This disadvantage is however not as important
as it first appears since the alternative, a fast modula-
tor, introduces losses close to 3dB, also resulting in an
increase of these error contributions. The striking simi-
larity between this scheme and the double Mach-Zehnder
arrangement discussed in the context of faint laser pulses
in section IVC1 is obvious when comparing Fig. 24 and
Fig. 16!
This scheme has been realized in the first half of 2000
by our group at Geneva University (Ribordy et al., 2001).
It constitutes the first experiment in which an asymmet-
ric setup, optimized for QC was used instead of a system
designed for tests of Bell inequality and having a source
located in the center between Alice and Bob (see Fig.
25). The two-photon source (a KNbO3 crystal pumped
by a doubled Nd-YAG laser) provides energy-time entan-
gled photons at non-degenerate wavelengths – one around
810 nm, the other one centered at 1550 nm. This choice
allows to use high efficiency silicon based single photon
counters featuring low noise to detect the photons of the
lower wavelength. To avoid the high transmission losses
at this wavelength in optical fibers, the distance between
the source and the corresponding analyzer is very short,
45The imbalancement of the interferometers must be large
enough so that the middle peak can easily be distinguished
from the satellite ones. This minimal imbalancement is de-
termined by the convolution of the detector’s jitter (tens of
ps), the electronic jitter (from tens to hundreds of ps) and the
single-photon coherence time (<1ps).
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of the order of a few meters. The other photon, at the
wavelength where fiber losses are minimal, is sent via
an optical fiber to Bob’s interferometer and is then de-
tected by InGaAs APD’s. The decoherence induced by
chromatic dispersion is limited by the use of dispersion-
shifted optical fiber (see section III B 3).
Implementing the BB84 protocols in the way discussed
above, with a total of four interferometers, is difficult.
They must indeed be aligned and their relative phase
kept accurately stable during the whole key distribution
session. To simplify this problem, we devised birefringent
interferometers with polarization multiplexing of the two
bases. Consequently, the constraint on the stability of the
interferometers is equivalent to that encountered in the
faint pulses double Mach-Zehnder system. We obtained
interference visibilities of typically 92%, yielding in turn
a QBERopt contribution of about 4%. We demonstrated
QC over a transmission distance of 8.5 km in a laboratory
setting using a fiber on a spool and generated several
Mbits of key in hour long sessions. This is the largest
span realized to date for QC with photon pairs.
As already mentioned, it is essential for this scheme to
have a pump laser whose coherence length is larger than
the path imbalancement of the interferometers. In addi-
tion, its wavelength must remain stable during a key ex-
change session. These requirements imply that the pump
laser must be somewhat more elaborate than in the case
of polarization entanglement.
2. Phase-time coding
We have mentioned in section IVC that states gener-
ated by two-paths interferometers are two-levels quantum
systems. They can also be represented on a Poincare´
sphere. The four-states used for phase coding in the
previous section would lie on the equator of the sphere,
equally distributed. The coupling ratio of the beamsplit-
ter is indeed 50%, and they differ only by a phase dif-
ference introduced between the components propagating
through either arm. In principle, the four-state proto-
col can be equally well implemented with only two states
on the equator and the two other ones on the poles. In
this section, we present a system exploiting such a set
of states. Proposed by our group in 1999 (Brendel et
al., 1999), the scheme follows in principle the Franson
configuration described in the context of phase coding.
However, it is based on a pulsed source emitting entan-
gled photons in so-called energy-time Bell states (Tittel
et al. 2000). The emission time of the photon pair is
therefore given by a superposition of only two discrete
terms, instead of a wide and continuous range bounded
only by the large coherence length of the pump laser (see
paragraph VB1).
Consider Fig. 26. If Alice registers the arrival times
of the photons with respect to the emission time of the
pump pulse t0, she finds the photons in one of three time
slots (note that she has two detectors to take into ac-
count). For instance, detection of a photon in the first
slot corresponds to “pump photon having traveled via the
short arm and downconverted photon via the short arm”.
To keep it short, we refer to this process as | s 〉P , | s 〉A,
where P stands for the pump- and A for Alice’s pho-
ton46. However, the characterization of the complete
photon pair is still ambiguous, since, at this point, the
path of the photon having traveled to Bob (short or long
in his interferometer) is unknown to Alice. Figure 26
illustrates all processes leading to a detection in the dif-
ferent time slots both at Alice’s and at Bob’s detector.
Obviously, this reasoning holds for any combination of
two detectors. In order to build up the secret key, Al-
ice and Bob now publicly agree about the events where
both detected a photon in one of the satellite peaks –
without revealing in which one – or both in the central
peak – without revealing the detector. This procedure
corresponds to key-sifting. For instance, in the example
discussed above, if Bob tells Alice that he also detected
his photon in a satellite peak, she knows that it must
have been the left peak as well. This is due to the fact
that the pump photon has traveled via the short arm –
hence Bob can detect his photon either in the left satellite
or in the central peak. The same holds for Bob who now
knows that Alice’s photon traveled via the short arm in
her interferometer. Therefore, in case of joint detection
in a satellite peak, Alice and Bob must have correlated
detection times. Assigning a bit value to each side peak,
Alice and Bob can exchange a sequence of correlated bits.
The cases where both find the photon in the central
time slot are used to implement the second basis. They
correspond to the | s 〉P , | l 〉A| l 〉B and | l 〉P , | s 〉A| s 〉B
possibilities. If these are indistinguishable, one obtains
two-photon interferences, exactly as in the case discussed
in the previous paragraph on phase coding. Adjusting
the phases, and maintaining them stable, perfect corre-
lations between output ports chosen by the photons at
Alice’s and Bob’s interferometers are used to establish
the key bits in this second basis.
Phase-time coding has recently been implemented in a
laboratory experiment by our group (Tittel et al., 2000)
and was reported at the same time as the two polariza-
tion entanglement-based schemes mentioned above. A
contrast of approximately 93% was obtained, yielding a
QBERopt contribution of 3.5%, similar to that obtained
with the phase coding scheme. This experiment will be
repeated over long distances, since losses in optical fibers
are low at the downconverted photons’ wavelength (1300
nm).
An advantage of this set-up is that coding in the time
basis is particularly stable. In addition, the coherence
length of the pump laser is not critical anymore. It is
46Note that it does not constitute a product state.
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however necessary to use relatively short pulses (≈ 500
ps) powerful enough to induce a significant downconver-
sion probability.
Phase-time coding, as discussed in this section, can
also be realized with faint laser pulses (Bechmann-
Pasquinucci and Tittel, 2000). The 1-photon configu-
ration has though never been realized. It would be sim-
ilar to the double Mach-Zehnder discussed in paragraph
IVC1, but with the first coupler replaced by an active
switch. For the time-basis, Alice would set the switch
either to full transmission or to full reflection, while for
the energy-basis she would set it at 50%. This illustrates
how considerations initiated on photon pairs can yield
advances on faint pulses systems.
3. Quantum secret sharing
In addition to QC using phase-time coding, we used the
setup depicted in Fig. 26 for the first proof-of-principle
demonstration of quantum secret sharing – the general-
ization of quantum key distribution to more than two
parties (Tittel et al., 2001). In this new application of
quantum communication, Alice distributes a secret key to
two other users, Bob and Charlie, in a way that neither
Bob nor Charlie alone have any information about the
key, but that together they have full information. Like
with traditional QC, an eavesdropper trying to get some
information about the key creates errors in the transmis-
sion data and thus reveals her presence. The motivation
behind quantum secret sharing is to guarantee that Bob
and Charlie cooperate – one of them might be dishonest
– in order to obtain a given piece of information. In con-
trast with previous proposals using three-particle GHZ
states (Z˙ukowski et al.,1998, and Hillery et al., 1999),
pairs of entangled photons in so-called energy-time Bell
states were used to mimic the necessary quantum cor-
relation of three entangled qubits, albeit only two pho-
tons exist at the same time. This is possible because
of the symmetry between the preparation device acting
on the pump pulse and the devices analyzing the down-
converted photons. Therefore, the emission of a pump
pulse can be considered as the detection of a photon with
100% efficiency, and the scheme features a much higher
coincidence rate than that expected with the initially pro-
posed “triple-photon” schemes.
VI. EAVESDROPPING
A. Problems and Objectives
After the qubit exchange and bases reconciliation, Al-
ice and Bob each have a sifted key. Ideally, these are
identical. But in real life, there are always some errors
and Alice and Bob must apply some classical information
processing protocols, like error correction and privacy
amplification, to their data (see paragraph IIC 4). The
first protocol is necessary to obtain identical keys, the
second to obtain a secret key. Essentially, the problem
of eavesdropping is to find protocols which, given that
Alice and Bob can only measure the QBER, either pro-
vides Alice and Bob with a provenly secure key, or stops
the protocol and informs the users that the key distribu-
tion has failed. This is a delicate question, really at the
intersection between quantum physics and information
theory. Actually, there is not one, but several eavesdrop-
ping problems, depending on the precise protocol, on the
degree of idealization one admits, on the technological
power one assumes Eve has and on the assumed fidelity
of Alice and Bob’s equipment. Let us immediately stress
that the complete analysis of eavesdropping on quantum
channel is by far not yet finished. In this chapter we
review some of the problems and solutions, without any
claim of mathematical rigor nor complete cover of the
huge and fast evolving literature.
The general objective of eavesdropping analysis is to
find ultimate and practical proofs of security for some
quantum cryptosystems. Ultimate means that the se-
curity is guaranteed against entire classes of eavesdrop-
ping attacks, even if Eve uses not only the best of to-
day’s technology, but any conceivable technology of to-
morrow. They take the form of theorems, with clearly
stated assumptions expressed in mathematical terms. In
contrast, practical proofs deal with some actual pieces of
hardware and software. There is thus a tension between
“ultimate” and “practical” proofs. Indeed the first ones
favor general abstract assumptions, whereas the second
ones concentrate on physical implementations of the gen-
eral concepts. Nevertheless, it is worth aiming at finding
such proofs. In addition to the security issue, they pro-
vide illuminating lessons for our general understanding
of quantum information.
In the ideal game Eve has perfect technology: she is
only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics, but not
at all by today’s technology 47. In particular, Eve can-
47The question whether QC would survive the discovery of
the currently unknown validity limits of quantum mechanics
is interesting. Let us argue that it is likely that quantum me-
chanics will always adequately describe photons at telecom
and vsible wavelengths, like classical mechanics always ade-
quately describes the fall of apples, whatever the future of
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not clone the qubits, as this is incompatible with quan-
tum dynamics (see paragraph IIC 2), but Eve is free to
use any unitary interaction between one or several qubits
and an auxiliary system of her choice. Moreover, after
the interaction, Eve may keep her auxiliary system un-
perturbed, in particular in complete isolation from the
environment, for an arbitrarily long time. Finally, af-
ter listening to all the public discussion between Alice
and Bob, she can perform the measurement of her choice
on her system, being again limited only by the laws of
quantum mechanics. Moreover, one assumes that all er-
rors are due to Eve. It is tempting to assume that some
errors are due to Alice’s and Bob’s instruments and this
probably makes sense in practice. But there is the danger
that Eve replaces them with higher quality instruments
(see next section)!
In the next section we elaborate on the most relevant
differences between the above ideal game (ideal espe-
cially from Eve’s point of view!) and real systems. Next,
we return to the idealized situation and present several
eavesdropping strategies, starting from the simplest ones,
where explicit formulas can be written down and ending
with a general abstract security proof. Finally, we dis-
cus practical eavesdropping attacks and comment on the
complexity of real system’s security.
B. Idealized versus real implementation
Alice and Bob use technology available today. This
trivial remark has several implications. First, all real
components are imperfect, so that the qubits are pre-
pared and detected not exactly in the basis described by
the theory. Moreover, a real source always has a finite
probability to produce more than one photon. Depending
on the details of the encoding device, all photons carry
the same qubit (see section VI J). Hence, in principle,
Eve could measure the photon number, without perturb-
ing the qubit. This is discussed in section VIH. Recall
that ideally, Alice should emit single qubit-photons, i.e.
each logical qubit should be encoded in a single degree
of freedom of a single photon.
On Bob’s side the situation is, first, that the efficiency
of his detectors is quite limited and, next, that the dark
counts (spontaneous counts not produced by photons)
are non negligible. The limited efficiency is analogous to
the losses in the quantum channel. The analysis of the
dark counts is more delicate and no complete solution
is known. Conservatively, Lu¨tkenhaus (2000) assumes
in his analysis that all dark counts provide information
to Eve. He also advises that whenever two detectors
fire simultaneously (generally due to a real photon and
a dark count), Bob should not disregard such events but
physics might be.
choose a value at random. Note also that the different
contributions of dark count to the total QBER depend
on whether Bob’s choice of basis is implemented using an
active or a passive switch (see section IVA).
Next, one usually assumes that Alice and Bob have
thoroughly checked their equipments and that it is func-
tioning according to the specifications. This is not par-
ticular to quantum cryptography, but is quite a delicate
question, as Eve could be the actual manufacturer of the
equipment! Classical crypto-systems must also be care-
fully tested, like any commercial apparatuses. Testing a
crypto-system is however delicate, because in cryptogra-
phy the client buys confidence and security, two qualities
difficult to quantify. D. Mayers and A. Yao (1998) pro-
posed to use Bell inequality to test that the equipments
really obey quantum mechanics, but even this is not en-
tirely satisfactory. Indeed and interestingly, one of the
most subtle loopholes in all present day tests of Bell in-
equality, the detection loophole, can be exploited to pro-
duce a purely classical software mimicking all quantum
correlation (Gisin and Gisin 1999). This illustrates once
again how close practical issues in QC are to philosophi-
cal debates about the foundations of quantum physics!
Finally, one has to assume that Alice and Bob are per-
fectly isolated from Eve. Without such an assumption
the entire game would be meaningless: clearly, Eve is
not allowed to look over Alice’s shoulder! But this el-
ementary assumption is again a nontrivial one. What
if Eve uses the quantum channel connecting Alice to the
outside world? Ideally, the channel should incorporate an
isolator 48 to keep Eve from shining light into Alice’s out-
put port to examine the interior of her laboratory. But
all isolators operate only on a finite bandwidth, hence
there should also be a filter. But filters have only a finite
efficiency. And so on. Except for section VIK where this
assumption is discussed, we henceforth assume that Alice
and Bob are isolated from Eve.
C. Individual, joint and collective attacks
In order to simplify the problem, several eavesdrop-
ping strategies of restricted generalities have been defined
(Lu¨tkenhaus 1996, Biham and Mor 1997a and 1997b) and
analyzed. Of particular interest is the assumption that
Eve attaches independent probes to each qubit and mea-
sures her probes one after the other. This class of attacks
is called individual attacks, also known as incoherent at-
tacks. This important class is analyzed in sections VID
and VIE. Two other classes of eavesdropping strate-
gies let Eve process several qubits coherently, hence the
name of coherent attacks. The most general coherent at-
48Optical isolators, based on the Faraday effect, let light pass
through only in one direction.
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tacks are called joint attacks, while an intermediate class
assumes that Eve attaches one probe per qubit, like in
individual attacks, but can measure several probes coher-
ently, like in coherent attacks. This intermediate class is
called collective attacks. It is not known whether this
class is less efficient than the most general joint one. It is
also not known whether it is more efficient than the sim-
pler individual attacks. Actually, it is not even known
whether joint attacks are more efficient than individual
ones!
For joint and collective attacks, the usual assumption
is that Eve measures her probe only after Alice and Bob
have completed all their public discussion about bases
reconciliation, error correction and privacy amplification.
But for the more realistic individual attacks, one assumes
that Eve waits only until the bases reconciliation phase
of the public discussion49. The motivation for this is
that one hardly sees what Eve could gain waiting for the
public discussion on error correction and privacy ampli-
fication before measuring her probes, since she is anyway
going to measure them independently.
Individual attacks have the nice feature that the prob-
lem can be entirely translated into a classical one: Alice,
Bob and Eve all have classical information in the form
of random variables α, β an ǫ, respectively, and the laws
of quantum mechanics imposes constraints on the joint
probability distribution P (α, β, ǫ). Such classical scenar-
ios have been widely studied by the classical cryptology
community and many results can thus be directly ap-
plied.
D. Simple individual attacks: intercept-resend,
measurement in the intermediate basis
The simplest attack for Eve consists in intercepting all
photons individually, to measure them in a basis cho-
sen randomly among the two bases used by Alice and to
send new photons to Bob prepared according to her re-
sult. As presented in paragraph IIC 3 and assuming that
the BB84 protocol is used, Eve gets thus 0.5 bit of infor-
mation per bit in the sifted key, for an induced QBER
of 25%. Let us illustrate the general formalism on this
simple example. Eve’s mean information gain on Alice’s
bit, I(α, ǫ), equals their relative entropy decrease:
I(α, ǫ) = Ha priori −Ha posteriori (40)
i.e. I(α, β) is the number of bits one can save writing α
when knowing β. Since the a priori probability for Alice’s
bit is uniform, Ha priori = 1. The a posteriori entropy
49With today’s technology, it might even be fair to assume,
in individual attacks, that Eve must measure her probe before
the basis reconciliation.
has to be averaged over all possible results r that Eve
might get:
Ha posteriori =
∑
r
P (r)H(i|r) (41)
H(i|r) = −
∑
i
P (i|r) log(P (i|r)) (42)
where the a posteriori probability of bit i given Eve’s
result r is given by Bayes’s theorem:
P (i|r) = P (r|i)P (i)
P (r)
(43)
with P (r) =
∑
i P (r|i)P (i). In the case of intercept-
resend, Eve gets one out of 4 possible results: r ∈ {↑, ↓
,←,→}. After the basis has been revealed, Alice’s input
assumes one out of 2 values: i ∈ {↑, ↓} (assuming the ↑↓
basis was used, the other case is completely analogous).
One gets P (i =↑ |r =↑) = 1, P (i =↑ |r =→) = 12 and
P (r) = 12 . Hence, I(α, ǫ) = 1− 12h(1)− 12h(12 ) = 1− 12 = 12
(with h(p) = p log2(p) + (1− p) log2(1− p)).
Another strategy for Eve, not more difficult to imple-
ment, consists in measuring the photons in the inter-
mediate basis (see Fig. 27), also known as the Brei-
dbart basis (Bennett et al. 1992a). In this way the
probability that Eve guesses the correct bit value is
p = cos(π/8)2 = 12 +
√
2
4 ≈ 0.854, corresponding to a
QBER=2p(1− p) = 25% and Shannon information gain
per bit of
I = 1−H(p) ≈ 0.399. (44)
Consequently, this strategy is less advantageous for Eve
than the intercept-resend one. Note however, that with
this strategy Eve’s probability to guess the correct bit
value is 85.%, compared to only 75% in the intercept-
resend case. This is possible because in the latter case
Eve’s information is deterministic in half the cases, while
in the first one Eve’s information is always probabilistic
(formally this results from the convexity of the entropy
function).
E. Symmetric individual attacks
In this section we present in some details how Eve
could get a maximum Shannon information for a fixed
QBER, assuming a perfect single qubit source and re-
stricting Eve to attacks on one qubit after the other (i.e.
individual attacks). The motivation is that this ideal-
ized situation is rather easy to treat and nicely illustrates
several of the subtleties of the subject. Here we concen-
trate on the BB84 4-state protocol, for related results on
the 2-state and the 6-state protocols see Fuchs and Peres
(1996) and Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin (1999), re-
spectively.
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The general idea of eavesdropping on a quantum chan-
nel goes as follows. When a qubit propagates from Al-
ice to Bob, Eve can let a system of her choice, called a
probe, interact with the qubit (see Fig. 28). She can
freely choose the probe and its initial state, but it has to
be a system satisfying the quantum rules (i.e. described
in some Hilbert space). Eve can also choose the interac-
tion, but it should be independent of the qubit state and
she should follow the laws of quantum mechanics, i.e. her
interaction is described by a unitary operator. After the
interaction a qubit has to go to Bob (in section VIH we
consider lossy channels, so that Bob does not always ex-
pect a qubit, a fact that Eve can take advantage of). It
makes no difference whether this qubit is the original one
(possibly in a modified state) or not. Actually the ques-
tion does not even make sense since a qubit is nothing
but a qubit! But in the formalism it is convenient to use
the same Hilbert space for the qubit sent by Alice and
that received by Bob (this is no loss of generality, since
the swap operator – defined by ψ⊗φ→ φ⊗ψ for all ψ,φ
– is unitary and could be appended to Eve’s interaction).
LetHEve and C2⊗HEve be the Hilbert spaces of Eve’s
probe and of the total qubit+probe system, respectively.
If |~m〉, |0〉 and U denote the qubit and the probe’s initial
states and the unitary interaction, respectively, then the
state of the qubit received by Bob is given by the density
matrix obtained by tracing out Eve’s probe:
ρBob(~m) = TrHEve(U |~m, 0〉〈~m, 0|U †). (45)
The symmetry of the BB84 protocol makes it very nat-
ural to assume that Bob’s state is related to Alice’s |~m〉
by a simple shrinking factor50 η ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig. 29):
ρBob(~m) =
1 + η~m~σ
2
. (46)
Eavesdroppings that satisfy the above condition are
called symmetric attacks.
Since the qubit state space is 2-dimensional, the uni-
tary operator is entirely determined by its action on two
states, for example the | ↑〉 and | ↓〉 states (in this section
we use spin 12 notations for the qubits). It is convenient
to write the states after the unitary interaction in the
Schmidt form (Peres 1997):
U | ↑, 0〉 = | ↑〉 ⊗ φ↑ + | ↓〉 ⊗ θ↑ (47)
50Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres were the first ones to derive
the result presented in this section, using numerical optimiza-
tion. Almost simultaneously Robert Griffiths and his stu-
dent Chi-Sheng Niu derived it under very general conditions
and Nicolas Gisin using the symmetry argument used here.
These 5 authors joined efforts in a common paper (Fuchs et
al. 1997). The result of this section is thus also valid without
this symmetry assumption.
U | ↓, 0〉 = | ↓〉 ⊗ φ↓ + | ↑〉 ⊗ θ↓ (48)
where the 4 states φ↑, φ↓, θ↑ and θ↓ belong to Eve’s probe
Hilbert space HEve and satisfy φ↑ ⊥ θ↑ and φ↓ ⊥ θ↓.
By symmetry |φ↑|2 = |φ↓|2 ≡ F and |θ↑|2 = |θ↓|2 ≡ D.
Unitarity imposes F +D = 1 and
〈φ↑|θ↓〉+ 〈θ↑|φ↓〉 = 0. (49)
The φ’s correspond to Eve’s state when Bob gets the
qubit undisturbed, while the θ’s are Eve’s state when
the qubit is disturbed.
Let us emphasize that this is the most general unitary
interaction satisfying (46). One finds that the shrinking
factor is given by: η = F − D. Accordingly, if Alice
sends | ↑〉 and Bob measures in the compatible basis,
then 〈↑ |ρBob(~m)| ↑〉 = F is the probability that Bob
gets the correct result. Hence F is the fidelity and D the
QBER.
Note that only 4 states span Eve’s relevant state space.
Hence, Eve’s effective Hilbert space is at most of dimen-
sion 4, no matter how subtle she might be51! This greatly
simplifies the analysis.
The symmetry imposes that the attack on the other
basis satisfies:
U | →, 0〉 = U | ↑, 0〉+ | ↓, 0〉√
2
(50)
=
1√
2
(| ↑〉 ⊗ φ↑ + | ↓〉 ⊗ θ↑ (51)
+ | ↓〉 ⊗ φ↓ + | ↑〉 ⊗ θ↓) (52)
= | →〉 ⊗ φ→ + | ←〉 ⊗ θ→ (53)
where
φ→ =
1
2
(φ↑ + θ↑ + φ↓ + θ↓) (54)
θ→ =
1
2
(φ↑ − θ↑ − φ↓ + θ↓) (55)
Similarly,
φ← =
1
2
(φ↑ − θ↑ + φ↓ − θ↓) (56)
θ← =
1
2
(φ↑ + θ↑ − φ↓ − θ↓) (57)
Condition (46) for the {| →〉, | ←〉} basis implies: θ→ ⊥
φ→ and θ← ⊥ φ←. By proper choice of the phases,
〈φ↑|θ↓〉 can be made real. By condition (49) 〈θ↑|φ↓〉 is
then also real. Symmetry implies then 〈θ→|φ←〉 ∈ ℜ.
51Actually, Niu and Griffiths (1999) showed that 2-
dimensional probes suffice for Eve to get as much information
as with the strategy presented here, though in their case the
attack is not symmetric (one basis is more disturbed than the
other).
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A straightforward computation concludes that all scalar
products among Eve’s states are real and that the φ’s
generate a subspace orthogonal to the θ’s:
〈φ↑|θ↓〉 = 〈φ↓|θ↑〉 = 0. (58)
Finally, using |φ→|2 = F , i.e. that the shrinking is the
same for all states, one obtains a relation between the
probe states’ overlaps and the fidelity:
F = 1 + 〈θˆ↑|θˆ↓〉
2− 〈φˆ↑|φˆ↓〉+ 〈θˆ↑|θˆ↓〉
(59)
where the hats denote normalized states, e.g. φˆ↑ =
φ↑√
D .
Consequently, the entire class of symmetric individual
attacks depends only on 2 real parameters52: cos(x) ≡
〈φˆ↑|φˆ↓〉 and cos(y) ≡ 〈θˆ↑|θˆ↓〉!
Thanks to the symmetry, it suffices to analyze this
scenario for the case that Alice sends the | ↑〉 state and
Bob measures in the {↑, ↓} basis (if not, Alice, Bob and
Eve disregard the data). Since Eve knows the basis, she
knows that her probe is in one of the following two mixed
states:
ρEve(↑) = FP (φ↑) +DP (θ↑) (60)
ρEve(↓) = FP (φ↓) +DP (θ↓). (61)
An optimummeasurement strategy for Eve to distinguish
between ρEve(↑) and ρEve(↓) consists in first distinguish-
ing whether her state is in the subspace generated by φ↑
and φ↓ or the one generated by θ↑ and θ↓. This is pos-
sible, since the two subspaces are mutually orthogonal.
Eve has then to distinguish between two pure states, ei-
ther with overlap cos(x), or with overlap cos(y). The first
alternative happens with probability F , the second one
with probability D. The optimal measurement distin-
guishing two states with overlap cos(x) is known to pro-
vide Eve with the correct guess with probability 1+sin(x)2
(Peres 1997). Eve’s maximal Shannon information, at-
tained when she does the optimal measurements, is thus
given by:
I(α, ǫ) = F ·
(
1− h(1 + sin(x)
2
)
)
(62)
+ D ·
(
1− h(1 + sin(y)
2
)
)
(63)
52Interestingly, when the symmetry is extended to a third
maximally conjugated basis, as natural in the 6-state protocol
of paragraph IID2, then the number of parameters reduces
to one. This parameter measures the relative quality of Bob’s
and Eve’s “copy” of the qubit send by Alice. When both
copies are of equal quality, one recovers the optimal cloning
presented in section II F (Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin
1999).
where h(p) = −p log2(p) − (1−) log2(1 − p). For a given
error rate D, this information is maximal when x = y.
Consequently, for D = 1−cos(x)2 , one has:
Imax(α, ǫ) = 1− h(1 + sin(x)
2
). (64)
This provides the explicit and analytic optimum eaves-
dropping strategy. For x = 0 the QBER (i.e. D) and
the information gain are zero. For x = π/2 the QBER
is 12 and the information gain 1. For small QBERs, the
information gain grows linearly:
Imax(α, ǫ) =
2
ln(2)
D +O(D)2 ≈ 2.9 D (65)
Once Alice, Bob and Eve have measured their quantum
systems, they are left with classical random variables α, β
and ǫ, respectively. Secret key agreement between Alice
and Bob is then possible using only error correction and
privacy amplification if and only if the Alice-Bob mutual
Shannon information I(α, β) is larger than the Alice-Eve
or the Bob-Eve mutual information53, I(α, β) > I(α, ǫ)
or I(α, β) > I(β, ǫ). It is thus interesting to compare
Eve’s maximal information (64) with Bob’s Shannon in-
formation. The latter depends only on the error rate D:
I(α, β) = 1− h(D) (66)
= 1 +D log2(D) + (1−D) log2(1 −D) (67)
Bob’s and Eve’s information are plotted on Fig. 30. As
expected, for low error rates D, Bob’s information is
larger. But, more errors provide Eve with more infor-
mation, while Bob’s information gets lower. Hence, both
information curves cross at a specific error rate D0:
I(α, β) = Imax(α, ǫ)⇐⇒ D = D0 ≡ 1− 1/
√
2
2
≈ 15%
(68)
Consequently, the security criteria against individual at-
tacks for the BB84 protocol reads:
BB84 secure⇐⇒ D < D0 ≡ 1− 1/
√
2
2
(69)
For QBERs larger than D0 no (one-way communica-
tion) error correction and privacy amplification protocol
can provide Alice and Bob with a secret key immune
against any individual attacks.
53Note, however, that if this condition is not satisfied, other
protocols might sometimes be used, see paragraph IIC 5.
These protocols are significantly less efficient and are usu-
ally not considered as part of “standard” QC. Note also that
in the scenario analysed in this section I(β, ǫ) = I(α, ǫ).
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Let us mention that more general classical protocols,
called advantage distillation (paragraph IIC 5), using two
way communication, exist. These can guarantee secrecy
if and only if Eve’s intervention does not disentangle Al-
ice and Bob’s qubits (assuming they use the Ekert ver-
sion of the BB84 protocol) (Gisin and Wolf 2000). If
Eve optimizes her Shannon information, as discussed in
this section, this disentanglement-limit corresponds to a
QBER= 1 − 1/√2 ≈ 30% (Gisin and Wolf 1999). But,
using more brutal strategies, Eve can disentangled Alice
and Bob already for a QBER of 25%, see Fig. 30. The
latter is thus the absolute upper limit, taking into ac-
count the most general secret-key protocols. In practice,
the limit (68) is more realistic, since advantage distilla-
tion algorithms are much less efficient than the classical
privacy amplification ones.
F. Connection to Bell inequality
There is an intriguing connection between the above
tight bound (69) and the CHSH form of Bell inequality
(Bell 1964, Clauser et al. 1969, Clauser and Shimony
1978, Zeilinger 1999):
S ≡ E(a, b) + E(a, b′) + E(a′, b)− E(a′, b′) ≤ 2 (70)
where E(a, b) is the correlation between Alice and Bob’s
data when measuring σa⊗1 and 1⊗σb, where σa denotes
an observable with eigenvalues ±1 parameterized by the
label a. Recall that Bell inequalities are necessarily sat-
isfied by all local models, but are violated by quantum
mechanics54. To establish this connection, assume that
the same quantum channel is used to test Bell inequality.
It is well-known that for error free channels, a maximal
violation by a factor
√
2 is achievable: Smax = 2
√
2 > 2.
However, if the channel is imperfect, or equivalently if
some perturbator Eve acts on the channel, then the quan-
tum correlation E(a, b|D) is reduced,
E(a, b|D) = F ·E(a, b)−D · E(a, b) (71)
= (1− 2D) · E(a, b) (72)
where E(a, b) denote the correlation for the unperturbed
channel. The achievable amount of violation is then re-
duced to Smax(D) = (1 − 2D)2
√
2 and for large pertur-
bations no violation at all can be achieved. Interestingly,
the critical perturbation D up to which a violation can
be observed is precisely the same D0 as the limit derived
in the previous section for the security of the BB84 pro-
tocol:
54Let us stress that the CHSH-Bell inequality is the strongest
possible for two qubits. Indeed, this inequality is violated if
and only if the correlation can’t be reproduced by a local
hidden variable model (Pitowski 1989).
Smax(D) > 2⇐⇒ D < D0 ≡ 1− 1/
√
2
2
. (73)
This is a surprising and appealing connection between
the security of QC and tests of quantum nonlocality.
One could argue that this connection is quite natural,
since, if Bell inequality were not violated, then quantum
mechanics would be incomplete and no secure commu-
nication could be based on such an incomplete theory.
In some sense, Eve’s information is like probabilistic lo-
cal hidden variables. However, the connection between
(69) and (73) has not been generalized to other protocols.
A complete picture of these connections is thus not yet
available.
Let us emphasize that nonlocality plays no direct role
in QC. Indeed, generally, Alice is in the absolute past
of Bob. Nevertheless, Bell inequality can be violated as
well by space like separated events as by time like sep-
arated events. However, the independence assumption
necessary to derive Bell inequality is justified by locality
considerations only for space-like separated events.
G. Ultimate security proofs
The security proof of QC with perfect apparatuses and
a noise-free channel is straightforward. However, the fact
that security can still be proven for imperfect apparatuses
and noisy channels is far from obvious. Clearly, some-
thing has to be assumed about the apparatuses. In this
section we simply make the hypothesis that they are per-
fect. For the channel which is not under Alice and Bob’s
control, however, nothing is assumed. The question is
then: up to which QBER can Alice and Bob apply er-
ror correction and privacy amplification to their classical
bits? In the previous sections we found that the threshold
is close to a QBER of 15%, assuming individual attacks.
But in principle Eve could manipulate several qubits co-
herently. How much help to Eve this possibility provides
is still unknown, though some bounds are known. Al-
ready in 1996, Dominic Mayers (1996b) presented the
main ideas on how to prove security55. In 1998, two ma-
jor papers were made public on the Los Alamos archives
(Mayers 1998, and Lo and Chau 1999). Nowadays, these
proofs are generally considered as valid, thanks – among
55I (NG) vividly remember the 1996 ISI workshop in Torino,
sponsored by Elsag-Bailey, were I ended my talk stressing the
importance of security proofs. Dominic Mayers stood up, gave
some explanation, and wrote a formula on a transparency,
claiming that this was the result of his proof. I think it is
fair to say that no one in the audience understood Mayers’
explanation. But I kept the transparency and it contains the
basic eq. (76) (up to a factor 2, which corresponds to an
improvement of Mayers result obtained in 2000 by Shor and
Preskill, using also ideas from Lo and Chau)!
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others – to the works of P. Shor and J. Preskill (2000),
H. Inamori et al. (2001) and of E. Biham et al. (1999).
But it is worth noting that during the first years after
the first disclosure of these proofs, essentially nobody in
the community understood them!
Here we shall present the argument in a form quite
different from the original proofs. Our presentation aims
at being transparent in the sense that it rests on two
theorems. The proofs of the theorems are hard and will
be omitted. However, their claims are easy to understand
and rather intuitive. Once one accepts the theorems, the
security proof is rather straightforward.
The general idea is that at some point Alice, Bob and
Eve perform measurements on their quantum systems.
The outcomes provide them with classical random vari-
ables α, β and ǫ, respectively, with P (α, β, ǫ) the joint
probability distribution. The first theorem, a standard
of classical information based cryptography, states nec-
essary and sufficient condition on P (α, β, ǫ) for the pos-
sibility that Alice and Bob extract a secret key from
P (α, β, ǫ) (Csisza´r and Ko¨rner 1978). The second the-
orem is a clever version of Heisenberg’s uncertainty re-
lation expressed in terms of available information (Hall
1995): it sets a bound on the sum of the information
available to Bob and to Eve on Alice’s key.
Theorem 1. For a given P (α, β, ǫ), Alice and Bob
can establish a secret key (using only error correc-
tion and classical privacy amplification) if and only if
I(α, β) ≥ I(α, ǫ) or I(α, β) ≥ I(β, ǫ), where I(α, β) =
H(α)−H(α|β) denotes the mutual information, with H
the Shannon entropy.
Theorem 2. Let E and B be two observables in an N
dimensional Hilbert space. Denote ǫ, β, |ǫ〉 and |β〉 the
corresponding eigenvalues and eigenvectors, respectively,
and let c = maxǫ,β{|〈ǫ|β〉|}. Then
I(α, ǫ) + I(α, β) ≤ 2 log2(Nc), (74)
where I(α, ǫ) = H(α) − H(α|ǫ) and I(α, β) = H(α) −
H(α|β) are the entropy differences corresponding to the
probability distribution of the eigenvalues α prior to and
deduced from any measurement by Eve and Bob, respec-
tively.
The first theorem states that Bob must have more in-
formation on Alice’s bits than Eve (see Fig. 31). Since
error correction and privacy amplification can be imple-
mented using only 1-way communication, theorem 1 can
be understood intuitively as follows. The initial situa-
tion is depicted in a). During the public phase of the
protocol, because of the 1-way communication, Eve re-
ceives as much information as Bob, the initial information
difference δ thus remains. After error correction, Bob’s
information equals 1, as illustrated on b). After privacy
amplification Eve’s information is zero. In c) Bob has re-
placed all bits to be disregarded by random bits. Hence
the key has still the original length, but his information
has decreased. Finally, removing the random bits, the
key is shortened to the initial information difference, see
d). Bob has full information on this final key, while Eve
has none.
The second theorem states that if Eve performs a mea-
surement providing her with some information I(α, ǫ),
then, because of the perturbation, Bob’s information is
necessarily limited. Using these two theorems, the ar-
gument now runs as follows. Suppose Alice sends out
a large number of qubits and that n where received by
Bob in the correct basis. The relevant Hilbert space’s
dimension is thus N = 2n. Let us re-label the bases used
for each of the n qubits such that Alice used n times
the x-basis. Hence, Bob’s observable is the n-time ten-
sor product σx ⊗ ... ⊗ σx. By symmetry, Eve’s optimal
information on the correct bases is precisely the same as
her optimal information on the incorrect ones (Mayers
1998). Hence one can bound her information assuming
she measures σz ⊗ ... ⊗ σz . Accordingly, c = 2−n/2 and
theorem 2 implies:
I(α, ǫ) + I(α, β) ≤ 2 log2(2n2−n/2) = n (75)
That is, the sum of Eve’s and Bob’s information per
qubit is smaller or equal to 1. This is quite an intu-
itive result: together, Eve and Bob cannot get more
information than sent out by Alice! Next, combining
the bound (75) with theorem 1, one deduces that a se-
cret key is achievable whenever I(α, β) ≥ n/2. Using
I(α, β) = n (1−D log2(D)− (1 −D) log2(1−D)) one
obtains the sufficient condition on the error rate D (i.e.
the QBER):
D log2(D) + (1−D) log2(1−D) ≤
1
2
(76)
i.e. D ≤ 11%.
This bound, QBER≤11%, is precisely that obtained
in Mayers proof (after improvement by P. Shor and J.
Preskill (2000)). The above proof is, strickly speaking,
only valid if the key is much longer than the number of
qubits that Eve attacks coherently, so that the Shannon
informations we used represent averages over many in-
dependent realisations of classical random variables. In
other words, assuming that Eve can attack coherently a
large but finite number n0 of qubits, Alice and Bob can
use the above proof to secure keys much longer than n0
bits. If one assumes that Eve has an unlimited power,
able to attack coherently any number of qubits, then the
above proof does not apply, but Mayer’s proof can still
be used and provides precisely the same bound.
This 11% bound for coherent attacks is clearly com-
patible with the 15% bound found for individual attacks.
The 15% bound is also a necessary one, since an explicit
eavesdropping strategy reaching this bound is presented
in section VIE. It is not known what happens in the
intermediate range 11% < QBER < 15%, but the fol-
lowing is plausible. If Eve is limited to coherent attacks
on a finite number of qubits, then in the limit of arbi-
trarily long keys, she has a negligibly small probability
that the bits combined by Alice and Bob during the error
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correction and privacy amplification protocols originate
from qubits attacked coherently. Consequently, the 15%
bound would still be valid (partial results in favor of this
conjecture can be found in Cirac and Gisin 1997, and
in Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin 1999). However, if
Eve has unlimited power, in particular, if she can coher-
ently attack an unlimited number of qubits, then the 11%
bound might be required.
To conclude this section, let us stress that the above
security proof equally applies to the 6-state protocol
(paragraph IID 2). It also extends straightforwardly to
protocols using larger alphabets (Bechmann-Pasquinucci
and Tittel 2000, Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Peres 2000,
Bourennane et al. 2001a, Bourennane et al. 2001b).
H. Photon number measurements, lossless channels
In section III A we saw that all real photon sources
have a finite probability to emit more than 1 photon. If
all emitted photons encode the same qubit, Eve can take
advantage of this. In principle, she can first measure
the number of photons in each pulse, without disturbing
the degree of freedom encoding the qubits56. Such mea-
surements are sometimes called Quantum Non Demoli-
tion (QND) measurements, because they do not perturb
the qubit, in particular they do not destroy the photons.
This is possible because Eve knows in advance that Al-
ice sends a mixture of states with well defined photon
numbers57, (see section II F). Next, if Eve finds more
than one photon, she keeps one and sends the other(s)
to Bob. In order to prevent that Bob detects a lower
qubit rate, Eve must use a channel with lower losses. Us-
ing an ideally lossless quantum channel, Eve can even,
under certain conditions, keep one photon and increase
the probability that pulses with more than one photon
get to Bob! Thirdly, when Eve finds one photon, she
may destroy it with a certain probability, such that she
does not affect the total number of qubits received by
Bob. Consequently, if the probability that a non-empty
pulse has more than one photon (on Alice’s side) is larger
than the probability that a non-empty pulse is detected
56For polarization coding, this is quite clear. But for phase
coding one may think (incorrectly) that phase and photon
number are incompatible! However, the phase used for en-
coding is a relative phase between two modes. Whether these
modes are polarization modes or correspond to different times
(determined e.g. by the relative length of interferometers),
does not matter.
57Recall that a mixture of coherent states |eiφα〉 with a
random phase φ, as produced by lasers when no phase ref-
erence in available, is equal to a mixture of photon num-
ber states |n〉 with Poisson statistics:
∫
2pi
0
|eiφα〉〈eiφα| dφ
2pi
=∑
n≥0
µn
n!
e−
µ
|n〉〈n|, where µ = |α|2.
by Bob, then Eve can get full information without intro-
ducing any perturbation! This is possible only when the
QC protocol is not perfectly implemented, but this is a
realistic situation (Huttner et al. 1995, Yuen 1997).
The QND atacks have recently received a lot of at-
tention (Lu¨tkenhaus 2000, Brassard et al. 2000). The
debate is not yet settled. We would like to argue that
it might be unrealistic, or even unphysical, to assume
that Eve can perform ideal QND attacks. Indeed, first
she needs the capacity to perform QND photon number
measurements. Although impossible with today’s tech-
nology, this is a reasonable assumption (Nogues et al.
1999). Next, she should be able to keep her photon until
Alice and Bob reveal the basis. In principle this could
be achieved using a lossless channel in a loop. We dis-
cuss this eventuality below. Another possibility would
be that Eve maps her photon to a quantum memory.
This does not exist today, but might well exist in the
future. Note that the quantum memory should have es-
sentially unlimited time, since Alice and Bob could easily
wait for minutes before revealing the bases58. Finally,
Eve must access a lossless channel, or at least a chan-
nel with losses lower than that used by Alice and Bob.
This might be the most tricky point. Indeed, besides
using a shorter channel, what can Eve do? The tele-
com fibers are already at the physical limits of what can
be achieved (Thomas et al. 2000). The loss is almost
entirely due to the Rayleigh scattering which is unavoid-
able: solve the Schro¨dinger equation in a medium with
inhomogeneities and you get scattering. And when the
inhomogeneities are due to the molecular stucture of the
medium, it is difficult to imagine lossless fibers! The 0.18
dB/km attenuation in silica fibers at 1550 nm is a lower
bound which is based on physics, not on technology59.
Note that using the air is not a viable solution, since the
attenuation at the telecom wavelengths is rather high.
Vacuum, the only way to avoid Rayleigh scattering, has
also limitations, due to diffraction, again an unavoidable
physical phenomenon. In the end, it seems that Eve has
only two possibilities left. Either she uses teleportation
(with extremely high success probability and fidelity) or
58The quantum part of the protocol could run continuously,
storing large ammount of raw classical data. But the classical
part of the protocol, processing these raw data, could take
place just seconds before the key is used.
59Photonics crystal fibers have the potential to overcome
the Rayleigh scaterring limit. Actually, there are two kinds
of such fibers. The first kind guides light by total internal
reflection, like in ordinary fibers. In these most of the light
also propagates in silica, and thus the loss limit is similar. In
the second kind, most of the light propagates in air, thus the
theoretical loss limit is lower. However, today the losses are
extremely high, in the range of hundreds of dB/km. The best
reported result that we are aware of is 11 dB/km and it was
obtained with a fiber of the first kind (Canning et al. 2000).
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she converts the photons to another wavelength (with-
out perturbing the qubit). Both of these “solutions” are
seemingly unrealistic in any foreseeable future.
Consequently, when considering the type of attacks
discussed in this section, it is essential to distinguish the
ultimate proofs from the practical ones discussed in the
first part of this chapter. Indeed, the assumptions about
the defects of Alice and Bob’s apparatuses must be very
specific and might thus be of limited interest. While for
practical considerations, these assumptions must be very
general and might thus be excessive.
I. A realistic beamsplitter attack
The attack presented in the previous section takes ad-
vantage of the pulses containing more than one photon.
However, as discussed, it uses unrealistic assumptions.
In this section, following N. Lu¨tkenhaus (2000) and M.
Dusek et al (2000), we briefly comment on a realistic at-
tack, also exploiting the multiphoton pulses (for details,
see Felix et al. 2001, where this and another examples
are presented). Assume that Eve splits all pulses in two,
analysing each half in one of the two bases, using pho-
ton counting devices able to distinguish pulses with 0,
1 and 2 photons (see Fig. 32). In practice this could
be realized using many single photon counters in paral-
lel. This requires nearly perfect detectors, but at least
one does not need to assume technology completely out
of today’s realm. Whenever Eve detects two photons
in the same output, she sends a photon in the corre-
sponding state into Bob’s apparatus. Since Eve’s infor-
mation is classical, she can overcome all the losses of the
quantum channel. In all other cases, Eve sends noth-
ing to Bob. In this way, Eve sends a fraction 3/8 of the
pulses containing at least 2 photons to Bob. On these,
she introduces a QBER=1/6 and gets an information
I(A,E) = 2/3 = 4 · QBER. Bob doesn’t see any re-
duction in the number of detected photons, provided the
transmission coefficient of the quantum channel t satis-
fies:
t ≤ 3
8
Prob(n ≥ 2|n ≥ 1) ≈ 3µ
16
(77)
where the last expression assumes Poissonian photon dis-
tribution. Accordingly, for a fixed QBER, this attacks
provides Eve with twice the information she would get
using the intercept resend strategy. To counter such an
attack, Alice should use a mean photon number µ such
that Eve can only use this attack on a fraction of the
pulses. For example, Alice could use pulses weak enough
that Eve’s mean information gain is identical to the one
she would obtain with the simple intercept resend strat-
egy (see paragraph IIC 3). For 10, 14 and 20 dB at-
tenuation, this corresponds to µ = 0.25, 0.1 and 0.025,
respectively.
J. Multi-photon pulses and passive choice of states
Multi-photon pulses do not necessarily constitute a
threat for the key security, but limit the key creation
rate because they imply that more bits must be discarded
during key distillation. This fact is based on the assump-
tion that all photons in a pulse carry the same qubit, so
that Eve does not need to copy the qubit going to Bob,
but merely keeps the copy that Alice inadvertently pro-
vides. When using weak pulses, it seems unavoidable
that all the photons in a pulse carry the same qubit.
However, in 2-photon implementations, each photon on
Alice’s side chooses independently a state (in the experi-
ments of Ribordy et al. 2001 and Tittel et al. 2000, each
photon chooses randomly both its basis and its bit value;
in the experiments of Naik et al. 2000 and Jennewein et
al. 2000b, the bit value choice only is random). Hence,
when two photon pairs are simultaneously produced, by
accident, the two twins carry independent qubits. Con-
sequently, Eve can’t take advantage of such multi-photon
twin-pulses. This might be one of the main advantages
of the 2-photon schemes compared to the much simpler
weak-pulse schemes. But the multi-photon problem is
then on Bob’s side who gets a noisy signal, consisting
partly in photons not in Alice’s state!
K. Trojan Horse Attacks
All eavesdropping strategies discussed up to now con-
sisted of Eve’s attempt to get a maximum information
out of the qubits exchanged by Alice and Bob. But Eve
can also follow a completely different strategy: she can
herself send signals that enter Alice and Bob’s offices
through the quantum channel. This kind of strategies
are called Trojan horse attacks. For example, Eve can
send light pulses into the fiber entering Alice or Bob ap-
paratuses and analyze the backreflected light. In this
way, it is in principle possible to detect which laser just
flashed, or which detector just fired, or the settings of
phase and polarization modulators. This cannot be sim-
ply prevented by using a shutter, since Alice and Bob
must leave the “door open” for the photons to go out
and in, respectively.
In most QC-setups the amount of backreflected light
can be made very small and sensing the apparatuses with
light pulses through the quantum channel is difficult.
Nevertheless, this attack is especially threatening in the
plug-&-play scheme on Alice’s side (section IVC2), since
a mirror is used to send the light pulses back to Bob.
So in principle, Eve can send strong light pulses to Alice
and sense the applied phase shift. However, by applying
the phase shift only during a short time ∆tphase(a few
nanoseconds), Alice can oblige Eve to send the spying
pulse at the same time as Bob. Remember that in the
plug-&-play scheme pulse coming from Bob are macro-
scopic and an attenuator at Alice reduces them to the
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below one photon level, say 0.1 photons per pulse. Hence,
if Eve wants to get, say 1 photon per pulse, she has to
send 10 times Bob’s pulse energy. Since Alice is detect-
ing Bob’s pulses for triggering her apparatus, she must
be able to detect an increase of energy of these pulses
in order to reveal the presence of a spying pulse. This
is a relatively easy task, provided that Eve’s pulses look
the same as Bob’s. But, Eve could of course use another
wavelength or ultrashort pulses (or very long pulses with
low intensity, hence the importance of ∆tphase), there-
fore Alice must introduce an optical bandpass filter with
a transmission spectrum corresponding to the sensitivity
spectrum of her detector, and choose a ∆tphase that fits
to the bandwidth of her detector.
There is no doubt that Trojan horse attacks can be
prevented by technical measures. However, the fact that
this class of attacks exist illustrates that the security of
QC can never be guaranteed only by the principles of
quantum mechanics, but necessarily relies also on tech-
nical measures that are subject to discussions 60.
L. Real security: technology, cost and complexity
Despite the elegant and generality of security proofs,
the dream of a QC system whose security relies entirely
on quantum principles is unrealistic. The technological
implementation of the abstract principles will always be
questionable. It is likely that they will remain the weak-
est point in all systems. Moreover, one should remember
the obvious equation:
Infinite security ⇒ Infinite cost (78)
⇒ Zero practical interest
On the other hand, however, one should not under-
estimate the following two advantages of QC. First, it
is much easier to forecast progress in technology than in
mathematics: the danger that QC breaks down overnight
is negligible, contrary to public-key cryptosystems. Next,
the security of QC depends on the technological level of
the adversary at the time of the key exchange, contrary
to complexity based systems whose coded message can
be registered and broken thanks to future progress. The
latter point is relevant for secrets whose value last many
years.
One often points at the low bit rate as one of the cur-
rent limitations of QC. However, it is important to stress
that QC must not necessarily be used in conjunction with
one-time pad encryption. It can also be used to provide
a key for a symmetrical cipher – such as AES – whose
security is greatly enhanced by frequent key changes.
60Another technological loophole, recently pointed out by
Kurtsiefer et al., is the possible information leakage caused
by light emitted by APDs during their breakdown (2001).
To conclude this chapter, let us briefly elaborate on
the differences and similarities between technological and
mathematical complexity and on their possible connec-
tions and implications. Mathematical complexity means
that the number of steps needed to run complex algo-
rithms explodes exponentially when the size of the input
data grows linearly. Similarly, one can define technolog-
ical complexity of a quantum computer by an exploding
difficulty to process coherently all the qubits necessary
to run a (non-complex) algorithm on a linearly growing
number of input data. It might be interesting to con-
sider the possibility that the relation between these two
concepts of complexity is deeper. It could be that the
solution of a problem requires either a complex classi-
cal algorithm or a quantum one which itself requires a
complex quantum computer61.
VII. CONCLUSION
Quantum cryptography is a fascinating illustration of
the dialog between basic and applied physics. It is based
on a beautiful combinations of concepts from quantum
physics and information theory and made possible thanks
to the tremendous progress in quantum optics and in the
technology of optical fibers and of free space optical com-
munication. Its security principle relies on deep theorems
in classical information theory and on a profound under-
standing of the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, as il-
lustrated by theorems 1 and 2 in section VIG (the only
mathematically involved theorems in this review!). Let
us also emphasize the important contributions of QC to
classical cryptography: privacy amplification and classi-
cal bound information (paragraphs II C 4 and II C5) are
examples of concepts in classical information whose dis-
covery were much inspired by QC. Moreover, the fasci-
nating tension between quantum physics and relativity,
as illustrated by Bell’s inequality, is not far away, as dis-
cussed in section VIF. Now, despite the huge progress
over the recent years, many open questions and techno-
logical challenges remain.
One technological challenge at present concerns im-
proved detectors compatible with telecom fibers. Two
other issues concern free space QC and quantum re-
peaters. The first is presently the only way to realize
QC over thousands of kilometers using near future tech-
nology (see section IVE). The idea of quantum repeaters
(section III E) is to encode the qubits in such a way that if
the error rate is low, then errors can be detected and cor-
rected entirely in the quantum domain. The hope is that
61Penrose (1994) pushes these speculations even further,
suggesting that spontaneous collapses stop quantum com-
puters whenever they try to compute beyond a certain
complexity.
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such techniques could extend the range of quantum com-
munication to essentially unlimited distances. Indeed,
Hans Briegel, then at Innsbruck University (1998), and
coworkers, showed that the number of additional qubits
needed for quantum repeaters can be made smaller than
the numbers of qubits needed to improved the fidelity of
the quantum channel (Dur et al. 1999). One could thus
overcome the decoherence problem. However, the main
practical limitation is not decoherence but loss (most
photons never get to Bob, but those which get there,
exhibit high fidelity).
On the open questions side, let us emphasize three
main concerns. First, complete and realistic analyses
of the security issues are still missing. Next, figures of
merit to compare QC schemes based on different quan-
tum systems (with different dimensions for example) are
still awaited. Finally, the delicate question of how to
test the apparatuses did not yet receive enough atten-
tion. Indeed, a potential customer of quantum cryptog-
raphy buys confidence and secrecy, two qualities hard to
quantify. Interestingly, both of these issues have a con-
nection with Bell inequality (see sections VIF and VIB).
But, clearly, this connection can not be phrased in the old
context of local hidden variables, but rather in the con-
text of the security of tomorrows communications. Here,
like in all the field of quantum information, old concepts
are renewed by looking at them from a fresh perspective:
let’s exploit the quantum weirdness!
QC could well be the first application of quantum me-
chanics at the single quanta level. Experiments have
demonstrated that keys can be exchanged over distances
of a few tens of kilometers at rates at least of the order
of a thousand bits per second. There is no doubt that
the technology can be mastered and the question is not
whether QC will find commercial applications, but when.
Indeed, presently QC is still very limited in distance and
in secret-bit rate. Moreover, public key systems occupy
the market and, being pure software, are tremendously
easier to manage. Every so often, the news is that some
classical ciphersystem has been broken. This would be
impossible with properly implemented QC. But this ap-
parent strength of QC might turn out to be its weak
point: the security agencies would equally be unable to
break quantum cryptograms!
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Implementation of the BB84 protocol. The four
states lie on the equator of the Poincare´ sphere.
FIG. 2. Poincare´ sphere with a representation of six states
that can be used to implement the generalization of the BB84
protocol.
FIG. 3. EPR protocol, with the source and a Poincare´ rep-
resentation of the four possible states measured independently
by Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 4. Illustration of protocols exploiting EPR quantum
systems. To implement the BB84 quantum cryptographic
protocol, Alice and Bob use the same bases to prepare and
measure their particles. A representation of their states on
the Poincare´ sphere is shown. A similar setup, but with Bob’s
bases rotated by 45◦, can be used to test the violation of Bell
inequality. Finally, in the Ekert protocol, Alice and Bob may
use the violation of Bell inequality to test for eavesdropping.
FIG. 5. Photo of our entangled photon-pair source as used
in the first long-distance test of Bell inequalities (Tittel et
al. 1998). Note that the whole source fits in a box of only
40 × 45 × 15cm3 size, and that neither special power supply
nor water cooling is necessary.
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FIG. 6. Transmission losses versus wavelength in optical
fibers. Electronic transitions in SiO2 lead to absorption at
lower wavelengths, excitation of vibrational modes to losses
at higher wavelength. Superposed is the absorption due to
Rayleigh backscattering and to transitions in OH groups.
Modern telecommunication is based on wavelength around
1.3 µm (second telecommunication window) and around 1.5
µm (third telecommunication window).
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FIG. 7. Illustration of cancellation of chromatic dispersion
effects in the fibers connecting an entangled-particle source
and two detectors. The figure shows differential group delay
(DGD) curves for two slightly different, approximately 10 km
long fibers. Using frequency correlated photons with central
frequency ω0 – determined by the properties of the fibers –,
the difference of the propagation times t2 − t1 between signal
(at ωs1, ωs2) and idler photon (at ωi1, ωi2) is the same for
all ωs, ωi. Note that this cancellation scheme is not restricted
to signal and idler photons at nearly equal wavelengths. It
applies also to asymmetrical setups where the signal photon
(generating the trigger to indicate the presence of the idler
photon) is at a short wavelength of around 800 nm and travels
only a short distance. Using a fiber with appropriate zero
dispersion wavelength λ0, it is still possible to achieve equal
DGD with respect to the energy-correlated idler photon at
telecommunication wavelength, sent through a long fiber.
52
FIG. 8. Transmission losses in free space as calculated us-
ing the LOWTRAN code for earth to space transmission at
the elevation and location of Los Alamos, USA. Note that
there is a low loss window at around 770 nm – a wavelength
where high efficiency Silicon APD’s can be used for single
photon detection (see also Fig. 9 and compare to Fig. 6).
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FIG. 9. Noise equivalent power as a function of wavelength
for Silicon, Germanium, and InGaAs/InP APD’s.
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FIG. 10. Normalized net key creation rate ρnet as a func-
tion of the distance in optical fibers. For n = 1, Alice uses
a perfect single photon source. For n > 1, the link is di-
vided into n equal length sections and n/2 2-photon sources
are distributed between Alice and Bob. Parameters: detec-
tion efficiency η = 10%, dark count probability pdark = 10
−4,
fiber attenuation α = 0.25 dB/km.
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FIG. 11. Bit rate after error correction and privacy ampli-
fication vs. fiber length. The chosen parameters are: pulse
rates 10 Mhz for faint laser pulses (µ = 0.1) and 1 MHz for the
case of ideal single photons (1550 nm “single”); losses 2, 0.35
and 0.25 dB/km, detector efficiencies 50%, 20% and 10%, and
dark count probabilities 10−7, 10−5, 10−5 for 800nm, 1300nm
and 1550 nm respectively. Losses at Bob and QBERopt are
neglected.
FIG. 12. Typical system for quantum cryptography using
polarization coding (LD: laser diode, BS: beamsplitter, F:
neutral density filter, PBS: polarizing beam splitter, λ/2: half
waveplate, APD: avalanche photodiode).
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FIG. 13. Geneva and Lake Geneva. The Swisscom optical
fiber cable used for quantum cryptography experiments runs
under the lake between the town of Nyon, about 23 km north
of Geneva, and the centre of the city.
FIG. 14. Conceptual interferometric set-up for quantum
cryptography using an optical fiber Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter (LD: laser diode, PM: phase modulator, APD: avalanche
photodiode).
FIG. 15. Poincare´ sphere representation of two-levels quan-
tum states generated by two-paths interferometers. The
states generated by an interferometer where the first coupler
is replaced by a switch correspond to the poles. Those gener-
ated with a symetrical beamsplitter are on the equator. The
azimuth indicates the phase between the two paths.
FIG. 16. Double Mach-Zehnder implementation of an in-
terferometric system for quantum cryptography (LD: laser
diode, PM: phase modulator, APD: avalanche photodiode).
The inset represents the temporal count distribution recorded
as a function of the time passed since the emission of the pulse
by Alice. Interference is observed in the central peak.
FIG. 17. Evolution of the polarization state of a light pulse
represented on the Poincare´ sphere over a round trip propa-
gation along an optical fiber terminated by a Faraday mirror.
FIG. 18. Self-aligned “Plug & Play” system (LD: laser
diode, APD: avalanche photodiode, Ci: fiber coupler, PMj :
phase modulator, PBS: polarizing beamsplitter, DL: optical
delay line, FM: Faraday mirror, DA: classical detector).
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FIG. 19. Implementation of sideband modulation (LD:
laser diode, A: attenuator, PMi: optical phase modulator,
Φj : electronic phase controller, RFOk: radio frequency oscil-
lator, FP: Fabry-Perot filter, APD: avalanche photodiode).
FIG. 20. Multi-users implementation of quantum cryptog-
raphy with one Alice connected to three Bobs by optical
fibers. The photons sent by Alice randomly choose to go to
one or the other Bob at a coupler.
FIG. 21. Typical system for quantum cryptography ex-
ploiting photon pairs entangled in polarization (PR: active
polarization rotator, PBS: polarizing beamsplitter, APD:
avalanche photodiode).
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FIG. 22. Principle of phase coding quantum cryptography
using energy-time entangled photons pairs.
FIG. 23. System for phase-coding entanglement based
quantum cryptography (APD: avalanche photodiode). The
photons choose their bases randomly at Alice and Bob’s cou-
plers.
FIG. 24. Quantum cryptography system exploiting pho-
tons entangled in energy-time and active basis choice. Note
the similarity with the faint laser double Mach-Zehnder im-
plementation depicted in Fig. 16.
FIG. 25. Schematic diagram of the first system designed
and optimized for long distance quantum cryptography and
exploiting phase coding of entangled photons.
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FIG. 26. Schematics of quantum cryptography using en-
tangled photons phase-time coding.
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FIG. 27. Poincare´ representation of the BB84 states and
the intermediate basis, also known as the Breidbart basis,
that can be used by Eve.
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FIG. 28. Eavesdropping on a quantum channel. Eve ex-
tracts information out of the quantum channel between Alice
and Bob at the cost of introducing noise into that channel.
FIG. 29. Poincare´ representation of the BB84 states in the
event of a symmetrical attack. The state received by Bob after
the interaction of Eve’s probe is related to the one sent by
Alice by a simple shrinking factor. When the unitary operator
U entangles the qubit and Eve’s probe, Bob’s state (eq. 46)
is mixed and is represented by a point inside the Poincare´
sphere.
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FIG. 30. Eve and Bob information versus the QBER, here
plotted for incoherent eavesdropping on the 4-state protocol.
For QBERs below QBER0, Bob has more information than
Eve and secret-key agreement can be achieved using classical
error correction and privacy amplification. These can, in prin-
ciple, be implemented using only 1-way communication. The
secret-key rate can be as large as the information differences.
For QBERs above QBER0 (≡ D0), Bob has a disadvantage
with respect to Eve. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob can apply
quantum privacy amplification up to the QBER correspond-
ing to the intercept-resend eavesdropping strategies, IR4 and
IR6 for the 4-state and 6-state protocols, respectively. Alter-
natively, they can apply a classical protocol called advantage
distillation which is effective precisely up to the same maxi-
mal QBER IR4 and IR6. Both the quantum and the classical
protocols require then 2-way communication. Note that for
the eavesdropping strategy optimal from Eve’ Shannon point
of view on the 4-state protocol, QBER0 correspond precisely
to the noise threshold above which a Bell inequality can no
longer be violated.
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FIG. 31. Intuitive illustration of theorem 1. The initial
situation is depicted in a). During the 1-way public discussion
phase of the protocol Eve receives as much information as
Bob, the initial information difference δ thus remains. After
error correction, Bob’s information equals 1, as illustrated on
b). After privacy amplification Eve’s information is zero. In
c) Bob has replaced all bits to be disregarded by random bits.
Hence the key has still the original length, but his information
has decreased. Finally, removing the random bits, the key is
shortened to the initial information difference, see d). Bob
has full information on this final key, while Eve has none.
FIG. 32. Realistic beamsplitter attack. Eve stops all
pulses. The two photon pulses have a 50% probability to
be analyzed by the same analyzer. If this analyzer is compat-
ible with the state prepared by Alice, then both photon are
detected at the same outcome; if not there is a 50% chance
that they are detected at the same outcome. Hence, there
is a probability of 3/8 that Eve detects both photons at the
same outcome. In such a case, and only in such a case, she
resends a photon to Bob. In 2/3 of these cases she introduces
no errors since she identified the correct state and gets full
information; in the remaining cases she has a probability 1/2
to introduce an error and gains no information. The total
QBER is thus 1/6 and Eve’s information gain 2/3.
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